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THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE INTERNET:  
A SYMPOSIUM FOR JOHN PERRY BARLOW1 
JAMES BOYLE† 
 John Perry Barlow passed away on Feb 7th, 2018.  John Perry’s 
name is generally followed by a long list of qualities: poet, lyricist, 
rancher, civil libertarian, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, teller-of-stories, organizer of parties, bringer of light.  Good 
friend.  Certainly he was all of these.  The picture above gives you some 
sense of his personality.  But he was also the author of two influential 
essays in the very early days of the World Wide Web—A Declaration of 
the Independence of Cyberspace2 and Selling Wine Without Bottles: The 
Economy of Mind on the Global Net.3   
 Written in 1996, A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace declared the moral and legal independence of the online 
world.  Its tone, both hopeful and defiant, can be captured from this brief 
excerpt:   
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh 
and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On 
behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are 
not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.  
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, 
so I address you with no greater authority than that with which 
liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are 
building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to 
impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess 
any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.  
 
1 This article is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution, Non 
Commercial, Sharealike license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
sa/3.0/.   
† William Neal Reynolds Professor of Law, Duke Law School 
2 Originally published as John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence 
of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER. FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), 
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.  The essay can also be found in 
this volume at 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5 (2019). 
3 Originally published as John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED 
(Mar. 1, 1994), https://www.wired.com/1994/03/economy-ideas/. The essay can 
also be found in this volume at 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8 (2019) (reprinted 
from John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on 
the Global Net, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/pages/selling-
wine-without-bottles-economy-mind-global-net).  
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. . . . 
You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation, 
nor did you create the wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know 
our culture, our ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide 
our society more order than could be obtained by any of your 
impositions.  
You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. 
You use this claim as an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of 
these problems don’t exist. Where there are real conflicts, where 
there are wrongs, we will identify them and address them by our 
means. We are forming our own Social Contract. This governance 
will arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our 
world is different.  
. . . . 
We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or 
prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or 
station of birth.  
We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express 
his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being 
coerced into silence or conformity.  
Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, 
movement, and context do not apply to us. They are all based on 
matter, and there is no matter here.4 
 Selling Wine Without Bottles had been written for WIRED in 
1994 under the title The Economy of Ideas.  It asked how the creative 
economy and its legal and ethical superstructure—particularly 
intellectual property—would fare in this new context.  Barlow makes 
many predictions—including the rise of encryption as a central feature of 
the economy, an increased primacy of viewpoint, voice and timeliness to 
online experience, and the difficulties of creative people getting paid in 
the digital world.  But he also makes bold claims about what will happen 
to intellectual property. 
The riddle is this: if our property can be infinitely reproduced 
and instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost, 
without our knowledge, without its even leaving our possession, 
how can we protect it? How are we going to get paid for the work 
we do with our minds? And, if we can’t get paid, what will assure 
the continued creation and distribution of such work?  
 
4 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 18 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5, 5–6 (2019).  
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Since we don’t have a solution to what is a profoundly new 
kind of challenge, and are apparently unable to delay the galloping 
digitization of everything not obstinately physical, we are sailing 
into the future on a sinking ship.  
This vessel, the accumulated canon of copyright and patent law, 
was developed to convey forms and methods of expression entirely 
different from the vaporous cargo it is now being asked to carry. It 
is leaking as much from within as without.  
Legal efforts to keep the old boat floating are taking three 
forms: a frenzy of deck chair rearrangement, stern warnings to the 
passengers that if she goes down, they will face harsh criminal 
penalties, and serene, glassy-eyed denial.5 
 Versions of the Internet date back to the 1950’s but the World 
Wide Web is of much more recent provenance.  Histories date its 
“invention” by Tim Berners-Lee to 1989, but the network as we know it 
did not have any real public manifestation until late 1991 or 1992.  These 
essays, in other words, are from its very first days.  How do they stand up 
today, more than 20 years later?  To be sure, John Perry was far from the 
only internet visionary.  Others, including some of the people writing in 
this volume, tried their own hand at it and offered perspectives that 
brought in academic rigor, interdisciplinary insight and complex legal 
analysis.  But for many of us, these essays started a conversation.  Where 
is that conversation now?  Are Barlow’s visions hopelessly outdated or, 
worse still, discredited by the digital evils we now know so well—from 
YouTube comment trolls to privacy-invading social networks to hackers 
attempting to subvert elections?  There are arguments both ways.  To 
quote from Cindy Cohn, who also writes in this volume: 
Barlow was sometimes held up as a straw man for a kind of naive 
techno-utopianism that believed that the Internet could solve all of 
humanity’s problems without causing any more. As someone who 
spent the past 27 years working with him at EFF, I can say that 
nothing could be further from the truth. Barlow knew that new 
technology could create and empower evil as much as it could 
create and empower good. He made a conscious decision to focus 
on the latter: “I knew it’s also true that a good way to invent the 
future is to predict it. So I predicted Utopia, hoping to give Liberty a 
 
5 John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the 
Global Net, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, 8–9 (2019).  
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running start before the laws of Moore and Metcalfe delivered up 
what Ed Snowden now correctly calls ‘turn-key totalitarianism.’”6 
 Rather than offer a simple Festschrift for Barlow, this 
symposium uses those two essays as the jumping off point for a 
reflection on the current state of the digital world.  They marked a 
particular moment in time and space.  How far from that moment, from 
those hopes and fears, are we now?  What mistakes did we make?  What 
opportunities did we grasp or miss?  In an online environment dominated 
by closed and controlled apps rather than the open web, on a web without 
a guarantee of net neutrality, with many global citizens having their 
experiences defined by a monopolistic telecom, or a government-
imposed Great Firewall of China, is it even worth our breath to talk about 
a “World Wide Web” anymore?  What will we wish we had worried 
about, or hoped for, in our digital environment when another 20 years 
has passed?  The distinguished contributors—and it is not going too far 
to say their work has set the terms of the legal and policy debate we are 
now in—have each agreed to write a short essay offering their own 
answers.   
 The articles gathered here do not seek to canonize John Perry or 
praise his ideas where our contributors believe they were simplistic or 
flawed: he would have found that offensive.  Worse, he would have 
found it boring.  There is criticism here as well as praise.  But, in their 
own way, these remarkable essays offer a memorial to his work, insight 
and humor, to his contribution to our world.  
 We are all the poorer for losing him.  I miss him.   
 
6 Cindy Cohn, John Perry Barlow, Internet Pioneer, 1947–2018, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/02/john-
perry-barlow-internet-pioneer-1947-2018.  
A DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF 
CYBERSPACE1 
JOHN PERRY BARLOW  
 Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh 
and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of 
the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome 
among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. 
 We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, 
so I address you with no greater authority than that with which liberty 
itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to 
be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You 
have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of 
enforcement we have true reason to fear. 
 Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the 
governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite 
you. You do not know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does 
not lie within your borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though 
it were a public construction project. You cannot. It is an act of nature 
and it grows itself through our collective actions. 
 You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation, 
nor did you create the wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know our 
culture, our ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our 
society more order than could be obtained by any of your impositions. 
 You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. 
You use this claim as an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of these 
problems don’t exist. Where there are real conflicts, where there are 
wrongs, we will identify them and address them by our means. We are 
forming our own Social Contract. This governance will arise according 
to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our world is different. 
 Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought 
itself, arrayed like a standing wave in the web of our communications. 
Ours is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where 
bodies live. 
																																																								
1 Reprinted from John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), 
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.   
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 We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or 
prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of 
birth. 
 We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express 
his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced 
into silence or conformity. 
 Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, 
and context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is 
no matter here. 
 Our identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot obtain 
order by physical coercion. We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-
interest, and the commonweal, our governance will emerge. Our 
identities may be distributed across many of your jurisdictions. The only 
law that all our constituent cultures would generally recognize is the 
Golden Rule. We hope we will be able to build our particular solutions 
on that basis. But we cannot accept the solutions you are attempting to 
impose. 
 In the United States, you have today created a law, the 
Telecommunications Reform Act, which repudiates your own 
Constitution and insults the dreams of Jefferson, Washington, Mill, 
Madison, DeToqueville, and Brandeis. These dreams must now be born 
anew in us. 
 You are terrified of your own children, since they are natives in a 
world where you will always be immigrants. Because you fear them, you 
entrust your bureaucracies with the parental responsibilities you are too 
cowardly to confront yourselves. In our world, all the sentiments and 
expressions of humanity, from the debasing to the angelic, are parts of a 
seamless whole, the global conversation of bits. We cannot separate the 
air that chokes from the air upon which wings beat. 
 In China, Germany, France, Russia, Singapore, Italy and the 
United States, you are trying to ward off the virus of liberty by erecting 
guard posts at the frontiers of Cyberspace. These may keep out the 
contagion for a small time, but they will not work in a world that will 
soon be blanketed in bit-bearing media. 
 Your increasingly obsolete information industries would 
perpetuate themselves by proposing laws, in America and elsewhere, that 
claim to own speech itself throughout the world. These laws would 
declare ideas to be another industrial product, no more noble than pig 
iron. In our world, whatever the human mind may create can be 
reproduced and distributed infinitely at no cost. The global conveyance 
of thought no longer requires your factories to accomplish. 
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INDEPENDENCE OF CYBERSPACE		
These increasingly hostile and colonial measures place us in the 
same position as those previous lovers of freedom and self-determination 
who had to reject the authorities of distant, uninformed powers. We must 
declare our virtual selves immune to your sovereignty, even as we 
continue to consent to your rule over our bodies. We will spread 
ourselves across the Planet so that no one can arrest our thoughts. 
 We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it 
be more humane and fair than the world your governments have made 
before. 	
	 	 		
	 	 		
SELLING WINE WITHOUT BOTTLES: THE 
ECONOMY OF MIND ON THE GLOBAL NET1 
JOHN PERRY BARLOW  
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of 
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an 
idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he 
keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into 
the possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess 
himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the 
less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives 
an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening 
mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without 
darkening me. That ideas should freely spread from one to another 
over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and 
improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and 
benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, 
expansible over all space, without lessening their density at any 
point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our 
physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive 
appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of 
property.  
–Thomas Jefferson  
 Throughout the time I’ve been groping around Cyberspace, there 
has remained unsolved an immense conundrum which seems to be at the 
root of nearly every legal, ethical, governmental, and social vexation to 
be found in the Virtual World. I refer to the problem of digitized 
property.  
 The riddle is this: if our property can be infinitely reproduced 
and instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost, without 
our knowledge, without its even leaving our possession, how can we 
protect it? How are we going to get paid for the work we do with our 
minds? And, if we can’t get paid, what will assure the continued creation 
and distribution of such work?  
 Since we don’t have a solution to what is a profoundly new kind 
of challenge, and are apparently unable to delay the galloping 																																																								
1 Reprinted from John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The 
Economy of the Mind on the Global Net, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/pages/selling-wine-without-bottles-economy-mind-global-
net.  
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digitization of everything not obstinately physical, we are sailing into the 
future on a sinking ship.  
 This vessel, the accumulated canon of copyright and patent law, 
was developed to convey forms and methods of expression entirely 
different from the vaporous cargo it is now being asked to carry. It is 
leaking as much from within as without.  
 Legal efforts to keep the old boat floating are taking three forms: 
a frenzy of deck chair rearrangement, stern warnings to the passengers 
that if she goes down, they will face harsh criminal penalties, and serene, 
glassy-eyed denial.  
 Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or 
expanded to contain the gasses of digitized expression any more than real 
estate law might be revised to cover the allocation of broadcasting 
spectrum. (Which, in fact, rather resembles what is being attempted 
here.) We will need to develop an entirely new set of methods as befits 
this entirely new set of circumstances.  
 Most of the people who actually create soft property––the 
programmers, hackers, and Net surfers––already know this. 
Unfortunately, neither the companies they work for nor the lawyers these 
companies hire have enough direct experience with immaterial goods to 
understand why they are so problematic. They are proceeding as though 
the old laws can somehow be made to work, either by grotesque 
expansion or by force. They are wrong.  
 The source of this conundrum is as simple as its solution is 
complex. Digital technology is detaching information from the physical 
plane, where property law of all sorts has always found definition.  
 Throughout the history of copyrights and patents, the proprietary 
assertions of thinkers have been focused not on their ideas but on the 
expression of those ideas. The ideas themselves, as well as facts about 
the phenomena of the world, were considered to be the collective 
property of humanity. One could claim franchise, in the case of 
copyright, on the precise turn of phrase used to convey a particular idea 
or the order in which facts were presented.  
 The point at which this franchise was imposed was that moment 
when the “word became flesh” by departing the mind of its originator 
and entering some physical object, whether book or widget. The 
subsequent arrival of other commercial media besides books didn’t alter 
the legal importance of this moment. Law protected expression and, with 
few (and recent) exceptions, to express was to make physical.  
 Protecting physical expression had the force of convenience on 
its side. Copyright worked well because, Gutenberg notwithstanding, it 
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was hard to make a book. Furthermore, books froze their contents into a 
condition which was as challenging to alter as it was to reproduce. 
Counterfeiting or distributing counterfeit volumes were obvious and 
visible activities, easy enough to catch somebody in the act of doing. 
Finally, unlike unbounded words or images, books had material surfaces 
to which one could attach copyright notices, publisher’s marques, and 
price tags.  
 Mental to physical conversion was even more central to patent. 
A patent, until recently, was either a description of the form into which 
materials were to be rendered in the service of some purpose or a 
description of the process by which rendition occurred. In either case, the 
conceptual heart of patent was the material result. If no purposeful object 
could be rendered due to some material limitation, the patent was 
rejected. Neither a Klein bottle nor a shovel made of silk could be 
patented. It had to be a thing and the thing had to work.  
 Thus the rights of invention and authorship adhered to activities 
in the physical world. One didn’t get paid for ideas but for the ability to 
deliver them into reality. For all practical purposes, the value was in the 
conveyance and not the thought conveyed.  
 In other words, the bottle was protected, not the wine.  
 Now, as information enters Cyberspace, the native home of 
Mind, these bottles are vanishing. With the advent of digitization, it is 
now possible to replace all previous information storage forms with one 
meta-bottle: complex––and highly liquid––patterns of ones and zeros.  
 Even the physical/digital bottles to which we’ve become 
accustomed, floppy disks, CD-ROM’s, and other discrete, shrink-
wrappable bit-packages, will disappear as all computers jack into the 
global Net. While the Internet may never include every single CPU on 
the planet, it is more than doubling every year and can be expected to 
become the principal medium of information conveyance if, eventually, 
the only one.  
 Once that has happened, all the goods of the Information Age––
all of the expressions once contained in books or film strips or records or 
newsletters––will exist either as pure thought or something very much 
like thought: voltage conditions darting around the Net at the speed of 
light, in conditions which one might behold in effect, as glowing pixels 
or transmitted sounds, but never touch or claim to “own” in the old sense 
of the word.  
 Some might argue that information will still require some 
physical manifestation, such as its magnetic existence on the titanic hard 
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disks of distant servers, but these are bottles which have no 
macroscopically discrete or personally meaningful form.  
 Some will also argue that we have been dealing with unbottled 
expression since the advent of radio, and they would be right. But for 
most of the history of broadcast, there was no convenient way to capture 
soft goods from the electromagnetic ether and reproduce them in 
anything like the quality available in commercial packages. Only 
recently has this changed and little has been done legally or technically 
to address the change.  
 Generally, the issue of consumer payment for broadcast products 
was irrelevant. The consumers themselves were the product. Broadcast 
media were supported either by selling the attention of their audience to 
advertisers, using government to assess payment through taxes, or the 
whining mendicancy of annual donor drives.  
 All of the broadcast support models are flawed. Support either 
by advertisers or government has almost invariably tainted the purity of 
the goods delivered. Besides, direct marketing is gradually killing the 
advertiser support model anyway.  
 Broadcast media gave us another payment method for a virtual 
product in the royalties which broadcasters pay songwriters through such 
organizations as ASCAP and BMI. But, as a member of ASCAP, I can 
assure you this is not a model which we should emulate. The monitoring 
methods are wildly approximate. There is no parallel system of 
accounting in the revenue stream. It doesn’t really work. Honest.  
 In any case, without our old methods of physically defining the 
expression of ideas, and in the absence of successful new models for 
non-physical transaction, we simply don’t know how to assure reliable 
payment for mental works. To make matters worse, this comes at a time 
when the human mind is replacing sunlight and mineral deposits as the 
principal source of new wealth.  
 Furthermore, the increasing difficulty of enforcing existing 
copyright and patent laws is already placing in peril the ultimate source 
of intellectual property, the free exchange of ideas.  
 That is, when the primary articles of commerce in a society look 
so much like speech as to be indistinguishable from it, and when the 
traditional methods of protecting their ownership have become 
ineffectual, attempting to fix the problem with broader and more 
vigorous enforcement will inevitably threaten freedom of speech.  
 The greatest constraint on your future liberties may come not 
from government but from corporate legal departments laboring to 
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protect by force what can no longer be protected by practical efficiency 
or general social consent.  
 Furthermore, when Jefferson and his fellow creatures of The 
Enlightenment designed the system which became American copyright 
law, their primary objective was assuring the widespread distribution of 
thought, not profit. Profit was the fuel which would carry ideas into the 
libraries and minds of their new republic. Libraries would purchase 
books, thus rewarding the authors for their work in assembling ideas, 
which otherwise “incapable of confinement” would then become freely 
available to the public. But what is the role of libraries in the absence of 
books? How does society now pay for the distribution of ideas if not by 
charging for the ideas themselves?  
 Additionally complicating the matter is the fact that along with 
the physical bottles in which intellectual property protection has resided, 
digital technology is also erasing the legal jurisdictions of the physical 
world, and replacing them with the unbounded and perhaps permanently 
lawless seas of Cyberspace.  
 In Cyberspace, there are not only no national or local boundaries 
to contain the scene of a crime and determine the method of its 
prosecution, there are no clear cultural agreements on what a crime might 
be. Unresolved and basic differences between European and Asian 
cultural assumptions about intellectual property can only be exacerbated 
in a region where many transactions are taking place in both hemispheres 
and yet, somehow, in neither.  
 Even in the most local of digital conditions, jurisdiction and 
responsibility are hard to assess. A group of music publishers filed suit 
against Compuserve this fall for it having allowed its users to upload 
musical compositions into areas where other users might get them. But 
since Compuserve cannot practically exercise much control over the 
flood of bits which pass between its subscribers, it probably shouldn’t be 
held responsible for unlawfully “publishing” these works.  
 Notions of property, value, ownership, and the nature of wealth 
itself are changing more fundamentally than at any time since the 
Sumerians first poked cuneiform into wet clay and called it stored grain. 
Only a very few people are aware of the enormity of this shift and fewer 
of them are lawyers or public officials.  
 Those who do see these changes must prepare responses for the 
legal and social confusion which will erupt as efforts to protect new 
forms of property with old methods become more obviously futile, and, 
as a consequence, more adamant.  
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I. FROM SWORDS TO WRITS TO BITS 
 Humanity now seems bent on creating a world economy 
primarily based on goods which take no material form. In doing so, we 
may be eliminating any predictable connection between creators and a 
fair reward for the utility or pleasure others may find in their works.  
 Without that connection, and without a fundamental change in 
consciousness to accommodate its loss, we are building our future on 
furor, litigation, and institutionalized evasion of payment except in 
response to raw force. We may return to the Bad Old Days of property.  
 Throughout the darker parts of human history, the possession 
and distribution of property was a largely military matter. “Ownership” 
was assured those with the nastiest tools, whether fists or armies, and the 
most resolute will to use them. Property was the divine right of thugs.  
 By the turn of the First Millennium A.D., the emergence of 
merchant classes and landed gentry forced the development of ethical 
understandings for the resolution of property disputes. In the late Middle 
Ages, enlightened rulers like England’s Henry II began to codify this 
unwritten “common law” into recorded canons. These laws were local, 
but this didn’t matter much as they were primarily directed at real estate, 
a form of property which is local by definition. And which, as the name 
implied, was very real.  
 This continued to be the case as long as the origin of wealth was 
agricultural, but with dawning of the Industrial Revolution, humanity 
began to focus as much on means as ends. Tools acquired a new social 
value and, thanks to their own development, it became possible to 
duplicate and distribute them in quantity.  
 To encourage their invention, copyright and patent law were 
developed in most western countries. These laws were devoted to the 
delicate task of getting mental creations into the world where they could 
be used––and enter the minds of others––while assuring their inventors 
compensation for the value of their use. And, as previously stated, the 
systems of both law and practice which grew up around that task were 
based on physical expression.  
 Since it is now possible to convey ideas from one mind to 
another without ever making them physical, we are now claiming to own 
ideas themselves and not merely their expression. And since it is likewise 
now possible to create useful tools which never take physical form, we 
have taken to patenting abstractions, sequences of virtual events, and 
mathematical formulae––the most un-real estate imaginable.  
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 In certain areas, this leaves rights of ownership in such an 
ambiguous condition that once again property adheres to those who can 
muster the largest armies. The only difference is that this time the armies 
consist of lawyers.  
 Threatening their opponents with the endless Purgatory of 
litigation, over which some might prefer death itself, they assert claim to 
any thought which might have entered another cranium within the 
collective body of the corporations they serve. They act as though these 
ideas appeared in splendid detachment from all previous human thought. 
And they pretend that thinking about a product is somehow as good as 
manufacturing, distributing, and selling it.  
 What was previously considered a common human resource, 
distributed among the minds and libraries of the world, as well as the 
phenomena of nature herself, is now being fenced and deeded. It is as 
though a new class of enterprise had arisen which claimed to own air and 
water.  
 What is to be done? While there is a certain grim fun to be had in 
it, dancing on the grave of copyright and patent will solve little, 
especially when so few are willing to admit that the occupant of this 
grave is even deceased and are trying to up by force what can no longer 
be upheld by popular consent.  
 The legalists, desperate over their slipping grip, are vigorously 
trying to extend it. Indeed, the United States and other proponents of 
GATT are making adherence to our moribund systems of intellectual 
property protection a condition of membership in the marketplace of 
nations. For example, China will be denied Most Favored nation trading 
status unless they agree to uphold a set of culturally alien principles 
which are no longer even sensibly applicable in their country of origin.  
 In a more perfect world, we’d be wise to declare a moratorium 
on litigation, legislation, and international treaties in this area until we 
had a clearer sense of the terms and conditions of enterprise in 
Cyberspace. Ideally, laws ratify already developed social consensus. 
They are less the Social Contract itself than a series of memoranda 
expressing a collective intent which has emerged out of many millions of 
human interactions.  
 Humans have not inhabited Cyberspace long enough or in 
sufficient diversity to have developed a Social Contract which conforms 
to the strange new conditions of that world. Laws developed prior to 
consensus usually serve the already established few who can get them 
passed and not society as a whole.  
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 To the extent that either law or established social practice exists 
in this area, they are already in dangerous disagreement. The laws 
regarding unlicensed reproduction of commercial software are clear and 
stern . . . and rarely observed. Software piracy laws are so practically 
unenforceable and breaking them has become so socially acceptable that 
only a thin minority appears compelled, either by fear or conscience, to 
obey them.  
 I sometimes give speeches on this subject, and I always ask how 
many people in the audience can honestly claim to have no unauthorized 
software on their hard disks. I’ve never seen more than ten percent of the 
hands go up.  
 Whenever there is such profound divergence between the law 
and social practice, it is not society that adapts. And, against the swift 
tide of custom, the Software Publishers’ current practice of hanging a 
few visible scapegoats is so obviously capricious as to only further 
diminish respect for the law.  
 Part of the widespread popular disregard for commercial 
software copyrights stems from a legislative failure to understand the 
conditions into which it was inserted. To assume that systems of law 
based in the physical world will serve in an environment which is as 
fundamentally different as Cyberspace is a folly for which everyone 
doing business in the future will pay.  
 As I will discuss in the next segment, unbounded intellectual 
property is very different from physical property and can no longer be 
protected as though these differences did not exist. For example, if we 
continue to assume that value is based on scarcity, as it is with regard to 
physical objects, we will create laws which are precisely contrary to the 
nature of information, which may, in many cases, increase in value with 
distribution.  
 The large, legally risk-averse institutions most likely to play by 
the old rules will suffer for their compliance. The more lawyers, guns, 
and money they invest in either protecting their rights or subverting those 
of their opponents, the more commercial competition will resemble the 
Kwakiutl Potlatch Ceremony, in which adversaries competed by 
destroying their own possessions. Their ability to produce new 
technology will simply grind to a halt as every move they make drives 
them deeper into a tar pit of courtroom warfare.  
 Faith in law will not be an effective strategy for high tech 
companies. Law adapts by continuous increments and at a pace second 
only to geology in its stateliness. Technology advances in the lunging 
jerks, like the punctuation of biological evolution grotesquely 
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accelerated. Real world conditions will continue to change at a blinding 
pace, and the law will get further behind, more profoundly confused. 
This mismatch is permanent.  
 Promising economies based on purely digital products will either 
be born in a state of paralysis, as appears to be the case with multimedia, 
or continue in a brave and willful refusal by their owners to play the 
ownership game at all.  
 In the United States one can already see a parallel economy 
developing, mostly among small fast moving enterprises who protect 
their ideas by getting into the marketplace quicker than their larger 
competitors who base their protection on fear and litigation.  
 Perhaps those who are part of the problem will simply quarantine 
themselves in court while those who are part of the solution will create a 
new society based, at first, on piracy and freebooting. It may well be that 
when the current system of intellectual property law has collapsed, as 
seems inevitable, that no new legal structure will arise in its place.  
 But something will happen. After all, people do business. When 
a currency becomes meaningless, business is done in barter. When 
societies develop outside the law, they develop their own unwritten 
codes, practices, and ethical systems. While technology may undo law, 
technology offers methods for restoring creative rights.  
II. A TAXONOMY OF INFORMATION 
 It seems to me that the most productive thing to do now is to 
look hard into the true nature of what we’re trying to protect. How much 
do we really know about information and its natural behaviors?  
 What are the essential characteristics of unbounded creation? 
How does it differ from previous forms of property? How many of our 
assumptions about it have actually been about its containers rather than 
their mysterious contents? What are its different species and how does 
each of them lend itself to control? What technologies will be useful in 
creating new virtual bottles to replace the old physical ones?  
 Of course, information is, by its nature, intangible and hard to 
define. Like other such deep phenomena as light or matter, it is a natural 
host to paradox. And as it is most helpful to understand light as being 
both a particle and a wave, an understanding of information may emerge 
in the abstract congruence of its several different properties which might 
be described by the following three statements:  
 
 
17                      SELLING WINE WITHOUT BOTTLES:  [Vol. 18 														THE ECONOMY OF MIND ON THE GLOBAL NET	
	 	 		
• Information is an activity.  
• Information is a life form.  
• Information is a relationship.  
In the following section, I will examine each of these.  
A. INFORMATION IS AN ACTIVITY  
1. Information Is a Verb, Not a Noun 
Freed of its containers, information is obviously not a thing. In 
fact, it is something which happens in the field of interaction between 
minds or objects or other pieces of information.  
Gregory Bateson, expanding on the information theory of Claude 
Shannon, said, “Information is a difference which makes a difference.” 
Thus, information only really exists in the Δ	[delta]. The making of that 
difference is an activity within a relationship. Information is an action 
which occupies time rather than a state of being which occupies physical 
space, as is the case with hard goods. It is the pitch, not the baseball, the 
dance, not the dancer. 	
2. Information Is Experienced, Not Possessed  
Even when it has been encapsulated in some static form like a 
book or a hard disk, information is still something which happens to you 
as you mentally decompress it from its storage code. But, whether it’s 
running at gigabits per second or words per minute, the actual decoding 
is a process which must be performed by and upon a mind, a process 
which must take place in time.  
There was a cartoon in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists a few 
years ago which illustrated this point beautifully. In the drawing, a 
holdup man trains his gun on the sort of bespectacled fellow you’d figure 
might have a lot of information stored in his head. “Quick,” orders the 
bandit, “Give me all your ideas.”  
3. Information Has to Move  
Sharks are said to die of suffocation if they stop swimming, and 
the same is nearly true of information. Information which isn’t moving 
ceases to exist as anything but potential . . . at least until it is allowed to 
move again. For this reason, the practice of information hoarding, 
common in bureaucracies, is an especially wrong-headed artifact of 
physically-based value systems.  
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4. Information Is Conveyed by Propagation, Not Distribution  
The way in which information spreads is also very different from 
the distribution of physical goods. It moves more like something from 
nature than from a factory. It can concatenate like falling dominos or 
grow in the usual fractal lattice, like frost spreading on a window, but it 
cannot be shipped around like widgets, except to the extent that it can be 
contained in them. It doesn’t simply move on. It leaves a trail of itself 
everywhere it’s been.  
The central economic distinction between information and 
physical property is the ability of information to be transferred without 
leaving the possession of the original owner. If I sell you my horse, I 
can’t ride him after that. If I sell you what I know, we both know it.  
B. INFORMATION IS A LIFE FORM  
1. Information Wants to Be Free 
Stewart Brand is generally credited with this elegant statement of 
the obvious, recognizing both the natural desire of secrets to be told and 
the fact that they might be capable of possessing something like a 
“desire” in the first place.  
English Biologist and Philosopher Richard Dawkins proposed 
the idea of “memes,” self-replicating, patterns of information which 
propagate themselves across the ecologies of mind, saying they were like 
life forms.  
I believe they are life forms in every respect but a basis in the 
carbon atom. They self-reproduce, they interact with their surroundings 
and adapt to them, they mutate, they persist. Like any other life form 
they evolve to fill the possibility spaces of their local environments, 
which are, in this case the surrounding belief systems and cultures of 
their hosts, namely, us.  
Indeed, the sociobiologists like Dawkins make a plausible case 
that carbon-based life forms are information as well, that, as the chicken 
is an egg’s way of making another egg, the entire biological spectacle is 
just the DNA molecule’s means of copying out more information strings 
exactly like itself.  
2. Information Replicates into the Cracks of Possibility  
Like DNA helices, ideas are relentless expansionists, always 
seeking new opportunities for lebensraum. And, as in carbon-based 
nature, the more robust organisms are extremely adept at finding new 
places to live. Thus, just as the common housefly has insinuated itself 
19                      SELLING WINE WITHOUT BOTTLES:  [Vol. 18 														THE ECONOMY OF MIND ON THE GLOBAL NET	
	 	 		
into practically every ecosystem on the planet, so has the meme of “life 
after death” found a niche in most minds, or psycho-ecologies.  
The more universally resonant an idea or image or song, the 
more minds it will enter and remain within. Trying to stop the spread of a 
really robust piece of information is about as easy as keeping killer bees 
South of the Border. The stuff just leaks. 	
3. Information Wants to Change  
If ideas and other interactive patterns of information are indeed 
life forms, they can be expected to evolve constantly into forms which 
will be more perfectly adapted to their surroundings. And, as we see, 
they are doing this all the time.  
But for a long time, our static media, whether carvings in stone, 
ink on paper, or dye on celluloid, have strongly resisted the evolutionary 
impulse, exalting as a consequence the author’s ability to determine the 
finished product. But, as in an oral tradition, digitized information has no 
“final cut.”  
Digital information, unconstrained by packaging, is a continuing 
process more like the metamorphosing tales of prehistory than anything 
which will fit in shrink wrap. From the Neolithic to Gutenberg, 
information was passed on, mouth to ear, changing with every re-telling 
(or re-singing). The stories which once shaped our sense of the world 
didn’t have authoritative versions. They adapted to each culture in which 
they found themselves being told.  
Because there was never a moment when the story was frozen in 
print, the so-called “moral” right of storytellers to keep the tale their own 
was neither protected nor recognized. The story simply passed through 
each of them on its way to the next, where it would assume a different 
form. As we return to continuous information, we can expect the 
importance of authorship to diminish. Creative people may have to 
renew their acquaintance with humility.  
But our system of copyright makes no accommodation whatever 
for expressions which don’t at some point become “fixed” nor for 
cultural expressions which lack a specific author or inventor.  
Jazz improvisation, standup comedy routines, mime 
performances, developing monologues, and unrecorded broadcast 
transmissions all lack the Constitutional requirement of fixation as a 
“writing.” Without being fixed by a point of publication the liquid works 
of the future will all look more like these continuously adapting and 
changing forms and will therefore exist beyond the reach of copyright.  
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Copyright expert Pamela Samuelson tells of having attended a 
conference last year convened around the fact that Western countries 
may legally appropriate the music, designs, and biomedical lore of 
aboriginal people without compensation to their tribe of origin since that 
tribe is not an “author” or “inventor.”  
But soon most information will be generated collaboratively by 
the cyber-tribal hunter-gatherers of Cyberspace. Our arrogant legal 
dismissal of the rights of “primitives” will be back to haunt us soon.  
4. Information Is Perishable  
With the exception of the rare classic, most information is like 
farm produce. Its quality degrades rapidly both over time and in distance 
from the source of production. But even here, value is highly subjective 
and conditional. Yesterday’s papers are quite valuable to the historian. In 
fact, the older they are, the more valuable they become. On the other 
hand, a commodities broker might consider news of an event which is 
more than an hour old to have lost any relevance.  
C. INFORMATION IS A RELATIONSHIP  
1. Meaning Has Value and Is Unique to Each Case  
In most cases, we assign value to information based on its 
meaningfulness. The place where information dwells, the holy moment 
where transmission becomes reception, is a region which has many 
shifting characteristics and flavors depending on the relationship of 
sender and receiver, the depth of their interactivity.  
Each such relationship is unique. Even in cases where the sender 
is a broadcast medium, and no response is returned, the receiver is hardly 
passive. Receiving information is often as creative an act as generating it.  
The value of what is sent depends entirely on the extent to which 
each individual receiver has the receptors . . . shared terminology, 
attention, interest, language, paradigm . . . necessary to render what is 
received meaningful.  
Understanding is a critical element increasingly overlooked in 
the effort to turn information into a commodity. Data may be any set of 
facts, useful or not, intelligible or inscrutable, germane or irrelevant. 
Computers can crank out new data all night long without human help, 
and the results may be offered for sale as information. They may or may 
not actually be so. Only a human being can recognize the meaning which 
separates information from data.  
In fact, information, in the economic sense of the word, consists 
of data which have been passed through a particular human mind and 
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found meaningful within that mental context. One fella’s information is 
all just data to someone else. If you’re an anthropologist, my detailed 
charts of Tasaday kinship patterns might be critical information to you. If 
you’re a banker from Hong Kong, they might barely seem to be data.  
2. Familiarity Has More Value Than Scarcity  
With physical goods, there is a direct correlation between 
scarcity and value. Gold is more valuable than wheat, even though you 
can’t eat it. While this is not always the case, the situation with 
information is usually precisely the reverse. Most soft goods increase in 
value as they become more common. Familiarity is an important asset in 
the world of information. It may often be the case that the best thing you 
can do to raise the demand for your product is to give it away.  
While this has not always worked with shareware, it could be 
argued that there is a connection between the extent to which commercial 
software is pirated and the amount which gets sold. Broadly pirated 
software, such as Lotus 1-2-3 or WordPerfect, becomes a standard and 
benefits from Law of Increasing Returns based on familiarity.  
In regard to my own soft product, rock and roll songs, there is no 
question that the band I write them for, the Grateful Dead, has increased 
its popularity enormously by giving them away. We have been letting 
people tape our concerts since the early seventies, but instead of reducing 
the demand for our product, we are now the largest concert draw in 
America, a fact which is at least in part attributable to the popularity 
generated by those tapes.  
True, I don’t get any royalties on the millions of copies of my 
songs which have been extracted from concerts, but I see no reason to 
complain. The fact is, no one but the Grateful Dead can perform a 
Grateful Dead song, so if you want the experience and not its thin 
projection, you have to buy a ticket from us. In other words, our 
intellectual property protection derives from our being the only real-time 
source of it.  
3. Exclusivity Has Value  
The problem with a model which turns the physical 
scarcity/value ratio on its head is that sometimes the value of information 
is very much based on its scarcity. Exclusive possession of certain facts 
makes them more useful. If everyone knows about conditions which 
might drive a stock price up, the information is valueless.  
But again, the critical factor is usually time. It doesn’t matter if 
this kind of information eventually becomes ubiquitous. What matters is 
being among the first who possess it and act on it. While potent secrets 
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usually don’t stay secret, they may remain so long enough to advance the 
cause of their original holders.  
4. Point of View and Authority Have Value  
In a world of floating realities and contradictory maps, rewards 
will accrue to those commentators whose maps seem to fit their territory 
snugly, based on their ability to yield predictable results for those who 
use them.  
In aesthetic information, whether poetry or rock ‘n’ roll, people 
are willing to buy the new product of an artist, sight-unseen, based on 
their having been delivered a pleasurable experience by previous work.  
Reality is an edit. People are willing to pay for the authority of 
those editors whose filtering point of view seems to fit best. And again, 
point of view is an asset which cannot be stolen or duplicated. No one 
but Esther Dyson sees the world as she does and the handsome fee she 
charges for her newsletter is actually for the privilege of looking at the 
world through her unique eyes.  
5. Time Replaces Space  
In the physical world, value depends heavily on possession, or 
proximity in space. One owns that material which falls inside certain 
dimensional boundaries and the ability to act directly, exclusively, and as 
one wishes upon what falls inside those boundaries is the principal right 
of ownership. And of course there is the relationship between value and 
scarcity, a limitation in space.  
In the virtual world, proximity in time is a value determinant. An 
informational product is generally more valuable the closer the purchaser 
can place himself to the moment of its expression, a limitation in time. 
Many kinds of information degrade rapidly with either time or 
reproduction. Relevance fades as the territory they map changes. Noise is 
introduced and bandwidth lost with passage away from the point where 
the information is first produced. Thus, listening to a Grateful Dead tape 
is hardly the same experience as attending a Grateful Dead concert. The 
closer one can get to the headwaters of an informational stream, the 
better his chances of finding an accurate picture of reality in it. In an era 
of easy reproduction, the informational abstractions of popular 
experiences will propagate out from their source moments to reach 
anyone who’s interested. But it’s easy enough to restrict the real 
experience of the desirable event, whether knock-out punch or guitar 
lick, to those willing to pay for being there.  
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6. The Protection of Execution  
In the hick town I come from, they don’t give you much credit 
for just having ideas. You are judged by what you can make of them. As 
things continue to speed up, I think we see that execution is the best 
protection for those designs which become physical products. Or, as 
Steve Jobs once put it, “Real artists ship.” The big winner is usually the 
one who gets to the market first (and with enough organizational force to 
keep the lead).  
But, as we become fixated upon information commerce, many of 
us seem to think that originality alone is sufficient to convey value, 
deserving, with the right legal assurances, of a steady wage. In fact, the 
best way to protect intellectual property is to act on it. It’s not enough to 
invent and patent, one has to innovate as well. Someone claims to have 
patented the microprocessor before Intel. Maybe so. If he’d actually 
started shipping microprocessors before Intel, his claim would seem far 
less spurious.  
7. Information as Its Own Reward  
It is now a commonplace to say that money is information. With 
the exception of Krugerands, crumpled cab-fare, and the contents of 
those suit-cases which drug lords are reputed to carry, most of the money 
in the informatized world is in ones and zeros. The global money supply 
sloshes around the Net, as fluid as weather. It is also obvious, as I have 
discussed, that information has become as fundamental to the creation of 
modern wealth as land and sunlight once were.  
What is less obvious is the extent to which information is 
acquiring intrinsic value, not as a means to acquisition but as the object 
to be acquired. I suppose this has always been less explicitly the case. In 
politics and academia, potency and information have always been closely 
related.  
However, as we increasingly buy information with money, we 
begin to see that buying information with other information is simple 
economic exchange without the necessity of converting the product into 
and out of currency. This is somewhat challenging for those who like 
clean accounting, since, information theory aside, informational 
exchange rates are too squishy to quantify to the decimal point.  
Nevertheless, most of what a middle class American purchases 
has little to do with survival. We buy beauty, prestige, experience, 
education, and all the obscure pleasures of owning. Many of these things 
can not only be expressed in non-material terms, they can be acquired by 
non-material means.  
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And then there are the inexplicable pleasures of information 
itself, the joys of learning, knowing, and teaching. The strange good 
feeling of information coming into and out of oneself. Playing with ideas 
is a recreation which people must be willing to pay a lot for, given the 
market for books and elective seminars. We’d likely spend even more 
money for such pleasures if there weren’t so many opportunities to pay 
for ideas with other ideas.  
This explains much of the collective “volunteer” work which 
fills the archives, newsgroups, and databases of the Internet. Its denizens 
are not working for “nothing,” as is widely believed. Rather they are 
getting paid in something besides money. It is an economy which 
consists almost entirely of information.  
This may become the dominant form of human trade, and if we 
persist in modeling economics on a strictly monetary basis, we may be 
gravely misled.  
8. Getting Paid in Cyberspace  
How all the foregoing relates to solutions to the crisis in 
intellectual property is something I’ve barely started to wrap my mind 
around. It’s fairly paradigm-warping to look at information through fresh 
eyes––to see how very little it is like pig iron or pork bellies, to imagine 
the tottering travesties of case law we will stack up if we go on treating it 
legally as though it were.  
As I’ve said, I believe these towers of outmoded boilerplate will 
be a smoking heap sometime in the next decade and we mind miners will 
have no choice but to cast our lot with new systems that work.  
I’m not really so gloomy about our prospects as readers of this 
jeremiad so far might conclude. Solutions will emerge. Nature abhors a 
vacuum and so does commerce.  
Indeed, one of the aspects of the electronic frontier which I have 
always found most appealing––and the reason Mitch Kapor and I used 
that phrase in naming our foundation––is the degree to which it 
resembles the 19th Century American West in its natural preference for 
social devices which emerge from it conditions rather than those which 
are imposed from the outside.  
Until the west was fully settled and “civilized” in this century, 
order was established according to an unwritten Code of the West which 
had the fluidity of etiquette rather than the rigidity of law. Ethics were 
more important than rules. Understandings were preferred over laws, 
which were, in any event, largely unenforceable.  
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I believe that law, as we understand it, was developed to protect 
the interests which arose in the two economic “waves” which Alvin 
Toffler accurately identified in The Third Wave. The First Wave was 
agriculturally based and required law to order ownership of the principal 
source of production, land. In the Second Wave, manufacturing became 
the economic mainspring, and the structure of modern law grew around 
the centralized institutions which needed protection for their reserves of 
capital, manpower, and hardware.  
Both of these economic systems required stability. Their laws 
were designed to resist change and to assure some equability of 
distribution within a fairly static social framework. The possibility spaces 
had to be constrained to preserve the predictability necessary to either 
land stewardship or capital formation.  
In the Third Wave we have now entered, information to a large 
extent replaces land, capital, and hardware, and as I have detailed in the 
preceding section, information is most at home in a much more fluid and 
adaptable environment. The Third Wave is likely to bring a fundamental 
shift in the purposes and methods of law which will affect far more than 
simply those statutes which govern intellectual property.  
The “terrain” itself––the architecture of the Net––may come to 
serve many of the purposes which could only be maintained in the past 
by legal imposition. For example, it may be unnecessary to 
constitutionally assure freedom of expression in an environment which, 
in the words of my fellow EFF co-founder John Gilmore, “treats 
censorship as a malfunction” and re-routes proscribed ideas around it.  
Similar natural balancing mechanisms may arise to smooth over 
the social discontinuities which previously required legal intercession to 
set right. On the Net, these differences are more likely to be spanned by a 
continuous spectrum which connects as much as it separates.  
And, despite their fierce grip on the old legal structure, 
companies which trade in information are likely to find that in their 
increasing inability to deal sensibly with technological issues, the courts 
will not produce results which are predictable enough to be supportive of 
long-term enterprise. Every litigation becomes like a game of Russian 
roulette, depending on the depth the presiding judge’s clue-impairment.  
Uncodified or adaptive “law,” while as “fast, loose, and out of 
control” as other emergent forms, is probably more likely to yield 
something like justice at this point. In fact, one can already see in 
development new practices to suit the conditions of virtual commerce. 
The life forms of information are evolving methods to protect their 
continued reproduction.  
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For example, while all the tiny print on a commercial diskette 
envelope punctiliously requires much of those who would open it, there 
are, as I say, few who read those provisos, let alone follow them to the 
letter. And yet, the software business remains a very healthy sector of the 
American economy.  
Why is this? Because people seem to eventually buy the software 
they really use. Once a program becomes central to your work, you want 
the latest version of it, the best support, the actual manuals, all privileges 
which are attached to ownership. Such practical considerations will, in 
the absence of working law, become more and more important in getting 
paid for what might easily be obtained for nothing.  
I do think that some software is being purchased in the service of 
ethics or the abstract awareness that the failure to buy it will result in its 
not being produced any longer, but I’m going to leave those motivators 
aside. While I believe that the failure of law will almost certainly result 
in a compensating re-emergence of ethics as the ordering template of 
society, this is a belief I don’t have room to support here.  
Instead, I think that, as in the case cited above, compensation for 
soft products will be driven primarily by practical considerations, all of 
them consistent with the true properties of digital information, where the 
value lies in it, and how it can be both manipulated and protected by 
technology.  
While the conundrum remains a conundrum, I can begin to see 
the directions from which solutions may emerge, based in part on 
broadening those practical solutions which are already in practice.  
9. Relationship and Its Tools  
I believe one idea is central to understanding liquid commerce: 
Information economics, in the absence of objects, will be based more on 
relationship than possession.  
One existing model for the future conveyance of intellectual 
property is real time performance, a medium currently used only in 
theater, music, lectures, stand-up comedy and pedagogy. I believe the 
concept of performance will expand to include most of the information 
economy from multi-casted soap operas to stock analysis. In these 
instances, commercial exchange will be more like ticket sales to a 
continuous show than the purchase of discrete bundles of that which is 
being shown.  
The other model, of course, is service. The entire professional 
class––doctors, lawyers, consultants, architects, etc.––are already being 
paid directly for their intellectual property. Who needs copyright when 
you’re on a retainer?  
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In fact, this model was applied to much of what is now 
copyrighted until the late 18th Century. Before the industrialization of 
creation, writers, composers, artists, and the like produced their products 
in the private service of patrons. Without objects to distribute in a mass 
market, creative people will return to a condition somewhat like this, 
except that they will serve many patrons, rather than one.  
We can already see the emergence of companies which base 
their existence on supporting and enhancing the soft property they create 
rather than selling it by the shrink-wrapped piece or embedding it in 
widgets.  
Trip Hawkins’ new company for creating and licensing 
multimedia tools, 3DO, is an example of what I’m talking about. 3DO 
doesn’t intend to produce any commercial software or consumer devices. 
Instead, they will act as a kind of private standards setting body, 
mediating among software and device creators who will be their 
licensees. They will provide a point of commonalty for relationships 
between a broad spectrum of entities.  
In any case, whether you think of yourself as a service provider 
or a performer, the future protection of your intellectual property will 
depend on your ability to control your relationship to the market––a 
relationship which will most likely live and grow over a period of time.  
The value of that relationship will reside in the quality of 
performance, the uniqueness of your point of view, the validity of your 
expertise, its relevance to your market, and, underlying everything, the 
ability of that market to access your creative services swiftly, 
conveniently, and interactively.  
10. Interaction and Protection  
Direct interaction will provide a lot of intellectual property 
protection in the future, and, indeed, it already has. No one knows how 
many software pirates have bought legitimate copies of a program after 
calling its publisher for technical support and being asked for some proof 
of purchase, but I would guess the number is very high.  
The same kind of controls will be applicable to “question and 
answer” relationships between authorities (or artists) and those who seek 
their expertise. Newsletters, magazines, and books will be supplemented 
by the ability of their subscribers to ask direct questions of authors.  
Interactivity will be a billable commodity even in the absence of 
authorship. As people move into the Net and increasingly get their 
information directly from its point of production, unfiltered by 
centralized media, they will attempt to develop the same interactive 
ability to probe reality which only experience has provided them in the 
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past. Live access to these distant “eyes and ears” will be much easier to 
cordon than access to static bundles of stored but easily reproducible 
information.  
In most cases, control will be based on restricting access to the 
freshest, highest bandwidth information. It will be a matter of defining 
the ticket, the venue, the performer, and the identity of the ticket holder, 
definitions which I believe will take their forms from technology, not 
law.  
In most cases, the defining technology will be cryptography.  
11. Crypto Bottling  
Cryptography, as I’ve said perhaps too many times, is the 
“material” from which the walls, boundaries––and bottles––of 
Cyberspace will be fashioned.  
Of course there are problems with cryptography or any other 
purely technical method of property protection. It has always appeared to 
me that the more security you hide your goods behind, the more likely 
you are to turn your sanctuary into a target. Having come from a place 
where people leave their keys in their cars and don’t even have keys to 
their houses, I remain convinced that the best obstacle to crime is a 
society with its ethics intact.  
While I admit that this is not the kind of society most of us live 
in, I also believe that a social over-reliance on protection by barricades 
rather than conscience will eventually wither the latter by turning 
intrusion and theft into a sport, rather than a crime. This is already 
occurring in the digital domain as is evident in the activities of computer 
crackers.  
Furthermore, I would argue that initial efforts to protect digital 
copyright by copy protection contributed to the current condition in 
which most otherwise ethical computer users seem morally untroubled 
by their possession of pirated software.  
Instead of cultivating among the newly computerized a sense of 
respect for the work of their fellows, early reliance on copy protection 
led to the subliminal notion that cracking into a software package 
somehow “earned” one the right to use it. Limited not by conscience but 
by technical skill, many soon felt free to do whatever they could get 
away with. This will continue to be a potential liability of the encryption 
of digitized commerce.  
Furthermore, it’s cautionary to remember that copy protection 
was rejected by the market in most areas. Many of the upcoming efforts 
to use cryptography-based protection schemes will probably suffer the 
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same fate. People are not going to tolerate much which makes computers 
harder to use than they already are without any benefit to the user.  
Nevertheless, encryption has already demonstrated a certain 
blunt utility. New subscriptions to various commercial satellite TV 
services sky-rocketed recently after their deployment of more robust 
encryption of their feeds. This, despite a booming backwoods trade in 
black decoder chips conducted by folks who’d look more at home 
running moonshine than cracking code.  
Another obvious problem with encryption as a global solution is 
that once something has been unscrambled by a legitimate licensee, it 
may be openly available to massive reproduction.  
In some instances, reproduction following decryption may not be 
a problem. Many soft products degrade sharply in value with time. It 
may be that the only real interest in some such products will be among 
those who have purchased the keys to immediacy.  
Furthermore, as software becomes more modular and 
distribution moves online, it will begin to metamorphose in direct 
interaction with its user base. Discontinuous upgrades will smooth into a 
constant process of incremental improvement and adaptation, some of it 
man-made and some of it arising through genetic algorithms. Pirated 
copies of software may become too static to have much value to anyone.  
Even in cases such as images, where the information is expected 
to remain fixed, the unencrypted file could still be interwoven with code 
which could continue to protect it by a wide variety of means.  
In most of the schemes I can project, the file would be “alive” 
with permanently embedded software which could “sense” the 
surrounding conditions and interact with them. For example, it might 
contain code which could detect the process of duplication and cause it to 
self-destruct.  
Other methods might give the file the ability to “phone home” 
through the Net to its original owner. The continued integrity of some 
files might require periodic “feeding” with digital cash from their host, 
which they would then relay back to their authors.  
Of course files which possess the independent ability to 
communicate upstream sound uncomfortably like the Morris Internet 
Worm. “Live” files do have a certain viral quality. And serious privacy 
issues would arise if everyone’s computer were packed with digital spies.  
The point is that cryptography will enable a lot of protection 
technologies which will develop rapidly in the obsessive competition 
which has always existed between lock-makers and lock-breakers.  
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But cryptography will not be used simply for making locks. It is 
also at the heart of both digital signatures and the aforementioned digital 
cash, both of which I believe will be central to the future protection of 
intellectual property.  
I believe that the generally acknowledged failure of the 
shareware model in software had less to do with dishonesty than with the 
simple inconvenience of paying for shareware. If the payment process 
can be automated, as digital cash and signature will make possible, I 
believe that soft product creators will reap a much higher return from the 
bread they cast upon the waters of Cyberspace.  
Moreover, they will be spared much of the overhead which 
presently adheres to the marketing, manufacture, sales, and distribution 
of information products, whether those products are computer programs, 
books, CD’s, or motion pictures. This will reduce prices and further 
increase the likelihood of non-compulsory payment.  
But of course there is a fundamental problem with a system 
which requires, through technology, payment for every access to a 
particular expression. It defeats the original Jeffersonian purpose of 
seeing that ideas were available to everyone regardless of their economic 
station. I am not comfortable with a model which will restrict inquiry to 
the wealthy.  
12. An Economy of Verbs  
The future forms and protections of intellectual property are 
densely obscured from the entrance to the Virtual Age. Nevertheless, I 
can make (or reiterate) a few flat statements which I earnestly believe 
won’t look too silly in fifty years.  
• In the absence of the old containers, almost everything we 
think we know about intellectual property is wrong. We are 
going to have to unlearn it. We are going to have to look at 
information as though we’d never seen the stuff before.  
• The protections which we will develop will rely far more 
on ethics and technology than on law.  
• Encryption will be the technical basis for most intellectual 
property protection. (And should, for this and other 
reasons, be made more widely available.)  
• The economy of the future will be based on relationship 
rather than possession. It will be continuous rather than 
sequential.  
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• And finally, in the years to come, most human exchange 
will be virtual rather than physical, consisting not of stuff 
but the stuff of which dreams are made. Our future 
business will be conducted in a world made more of verbs 
than nouns.  
Ojo Caliente, New Mexico, October 1, 1992 
New York, New York, November 6, 1992 
Brookline, Massachusetts, November 8, 1992 
New York, New York, November 15, 1993 
San Francisco, California, November 20, 1993 
Pinedale, Wyoming, November 24–30, 1993 
New York, New York, December 13–14, 1993  
This expression has lived and grown to this point over the time 
period and in the places detailed above. Despite its print publication here, 
I expect it will continue to evolve in liquid form, possibly for years.  
The thoughts in it have not been “mine” alone but have 
assembled themselves in a field of interaction which has existed between 
myself and numerous others, to whom I am grateful. They particularly 
include: Pamela Samuelson, Kevin Kelly, Mitch Kapor, Mike Godwin, 
Stewart Brand, Mike Holderness, Miram Barlow, Danny Hillis, Trip 
Hawkins, and Alvin Toffler.  
However, I should note in honesty that when WIRED sends me a 
check for having temporarily “fixed” it on their pages, I alone will cash it 
. . .  	
IS THE INTERNET OVER?! (AGAIN?)1 
JAMES BOYLE† 
About 30 years ago, in March of 1989, a British man wrote a 
memo to his boss. The memo had the remarkably boring title, 
Information Management: A Proposal. It looked like this2:  
 
1 This article is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution, Non 
Commercial, Sharealike license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
sa/3.0/.   
† William Neal Reynolds Professor of Law, Duke Law School.   
2 Tim Berners-Lee, Information Management: A Proposal, CERN (Mar. 1989),  
http://info.cern.ch/Proposal.html. 
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The memo came back with his boss’s annotation on it. “Vague 
but exciting…”  
Both adjectives were well-chosen. The man was Tim Berners-
Lee. Now Sir Tim Berners-Lee. The proposal? Oh, nothing big. Just the 
World Wide Web. Berners-Lee’s memo was something that started as a 
proposal for information management inside of CERN, the European 
Nuclear Research organization, and became the framework for the World 
Wide Web. You know, those three little letters in your browser bar? 
WWW?  
Dispensing with the cumbersome protocols of the time, Berners-
Lee envisioned a web of information, linked together by a language 
called html (hypertext markup language), a precise geography provided 
by Uniform Resource Identifiers (think the URL’s of web addresses) and 
finally a method of transfer, http (the hypertext transfer protocol that you 
can still see in the address of the sites in your web browser). By 1990 he 
had written each of these protocols.  
I teach at a law school that has world-class faculty and brilliant 
students. Their breadth of learning humbles me on a daily basis. But 
many of them do not understand the network architecture that is so 
central to their lives. Of course, it is not their specialty. Yet they 
understand the basic explanation of anthropogenic climate-change, the 
idea of externalities in economics, the broad strokes of the history of 
civil rights in the United States, the debate about whether minimum 
wages are good for poor workers and the issues raised by the use of 
drones in armed conflict. They fluently invoke the concept of noir 
cinema and make jokes about magical realist fiction when a faculty 
meeting turns bizarre. They are, in short, profoundly well-rounded, 
educated people, knowledgeable beyond their own specialties. But they 
do not really understand the internet or the world wide web. That is a 
shame.  
It is a shame because understanding the most important 
communications network of our time, the network for our culture and 
news and search and flirting and shopping and politics, is central to 
knowing how—or whether—to regulate it. To build on it. To use it. As I 
will try to explain, some of the features of the internet that its critics view 
as its main problems—anonymity, the fact that anyone can connect to the 
internet and say anything, the difficulty of filtering it or managing it, its 
decentralized anarchic governance—are also among its transformative 
and engaging features. It is a shame for us not to understand all this 
because the network that shapes our cognitive world, defines our 
markets, and runs our infrastructure is as important as the rest of the 
things a “well-rounded person” knows about. But it is also a shame 
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because Berners-Lee’s idea was beautiful. It was an idea that a scholar 
would come up with and that a scholar would love. Now it is central to 
our world. Yet somehow it progressed from bizarre novelty to essential 
utility without ever passing through the intermediate stage of public 
comprehension. 
Berners-Lee imagined a republic of ideas built on a vision of 
language. The whole thing had a whiff of Harry Potter magic. To click 
on the hyperlink was to summon its referent. The name was the magical 
command for the presence of the resource, as though every footnote 
animated itself, went to the library and brought you back the relevant 
book. To write a web page was to build a transporter of the mind. The 
link was a reference to the resource, a map to the place where the 
resource was held and a vehicle to take you there. Each new document 
wove the network a little wider and tighter. That’s why they called it the 
world wide web. And its architecture was “distributed.” Anyone could 
build the web—as if we could all wander outside our houses and build 
the Eisenhower freeways of the mind ourselves, draw the maps that 
chronicled those freeways, assemble the cars that traveled along them 
and then construct the libraries, bookstores, shops, coffee houses and red 
light districts to which they journeyed. All done through a decentralized 
process that required neither governmental permission, nor 
authentication of your content—for better or worse. Better and worse. 
The network had no central controller, no authority that must 
authenticate or vet, no central node through which all connections 
passed.  Writing back in 1997, I tried to summarize the attraction of this 
architecture to libertarians, starting with the famous quotation “The Net 
interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.” 
This quote from John Gilmore, one of the founders of the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, has the twin advantages of being pithy and 
technologically accurate. The Internet[’s] . . . distributed 
architecture and its technique of packet switching were designed to 
get messages delivered despite blockages, holes, and malfunctions. 
Imagine the poor censor faced with such a system. There is no 
central exchange to seize and hold; messages actively “seek out” 
alternative routes so that even if one path is blocked another may 
open up. Here was the civil libertarian’s dream: a technology with a 
comparatively low cost of entry to speakers and listeners alike, 
technologically resistant to censorship, yet politically and 
economically important enough that it cannot easily be ignored. The 
Internet offers obvious advantages to the countries, research 
communities, cultures, and companies that use it, but it is extremely 
hard to control the amount and type of information available; access 
is like a tap that only has two settings–“off” and “full.” For 
governments, this has been seen as one of the biggest problems 
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posed by the Internet. To the Internet’s devotees, most of whom 
embrace some variety of libertarianism, the Internet’s structural 
resistance to censorship, or any externally imposed filtration, is “not 
a bug but a feature.”3 
It was not merely the network’s distributed nature or its 
resistance to censorship that attracted attention. It was the degree of 
freedom it gave its users. The network imposed no barriers to what could 
pass over its fibers, so long as that content could be broken down into 
packets. It was based on an “end-to-end architecture.” It imposed no 
judgment about what would be done at either end of its connections. This 
was not just a network of terminals, like many of its earlier digital 
antecedents such as Ceefax or Minitel. It did not limit connection to 
devices hardwired to perform only a few defined functions, such as an 
ATM or an airline check-in kiosk. The ATM will not give you the 
weather and the check-in kiosk cannot produce pictures of your 
grandchildren.4 Terminal design = control of user. This is the genius of 
Larry Lessig’s focus on architecture as regulation. But this was not a 
network of terminals. If you plugged in a general purpose computer at 
either end of this network, you could do whatever software on a general 
purpose computer could do. Chat? Music? Video remix? Flirting? 
Arranging calendars? Generating knitting patterns? Doing facial 
recognition or portfolio analysis? Making a tribute to a departed loved 
one? Looking in on your babysitter while you are on a date? Managing 
just-in-time inventory through the same system that handled your 
customer orders? Generating encrypted communications that your 
despotic government could not read? Creating a message board on which 
you discovered that you were not in fact the only gay teenager in the 
world, it just seemed that way? So long as the software could be written 
 
3 James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty and 
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 178–79 (1997) (footnotes omitted). 
To be fair, all of this was in the context of criticizing the naivete of hardcore 
digital libertarianism. Even back then academic commentators, including me, 
stressed that such claims relied on a form of technological essentialism— 
assuming that the current form of the network was in some sense canonical—
and stressed the possibility of “hard wired censors” which could in fact tame the 
supposedly unregulable internet. The best example of those hard wired censors 
was to be the Great Firewall of China. Id.; More importantly, see LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). Since we were among 
naïve libertarianism’s principal critics, it is mildly annoying to have the views 
we criticized attributed to us. 
4 Just to clarify: “The grandchildren are in the Facebook. The Facebook lives in 
the Google.” The advanced class deals with how one gets to the Google by 
rebooting the router. 
No. 1]                 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW                    36 
 
and the information broken into packets, those packets could be sent and 
received anywhere in the world.  
It was a world-changing technology, a world-changing idea. Yes, 
of course, we immediately used it for porn, copyright infringement, spam 
and videos of cats. We are human. We build glorious cathedrals and then 
scribble illiterate graffiti on their walls.  But it could do so much more, 
and it did. And thirty years ago, it did not exist. In 1991, people outside 
of CERN were invited to use this new network. Think about that for a 
moment. For all intents and purposes, the web that is so central to every 
aspect of your lives today did not exist at all until 1991. Maybe 1994, if 
you talk about mediumly-widespread public use. It is as if I told you that 
no one had thought of roads, or wheels, or air, until 25 years ago.  
There had been “an internet,” true. There had been packet-
switched network precursors or ancestors, depending on how one does 
one’s digital zoological classification. The first message was sent over 
ARPANET in 1969. TCP/IP—the protocols that collectively allow data 
to be broken into packets, addressed, transmitted and reassembled—had 
been written for ARPANET under the auspices of DARPA in the 70’s. 
Berners-Lee’s genius was to come up with the idea—and it was as much 
an idea or a language as it was a technology—that made all of the 
(brilliant, visionary) earlier development something that now everyone 
was going to want to use, dispute, monetize, subvert, romanticize and 
demonize.  
There was one more vital thing about the web that the digerati 
found noteworthy. It was built on a commons. Actually, it was built on a 
series of layers, each a commons or semi-commons, in which key aspects 
of the layer were free from the kind of control that proprietary ownership 
would have conveyed.  
First, the network. With a proprietary network like AOL 
(America OnLine) or CompuServe, the owner controls what and who can 
become part of the network. There is a right to exclude. With the web 
and the internet, the reverse was true. So long as you had the money to 
purchase a domain name, so long as you could create or rent a presence 
on a server connected to the internet, you were online, with control over 
your own site and your own content. In that sense, access was a 
commons—regulated, if at all, by the strictures and guidelines of the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)5 or the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). But those strictures were largely 
technical in nature, setting up the federated set of internet domain name 
registrars, and a process for resolving trademark disputes over domain 
 
5 See generally James Boyle, A Nondelegation Doctrine for the Digital Age?, 50 
DUKE L.J. 5 (2000). 
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names, or specifying the common metadata language through which web 
pages were to express themselves. True, you had to pay a minimal fee to 
get a domain name and if you coded your webpage in non-standard html 
then it would not display properly. In that sense, there was control. But 
there was no proprietary network owner to grant or deny access.  
Second, the protocols by which the network operated were also a 
commons. For example, TCP/IP tries to make sure that the packets you 
are sending end up at the right place, in the right order. If packets are 
missed or dropped, it retransmits. But no one owns or controls TCP/IP. It 
achieved dominance precisely because it was not a proprietary system 
subject to intellectual property rights, but rather a commons that was 
open to all. And Berners-Lee’s protocols—the suite that included html, 
http and URLs—were left open as well, by explicit choice. Partly that 
was because he believed he was building on the work of those who went 
before him. Partly it was because he wanted this to be a resource held in 
common-like language. And that openness enabled others to standardize 
around its protocols without fear of holdup or control at a later stage. 
After describing how Berners-Lee worked at CERN in Switzerland 
back in the 1980s, Doan moved on to the web. When Berners-Lee 
invented the web, did he apply for a patent on it, Doan asked.  
“No,” said Berners-Lee.  
“Why not?” asked Doan.  
“The internet was already around. I was taking hypertext, and it was 
around a long time too. I was taking stuff we knew how to do…. All 
I was doing was putting together bits that had been around for years 
in a particular combination to meet the needs that I have.”  
Doan: “And who owns the web?”  
Berners-Lee: “We do.”  
. . . . 
“. . . The reason the Web took off is not because it was a magic 
idea, but because I persuaded everyone to use HTML and HTTP.”6 
Finally, by custom, nudge and occasional resort to administrative 
fiat, it was assumed that the network was and should be ‘neutral.’ 
Operators of one layer, for example your internet service provider, 
should be forbidden from discriminating between different sources of 
content of the same digital type. Video and audio streams can be treated 
differently than text, of course, because simultaneity, synching and speed 
 
6 Joe Mullin, Tim Berners-Lee Takes the Stand to Keep the Web Free, WIRED 
(Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/02/tim-berners-lee-patent/. 
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are more important there. But my ISP should not be able to prioritize 
different sources of content, sending me Youtube videos twice as fast as 
to its competitors for example, or streaming Amazon Prime videos at a 
higher rate than Netflix. The fear here was that network effects could be 
used to create dominant positions and thus to solidify incumbents, or to 
give priority to the content provided by large, vertically integrated 
communications companies with extensive portfolios of content. Imagine 
the process of Facebook trying to unseat Myspace as the dominant social 
network, for example, if Myspace could pay all service-providers to 
throttle Facebook’s content or boost its own. Imagine if only Time-
Warner’s videos played on the cable networks their parent company 
owned. The idea here was profoundly anti-incumbent, against barriers to 
entry.  
The effects were cumulative. Together, the end-to-end principle 
of network design, the censorship-resistant architecture of a packet-
switched system, the open access provided by its layers of commons, and 
the traffic-equality mandate of net-neutrality7 seemed to offer an opening 
for both anti-authoritarian politics and disruptive commerce: If one could 
“think as one wished, and speak as one thought,” to quote our colleague 
David Lange, and if a disruptive business idea could instantly reach 
world-wide without being squashed by the incumbent dinosaurs, then 
both economic and political liberty would have gained a powerful ally.  
The cheering was not only from the civil libertarian or the Ayn 
Rand sectors of the arena. By lowering the barriers to collaboration, the 
web promised to allow new forms of creativity—from Wikipedia to open 
source software. Many of these new forms of creativity were themselves 
built on a network composed of layers of commons and yielded a 
resource that itself was a commons; think of Linux or Wikipedia, articles 
or software created by strangers and released under a license that 
permitted copying and remix. And these forms of creation could take 
place outside or beside the dominant forms of commodified creativity, 
perhaps challenging our ideas about where intellectual property rights 
were necessary to incentivize innovation, perhaps sometimes adding a 
tertium quid between work and play, between homo economicus and 
homo ludens. The central reference here is Yochai Benkler’s work on the 
way in which the network should change our economic assumptions, and 
particularly our assumptions about the possibility of commons-based 
creativity.8 
 
7 Hat tip, Tim Wu, the inventor of the phrase. 
8 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); Yochai Benkler, 
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It was in the context of all of this, that John Perry Barlow wrote 
the essays that are the subject of this symposium. How should we grade 
his prognostications today? Selling Wine Without Bottles probably stands 
up best to the test of time. Barlow was right that the internet would pose 
a challenge to the current forms of distribution of copyrighted content. 
He was right that encryption would eventually provide the “bottles” 
around the content we receive; every Pandora stream or Netflix video 
comes to you wrapped in walls made of code. He was right that the 
network would bring a focus on timeliness, on personal and 
uncommodifiable perspective, on relationships other than those of buyer 
and seller. This is an insight that affects every influencer on social media, 
every columnist who draws you to the New York Times rather than the 
Huffington Post, every band that builds a cadre of loyal fans who come 
to its concerts and buy its merchandise and vinyl releases. He was right 
to say that the availability of perfect digital copies on demand would 
actually make the original live experience seem more valuable, not less.9 
One can see this both from the growing proportion of musical revenues 
generated by live performances and by the increasing number of those 
performances over time. He was at least partially right that ethics and 
law were becoming increasingly out of joint.  
Widespread file-sharing of copyrighted works without 
authorization is illegal in the United States and breaking the law is a bad 
thing. Yet to the Napster generation it did not seem as if that were true. 
In our law school parking lot it is equally illegal to park in the fire lanes 
and, if one is not entitled to do so, in the handicapped spaces. My law-
abiding, law professor colleagues freely park in the first when the lot is 
full. I’ve never seen them park in the second. For a while, file-sharing 
was seen like parking illegally to run a quick errand10—running some 
risk of sanction but carrying no negative moral force. If illicit 
downloading were an exercise in bold civil disobedience that would be 
one thing, but this was—for the most part—just wanting to get away 
with getting the music without paying. That seems like a bad thing both 
for the legitimacy of law and for the backlash it would reliably generate: 
massive overreactions in attempting to regulate the network to make it 
 
Coase’s Penguin: or Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 
(2002). 
9 Cf. WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction, in ILLUMINATIONS 217 (1968). This is a much-cited essay which 
is deep, insightful and completely wrong on this specific point.  
10 To defend my colleagues, the fire-lanes are large enough for the Starship 
Enterprise to land on them. Still, the disparity is remarkable. 
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more tractable, running the risk of destroying many of its most attractive 
attributes in the process.11  
Barlow was also right about one cure for lawlessness. People 
will pay for convenient, cheap, legal access. Ten years ago, file sharing 
was a principal source of music for the student demographic. Today 
almost all of my students got their music from legal streaming services. 
He was also right that it would take a long time for the music industry to 
accept that the old model was dead and that the intellectual property law 
would actually make it quite hard to create a multijurisdictional, legal, 
music streaming service. “Legal efforts to keep the old boat floating are 
taking three forms: a frenzy of deck chair rearrangement, stern warnings 
to the passengers that if she goes down, they will face harsh criminal 
penalties, and serene, glassy-eyed denial.”12 The long delay in the rollout 
of reasonably priced legal sources of digital music can indeed be 
attributed both to industry denial, and to the barriers that 100 years of 
copyright law, built up technology by technology and licensing stream 
by licensing stream, put in the way of the one-stop-shop service.  
Barlow was not right everywhere. He underestimated the ability 
of law to adapt, and to incentivize private actors to make compliance 
more profitable than illegality. His vision of property law lacks some of 
the Hohfeldian, bundle-of-rights, complexity the legal system actually 
has. He overestimated the idea that the web would be a community with 
its own ethics—something that might be true for a small group of first 
adopters, but is harder to sustain when the network contains most of the 
population of the world.  
What about A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace? 
This document—a deliberate provocation of the global elite at Davos13—
invites pushback. The full-throated claim that “cyberspace” could and 
should be a self-governing entity, free from state power, organized only 
by the dictates of custom and the Golden Rule is an easy, and 
appropriate, target for critique. When linked to the techno-libertarian 
slogans I quoted earlier such as “the Net interprets censorship as damage 
and routes around it,” it seems to substantiate the idea that these were a 
group of people who thought that the technology would automatically 
provide freedom, which would thereafter self-regulate.  
 
11 This is a theme that Pam Samuelson and Kathryn Hashimoto explore at length 
in their contribution to this volume, The Enigma of Digitized Property: A 
Tribute to John Perry Barlow, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 103 (2019). 
12 John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8 
(2019). 
13 Written while tipsy, according to the backstory provided by Cindy Cohn, 
Inventing the Future: Barlow and Beyond, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 69 (2019). 
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In the first essay in this volume, though, a moving, personal 
reflection on Barlow’s ideas, Cory Doctorow argues for a different 
interpretation. 
[C]ontext is everything: “The Net interprets censorship as damage 
and routes around it” was a prescription as much as an observation. 
It was uttered in the context of a nascent internet whose technical 
caretakers disagreed on many ethical and technical points, but were 
united in a sense of civic duty to keep the technology open and 
universal and “free as in freedom.” Gilmore didn’t mean, “Stand 
down everyone, we’ve built a censorship-proof internet that will 
automatically maintain its integrity.” He meant, “To you, my 
comrades-in-arms who toil endlessly to make our balky, wonderful 
invention run, I say: the same measures that we take to re-knit our 
network when a technical failure tears holes in its fabric can be 
repurposed to resist censorship, to route around the nodes that have 
fallen under a censor’s thrall. Our shared civic mission, heretofore 
dedicated primarily to the technical task of preserving a forum for 
discourse, can and should be expanded to the political task of 
preserving that forum, and what’s more, the tactics that we have 
mastered so thoroughly for the former will serve us in the latter.”14  
The notion here is that people like Barlow and Gilmore and Brand were 
writing in the context of something greater than a mere technology—a 
community of technologists and activists who wanted to preserve the 
aspects of the technology that promoted human flourishing and were 
working to minimize those that subverted that goal. 
When Barlow advocated for a free internet—“free” in all the 
usefully overlapping and ambiguous senses of that word—he wasn’t 
doing so because he lacked an appreciation of the risks of a 
monopolized internet, or an internet that was under the thumb of a 
repressive state. Rather, he did so precisely because he feared that a 
globe-spanning network of ubiquitous, sensor-studded, actuating 
devices that were designed and governed without some kind of 
ethical commitment, without the pioneering spirit of the early 
internet and its yeoman smallholders who defended it from those 
who sought to dominate or pervert it, that we would arrive at a 
dystopian future where the entertainment industry’s Huxleyism was 
the means for realizing the nightmares of Orwell.15 
In Doctorow’s view, Barlow’s repeated invocation of hope was, in the 
end, a response to “peak indifference”—the moment when problems 
seem so overwhelming that it is easy to give up. But he then adds a point 
often missed by those who think Barlow was a naïve utopian. “You don't 
 
14 Cory Doctorow, Barlow’s Legacy, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 61, 62 (2019). 
15 Id. 
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found an organization like the Electronic Frontier Foundation because 
you are sanguine about the future of the internet: you do so because your 
hope for an amazing, open future is haunted by terror of a network 
suborned for the purposes of spying and control.”16 Those among us, like 
me, who are not one of the founders of the nation’s premier digital civil 
liberties organization, please raise your hands. Collectively, we may need 
to work on our definition of “naïve.” 
That theme is picked up by Cindy Cohn, the Executive Director 
of that very organization.  
Since Barlow’s death, I’ve spent a lot of time trying to ensure 
that the straw men who have Barlow’s face taped to them don’t 
overshadow the actual man . . . .   
To be fair, the real Barlow definitely was an optimist and he 
loved all attention, positive or negative. You could argue that he 
sometimes pasted his own face on that straw man. Especially in the 
Declaration, his language was expansive and visionary. You don’t 
start a legal or policy argument with: “you weary giants of flesh and 
steel.” You don’t seek nuance with: “I declare the global social 
space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies 
you seek to impose on us.” In talking about the Declaration at 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) many years later, Barlow 
admitted that when he stepped out of a party at Davos to write it, he 
was both a little drunk and trying desperately to channel Thomas 
Jefferson. So maybe some of the sweeping rebukes are just trying to 
match his original bravado.17  
But Cohn believes that this misses Barlow’s true project. She quotes a 
2015 letter of his to the Washington Post.  
I [] knew that we were building the most penetrating and total 
surveillance system that could be imagined, and I was no more 
comfortable with the Googles (which didn’t exist but predictably 
would) who would peer out through those All-Seeing Eyes than I 
was with an equally enhanced NSA, Chinese Government, or 
United States Cyber Command. However, just as Alan Kay said, 
“The best way to predict the future is to invent it,” I knew it’s also 
true that a good way to invent the future is to predict it. So I 
predicted Utopia, hoping to give Liberty a running start before the 
laws of Moore and Metcalfe delivered up what Ed Snowden now 
correctly calls “turn-key totalitarianism.” Which is now available to 
 
16 Id. at 63 (emphasis added).  
17 Cohn, supra note 13, at 69–70 (footnotes omitted). 
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a number of secretive institutions, public and private (not that 
there’s a useful distinction).18  
We should have two Barlow’s. One useful for viewpoint-
taxonomies, the naïve libertarian set of claims that is reasonably 
attributed to his own most famous essays. He did say those things, after 
all, and those essays were the assigned starting point for the symposium. 
The second Barlow would reflect his less famous, though more 
numerous, statements that he was as afraid of private power as public, 
that he was as skeptical of corporations as he was of the state.  
As for his tone, Cohn describes Barlow’s utopianism as the 
counterpart to EFF’s own careful, analogy-packed, legal reasoning.  
I would then proceed, like a good American litigator, to tie the 
liberties of the future Internet to the precedents in the founding of 
the country. I would tie anonymous online speakers to Publius of 
the Federalist Papers. I would tie the need for digital encryption to 
the physical encryption systems used by Madison and Jefferson. 
Later I would tie the fight against mass surveillance to John Otis’ 
fight against general warrants. Since Barlow’s assertions were 
factually wrong—of course people could be held accountable for 
what they did online as long as their feet touched down in the 
jurisdiction of some government somewhere—I worried that he 
risked us losing the civil liberties and human rights online that so 
many had worked so hard to win offline.  
In retrospect, we both had useful strategies for convincing 
different audiences to protect freedom online. It’s just that I aimed 
for the Supreme Court while Barlow aimed for the sky . . . .19 
Cohn takes seriously the invitation of the symposium to look forward 20 
years as well as backwards. After brainstorming with her colleagues at 
EFF she tries to answer the question, ‘what do we need to do or say 
today to invent the future we want?’ “[A] short answer could be that we 
want to win our current fights: rein in government surveillance, protect 
coders, privacy and freedom of expression, ensure neither copyright nor 
overbroad criminal laws cannot squelch freedom of expression, freedom 
to tinker or innovation online, and more . . . . But Barlow would want us 
to go further.”20  Her answer, presented “with a light touch of Barlow-
style rhetoric,” focuses both on the dangers of state power and corporate 
power, and resonates much more with the ideals of “human flourishing.” 
 
18 Letter to the Editor from John P. Barlow to the Wash. Post (sent in response to 
J. Silverman, The Internet’s First Anarchist, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2015 
(evening edition)).     
19 Cohn, supra note 13, at 70–71 (footnotes omitted).  
20 Id. at 75.  
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We are building a civilization that empowers humans as the 
users, builders and beneficiaries of technologies. Governments, 
businesses, religions, cultures, communities and robots all matter, 
but they all work under, and are transparent to, the bright light of 
the humans they serve. We’re building a society that gives power 
back to people, especially those who have been robbed of it for too 
long. We unflinchingly recognize the bias and prejudices that have 
forestalled equity and caused our visions of a just society to fall 
short, and we use the power of technology and law to ensure those 
wrongs cannot invade further into our digital societies.  
We are building a world where the users have primary control 
over their tools, devices and networks. Technology serves us, not 
the other way around, and it treats efforts to surveil, track or profile 
us as hostile measures that should be blocked. Where it cannot, we 
have protected pathways—legal, technological, policy and 
cultural—so that we can leave those walled gardens, panopticons 
and crystal prisons to build our own new worlds.21 
In his essay for this volume, A Political Economy of Utopia?,22 
Yochai Benkler notes something that most commentators miss; that 
Barlow’s work was not just skeptical of the state, but also of a world of 
creativity defined around the commodity form.  
John Perry Barlow’s two essays capture a yearning to escape 
the oppressive clutches of the two most important institutional 
forms in modernity: the state and market society. A Declaration of 
the Independence of Cyberspace is explicitly against the modern 
state. One might say, “All right, but apart from the sanitation, the 
medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a fresh 
water system, and public health, what have the Romans ever done 
for us?” The Declaration reflected not only a libertarian utopia that 
assumed that if only the state were to back off markets will take 
care of it all, but also a left-anchored critique of the state as a 
critical site of protecting the power and privilege of elites, insistence 
that individual self-actualization demanded a state contained within 
narrow boundaries, and a deep skepticism of all forms of authority, 
as Fred Turner showed in From Counterculture to Cyberculture. 
Selling Wine Without Bottles is not against markets or payment as 
such, but rather a resistance to the totalizing vision of commodity 
exchange as all there is . . . .23  
 
21 Id. at 76.  
22 Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of Utopia, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 78 
(2019). 
23 Id. at 78 (footnotes omitted).  
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Benkler points out that Barlow was at least as excited about what the 
network might mean for non-commodified forms of human flourishing, 
quoting these lines from Selling Wine: 
And then there are the inexplicable pleasures of information 
itself, the joys of learning, knowing, and teaching. The strange good 
feeling of information coming into and out of oneself. Playing with 
ideas is a recreation which people must be willing to pay a lot for, 
given the market for books and elective seminars. We’d likely 
spend even more money for such pleasures if there weren’t so many 
opportunities to pay for ideas with other ideas.  
This explains much of the collective “volunteer” work which 
fills the archives, newsgroups, and databases of the Internet. Its 
denizens are not working for “nothing,” as is widely believed. 
Rather they are getting paid in something besides money. It is an 
economy which consists almost entirely of information.24  
Adding this dimension to Barlow’s ideas shows that they cannot be 
reduced to simple libertarianism.  Ayn Rand was not a noted skeptic of 
the commodity form. Benkler’s own magisterial body of scholarship, 
which defined and tried to systematize the potential, limitations and 
political economy of “commons-based peer production” has followed 
exactly this line. Yet he uses this symposium to muse about the humility-
inducing lessons the last twenty years have taught us. Earlier, I pointed 
out that one of the most fascinating characteristics of the network was 
that it was built on multiple layers and that each layer depended, in part, 
on a commons. Benkler adds a note of caution, however, about assuming 
that the status of something as a commons is in any way determinative of 
how that resource ends up being used. 
[T]he kind of optimism that typified Barlow’s writing, as well as at 
least some of my own, is much harder to sustain now that we’ve 
seen how the successes of the first generation of battles over the 
commons have turned out.  
Facebook runs over TCP/IP and WiFi. The fact that the 
underlying carrier technology and the Internet Protocol are open 
access commons turned out not to have been enough to preserve 
people’s freedom from the power of a small number of 
corporations. Both on the consumer end, like Roku, and on the 
cloud services side, Linux is everywhere. The Internet of Things 
could not run on anything other than FOSS and spectrum commons. 
And yet, these devices are all centrally controlled, and many 
function as the sensors for pervasive surveillance systems. Just as 
industrial manufacturers cheerfully emitted pollutants and effluents 
 
24 Barlow, supra note 12, at 24.    
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into the commons of the air and water to externalize some of their 
costs, so too are Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple finding 
ways of constructing new bottlenecks above and below the open 
layers, creating new toll booths and points of observation, and using 
the “free” nature of the open parts of the infrastructure as low cost 
input from which to then mine our “biopolitical public domain,” as 
Julie Cohen puts it. 25 
Benkler also notes that current events seem to call for a much larger role 
for the state and do so in a way that calls into doubt the contemporary 
equivalent of Barlow’s ideas, the breathless, chiliastic wittering about the 
transformative power of the blockchain.26 
A resurgent progressive movement is fighting hard to change the 
basic narrative on how important it is to harness the state, 
accountably and democratically, to play its core roles.  
So this, to me, is the great challenge facing those of us who still 
want to think of technological change in terms of its effects on 
social relations. We need a clearer, and more fully articulated 
political economy of technology. We need a better understanding of 
what the state and the market are for, in the context of a genuine 
three-way interaction between state, market, and commons-based 
production specifically or social, nonmarket production more 
generally. And we to internalize the limits of anarchism, whether of 
the right or left spin. I see present debates over blockchain, 
cryptocurrencies, and re-decentralizing the net, and I see in them a 
rededication to the ideals that Barlow expressed so poetically. The 
words are still there, but the music seems out of sync with the beat 
of the times.27 
In Internet Utopianism and the Practical Inevitability of Law 
Julie Cohen, who Benkler quoted earlier, echoes these themes but takes 
aim at cyberlaw scholarship that she believes has suffered from drinking 
too deep of ideas like Barlow’s.  
 
25 Benkler, supra note 22, at 81–82 (footnotes omitted). To be fairer to Benkler 
than perhaps he is to himself, to me it seemed that his own work never presented 
commons status as a sufficient condition for the range of benign outcomes he 
discusses, merely as a necessary one which allowed a hitherto unlikely and 
counter-hegemonic set of ideas the possibility of success. 
26 One of the true architects of the internet, Vint Cerf, has a slide deck about 
blockchain with one slide in it. It takes the form of a flowchart. The flowchart 
box asks the question “Do I need a blockchain?” The arrow goes to a single 
answer. “No.”  Vinton G. Cerf, (@vgcerf), TWITTER, (Jul. 19, 2018, 9:49 AM) 
https://twitter.com/vgcerf/status/1019987651301081089?lang=en. True, this is 
an overstatement. But it is a nice corrective and one which, given its source, 
probably deserves our attention. 
27 Benkler, supra note 22, at 84. 
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Cyberlaw scholarship in the Barlowian mold isn’t to blame for 
the worldwide erosion of protections for fundamental rights, but it 
also hasn’t helped as much as it might have. In this essay . . . I 
identify and briefly examine three intersecting flavors of internet 
utopianism in cyberlegal thought that are worth reexamining: 
utopianism about platforms for distributed cultural and political 
production (and concomitant failure to reckon with the 
transformative force of informational capitalism); utopianism about 
anonymity as a force for institutional disruption (and concomitant 
failure to acknowledge the essential role of institutions in cabining 
the human capacity for malice and mayhem); and utopianism about 
the relationship between information and communication networks 
and human freedom (and concomitant failure to contend with the 
powerful and inherently informational mechanisms by which 
existing protections for human rights are increasingly outflanked 
and coopted). It has become increasingly apparent that functioning 
legal institutions have indispensable roles to play in protecting and 
advancing human freedom. It has also become increasingly 
apparent, however, that the legal institutions we need are different 
than the ones we have.28  
Cohen’s solutions attempt to respond to each of those failings in turn. 
She addresses the nightmare of network enthusiasts: that the very 
characteristics they lauded—openness, commons-based production, 
distributed architecture—might not only fail to produce positive 
outcomes but (under some circumstances and on some platforms) be a 
problem rather than a solution.  
The results of distributed cultural and political production also 
are not inevitably democracy-promoting, and predictions to the 
contrary have, in retrospect, come to seem extraordinarily naïve. 
The particular quality-control mechanisms that keep open source 
software robust and secure and Wikipedia reliable and (mostly) 
objective work far less well (or not at all) within massively-
intermediated environments that are optimized to advertiser-driven 
platform revenue models. In such environments, the vaunted 
“wisdom of crowds” is a scalar, not a vector. Algorithmic processes 
optimized to boost click-through rates and prompt social sharing 
heighten the volatility of online interactions, and surveillant 
assemblages designed to enhance capabilities for content targeting 
and behavioral marketing create powerful––and easily weaponized–
–stimulus-response feedback loops. The result is a sociotechnical 
 
28 Julie E. Cohen, Internet Utopianism and the Practical Inevitability of Law, 18 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 85, 85–86 (2019). 
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apparatus that is also optimized for stoking outrage and deepening 
preexisting political, ideological, and cultural divisions.29 
Or, to put it less elegantly: reality today.  
In Revisiting Barlow’s Misplaced Optimism Ben Edelman also 
casts a dubious eye on Barlow’s predictions.  
Barlow’s A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace 
calls for a “civilization of the mind in cyberspace,” and he says it 
will be “more humane and fair” than what governments created. 
Barlow’s vision is unapologetically optimistic, easily embraced by 
anyone who longs for better times to come. Yet twenty years later, 
it’s easy to see some important respects in which reality fell short of 
his vision. Alongside the Internet’s many pluses are clickbait, 
scams, hacks, and all manner of privacy violations. Ten thousand 
hours of cat videos may be delightful, but they’re no civilization of 
the mind. With a bit of hindsight, Barlow’s techno-utopianism looks 
as stilted as other utopianism—and equally far removed from 
reality.30 
Edelman faults Barlow for failing to envisage the institutions that would 
bring about a better world. After listing a series of government successes, 
he also suggests that the state has a much more robust role to play than 
Barlow envisaged and that Barlow was wrong to lay such stress on the 
Golden Rule, of “do as you would be done by.” “But the moral 
suasion—and practical effectiveness—of the Golden Rule presupposes 
participants of roughly equal power and status. It is no small feat to 
meaningfully consider what Joe User might want from Mega Social 
Network if the tables were turned and Joe owned the goliath.”31  
On one level Edelman’s argument seems like a moral category-
error. The common sense moral norm, ‘one should treat others as one 
would like to be treated oneself’ does not depend on a capability 
assessment. The heavyweight champion of the world could certainly beat 
me up for no reason. Nevertheless, according to that norm, he is still 
wrong to beat me up because he would not like to be brutalized for no 
reason himself, even if it had to be by someone with a gun or an M1 
tank. The same is true of the Golden Rule’s more formal instantiation in 
Kantian moral theory. “Act only in accordance with that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” does 
not depend on the size of my biceps, bank account or gun collection, nor 
those of the counterparties with whom I deal. To my knowledge, no one 
 
29 Id. at 88 (footnotes omitted).  
30 Benjamin Edelman, Revisiting Barlow’s Misplaced Optimism, 18 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 97, 97 (2019) (footnotes omitted).  
31 Id. 
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in the long history of Kantian moral thought has ever suggested 
otherwise. So I have to disagree on that portion of Edelman’s analysis. 
The Golden Rule does not depend morally on participants of roughly 
equal power and status. Indeed, its principal function as a normative 
thought-primer is to force the more powerful to restrain themselves by 
asking the question, “how would I like it if I were in the position of 
powerless supplicant in this situation?” That is the point of the thought 
exercise. With participants of roughly equal power and status there 
would be much less need for the Golden Rule in the first place. 
Yet on another level, Edelman has an undeniable point, albeit in 
a different register. Barlow was addressing himself, as Doctorow puts it, 
to the yeoman smallholders of a budding network. The moral problem 
with Barlow’s argument is not that Facebook has more power than me, 
and thus it is allowed—under the Golden Rule—to invade my privacy 
because I cannot meaningfully threaten to invade its privacy. That just 
takes us back to the normative category-error of me and the heavyweight 
champion. The problem is that Facebook is a collection of contracts, not 
an actual moral being. One can still apply Barlow’s framework to the 
legal entity, the legal fiction, formed out of those contracts—the people 
who signed them would presumably not like their privacy to be violated. 
We can tell the corporation’s managers that they must act as if the norm 
underlying their actions would become a universal law and there is 
nothing incoherent in that command. Indeed, the justified outrage that 
Edelman displays about corporate misdeeds, and his consequent criticism 
of Barlow for undervaluing the role of the state, depends on exactly those 
kind of moral intuitions. Still, it is more of a leap, cognitively speaking. 
The Golden Rule still has moral force and normative coherence as it 
confronts the corporate personality and the faceless algorithm. But, for 
different reasons, neither is likely to pay it much mind. The problem is 
not moral coherence, but enforcement. In the speech communities within 
which algorithm or corporation are constituted, the Golden Rule either 
does not exist as an internalized norm, or exists only because of 
government mandates of the kind Edelman is advocating. I would restate 
his argument thus: only the state has the power, status and administrative 
capability to become the Kantian superego of corporations and Barlow is 
wrong to neglect that fact. It is hard to deny that Edelman wins that 
argument. 
In that regard, Edelman points out some of the digital 
achievements of the state. He points out the success the state has had in 
reining in the most clear-cut violations of copyright and the progress it 
has made on online scams. While Edelman thinks there is much work to 
be done—whether in competition policy or cyberbullying—he takes a 
longer time-frame, one that makes him cautiously optimistic. 
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A century ago, the Pure Food and Drug Act sought to assure 
accurate labeling, purity, and ultimately safety to products 
Americans consume every day. By all accounts this seemed difficult 
at the time. What stops a factory from changing its process or 
ingredients when the inspector leaves? And who’s to say what 
consequences a drug might entail years later[?] Yet today the FDA 
achieves substantial success, and the problems of that era are 
delightfully in the past.  
A generation later, the GI Bill of Rights stood for the principle 
that after defending the nation, a serviceman deserved a quality 
education and the reliable job it would usually bring. The next 
generation established Medicare—a safety net to assure that our 
nation’s elderly would get sustenance and medical care befitting the 
nation’s prosperity. For both of these, there were serious questions 
about cost and sustainability from the outset—but the moral 
imperative was clear, and the projects went forward. I never 
discussed these subjects with Barlow, and so far as I know he never 
wrote about them or spoke publicly about them. But each of these 
programs faced genuine challenges, arguably at least as 
fundamental as the technology architecture Barlow considered so 
important. We should be emboldened by our prior successes and no 
less willing to take on great challenges as we look ahead.32 
Another cluster of essays in this volume focuses more centrally 
on the past and future of digital intellectual property. In their 
contribution, The Enigma of Digital Property: A Tribute to John Perry 
Barlow,33 Pam Samuelson and Kathryn Hashimoto carefully assess the 
legacy of Barlow’s ideas, and those of his fellow travelers, about 
copyright online. Like me, they give his predictions a good grade, but 
think that he underestimated the possibility that copyright law could be 
changed to deal with the digital world, sometimes in ways that threatened 
the freedoms Barlow cared so much about. They use as an example, the 
recent lobbying over Articles 11 and 13 of the EU’s Directive on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market. Article 13, which makes online 
platforms liable if copyright infringing material is uploaded to them, has 
been roundly condemned.  
Critics have argued that Article 13 would effectively mandate 
monitoring and filtering across all platforms, violating user privacy 
and free speech interests as automated systems would be obliged to 
scan all content and block even legitimate, noninfringing uses of 
copyrighted work such as quotations and parodies. Article 13 also 
 
32 Id. at 102 (footnotes omitted).  
33 Pamela Samuelson and Kathryn Hashimoto, The Enigma of Digital Property: 
A Tribute to John Perry Barlow, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 103 (2019). 
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raises competition concerns, as it would likely favor and entrench 
major existing platforms, which already have or can afford to 
implement the necessary surveillance and filtering technologies, 
while disadvantaging smaller and newer entrants to the market.  
Dozens of European intellectual property (IP) scholars have 
written articles criticizing the Article 13 filtering mandate on 
various grounds, including the threat it poses for freedom of 
expression on the Internet . . . In addition, Tim Berners-Lee, Vint 
Cerf, and numerous other Internet pioneers signed an open letter 
urging the EU Parliament to drop Article 13:  
By requiring Internet platforms to perform automatic 
filtering [on] all of the content that their users upload, 
Article 13 takes an unprecedented step towards the 
transformation of the Internet from an open platform for 
sharing and innovation, into a tool for the automated 
surveillance and control of its users.  
More than 145 civil society organizations have expressed 
opposition to adoption of Article 13, as have more than 5 million 
people who signed a petition against it.34 
Despite all of this, Article 13 passed. Samuelson and Hashimoto observe 
that Barlow “would have been appalled at the curtailment of freedom of 
expression and access to knowledge on the Internet that Articles 11 and 
13 will almost certainly bring about.”35 
 However their view is not entirely, or even mainly, pessimistic. 
They argue that artists have managed to find ways to get compensated 
online, in some cases using methods that Barlow predicted, and conclude 
that the real danger is that attempts to restore pre-digital levels of control 
may actually threaten the attractive features of the network along with 
the illicit activity. 
John Perry Barlow had a vision of an economy of ideas in 
which information would flow freely through the Internet ether. 
While his hope that copyright would disappear in the new creative 
economy is unlikely to transpire, there is some reason to hope that 
policymakers will come to recognize that creative sectors of the 
economy are thriving. Barlow insisted that 
we have a profound responsibility to be better ancestors. 
What we do now will likely determine the productivity and 
freedom of 20 generations of artists yet unborn. So it is 
time to stop speculating about when the new economy of 
 
34 Id. at 109–110 (footnotes omitted). 
35 Id. at 111.  
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ideas will arrive. It’s here. Now comes the hard part, which 
also happens to be the fun part: making it work. 
As a tribute to Barlow, let’s not screw things up by adopting 
stronger copyright rules that will inhibit rather than promote the 
progress of science, as the Constitution directs.36 
Jessica Litman, in her article, Imaginary Bottles,37 also gives 
Barlow high marks for his predictive powers about the digital 
marketplace of the future. 
Some of Barlow’s initial musings on the nature and value of 
information seem startlingly prescient 25 years later. His prediction 
that, in the near future, “information will be generated 
collaboratively by the cyber-tribal hunter-gatherers of Cyberspace,” 
was an eerily accurate description of Twitter. Barlow’s suggestion 
that information itself was supplanting money as our dominant 
currency presaged a future ruled by Google, Facebook, and 
Amazon, three companies that derive much of their monetary value 
from trafficking in information. He proposed that we 
reconceptualize information in the networked digital environment as 
more akin to a living organism than a static package of knowledge. 
As a non-carbon-based life form, Barlow suggested, information 
evolves, spreads, and, over time, it spoils. It creates relationships 
and meaning. Some information’s value depends on exclusivity; 
other information is worth more the more common it becomes.38 
Like Samuelson and Hashimoto, Litman thinks that, 
Barlow might have underestimated the tenacity of legacy copyright 
owners. Despite significant missteps, bad bets, and massive 
investment in stupid initiatives, they seem to have emerged into a 
new world where, from their vantage point, the copyright rules are 
startlingly similar to the rules that governed the old world, only 
better. 39 
When she says “better,” Litman means that, under the guise of protecting 
intellectual property from a digital threat, copyright owners were able—
through technological happenstance, poorly reasoned court decisions or 
legislative fiat—to extend their exclusive rights to actions that copyright 
law had never previously regulated. Litman argues that this was not, as 
many expected it to be, by extending their powers through encryption but 
rather by taking a different approach. 
 
36 Id. at 126 (footnotes omitted). 
37 Jessica Litman, Imaginary Bottles, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 127 (2019). 
38 Id. at 128 (footnotes omitted). 
39 Id. at 128–29. 
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The key to this approach was a breathtakingly expansive 
reinterpretation of the exclusive right to reproduce a work in copies, 
predicated on a very broad definition of “copy.” Fans of this new 
understanding maintain that whenever a work appears in the 
working memory of any computer anywhere, an actionable copy 
has been made, in violation of the statutory reproduction right. By 
insisting, again and again, that the word “copy” had long been 
understood in this broader sense, and by behaving as if they were 
right about that, copyright owners were able to persuade some 
courts that the copyright law, if properly interpreted, afforded them 
extensive rights to control any appearance of their works over 
digital networks.  
The new definition requires some mental gymnastics for readers 
who pay attention to statutory language. The copyright statute has, 
since 1976, defined “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a 
work is fixed.”  Congress hasn’t revised that definition, and 
copyright owners haven’t asked Congress to do so.  Being attached 
to a material object, though, is precisely the characteristic that 
Barlow argued that digital files lack.  The modern revisionist 
interpretation expands the understanding of a “copy” beyond the 
idea of a tangible material object to include temporary and 
ephemeral instantiations. Essentially, it reads the words “material 
objects” out of the statutory definition.  
Over the past 20 years, this expanded meaning of “copy” has 
ceased to be seen as radical. That has allowed copyright owners to 
sell their wine in what I would call make-believe bottles . . . .40  
And thus, over 25 years, we move from selling wine without bottles to 
selling wine in imaginary bottles. All of this was accomplished, Litman 
argues, without much in the way of other changes to copyright law. 
Most of what was idiotic and counterproductive about the ways that 
copyright law worked in 1994 is still idiotic and counterproductive 
in 2019. If the purpose of copyright law is to compensate creators 
for the products of their minds, it hasn’t yet come close to achieving 
that goal. Oodles of money flood into the copyright system. Most of 
that money is siphoned off before it reaches creators’ pockets, and 
where and why the money goes where it goes is kept a closely 
guarded secret. Creators across a wide swathe of fields complain of 
a shocking lack of transparency . . . .  
Yet Barlow’s musings about the organic and volatile nature of 
information remain compelling; they seem even truer today than 
they seemed 25 years ago. Remove information from its containers 
and it spills. Spills spread. As different individual creators and 
 
40 Id. at 131–32 (footnotes omitted).  
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researchers discover closely-held details of how money and rights 
move through the copyright system, that knowledge may itself 
transform the ways that copyright owners do business . . . . Even if 
the heavily fortified legacy copyright system fails to crumble under 
its own weight, a flood of newly revealed information may enable 
the rest of us to piece together a truer picture of where and how the 
system is failing, and what interventions might help creators to 
wrest back some control, or at least some money, from the legacy 
rights holders seeking to preserve the old regime.41  
Jonathan Zittrain is the author of a wonderful book, The Future 
of the Internet: And How to Stop It,42 that explores many of the issues in 
this symposium. In that book, Zittrain argues that the openness of the 
internet does indeed make it vulnerable to misuse, to spam and malware 
and misinformation. Yet he argues that the cure for openness may 
sometimes be more openness. Spam sites originally loaded themselves 
with the words that searchers might look for, making search engines 
useless. Search engines reacted by turning to so called “water hole” 
algorithms, using the links created by the denizens of the network as a 
form of informal peer review, thus once again elevating the real sites to 
the top of search lists. Spammers responded with search engine 
optimization strategies, gamed links and so on—an endless arms race in 
which the open nature of the network is both disease and cure, or at least 
inoculation.  
 In his contribution to this volume, John Perry Barlow’s Call for 
Persuasion Over Power,43 Zittrain muses on copyright law and Barlow’s 
comments about it, noting that even before the digital revolution, 
copyright laws had strayed far indeed from a layperson’s common sense 
understanding of what behavior was regulated.  
A glance at the U.S. copyright code by the time of Napster 
showed just how far Title 17 had quietly diverged from day-to-day 
reality. The idea that singing a song aloud at a birthday party could 
result in thousands of dollars in “damages” was counterintuitive, to 
say the least, even as there’s legitimate rationale for the core 
“performance right” within copyright. The statutory limitations to 
the right are tellingly mincing, such as 17 U.S.C. § 110(6), which 
establishes that notwithstanding the public performance right, there 
are some limited exceptions, such as: 
 
41 Id. at 135–36 (footnotes omitted).  
42 JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 
(2006). 
43 Jonathan L. Zittrain, John Perry Barlow’s Call for Persuasion Over Power, 
18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 137 (2019). 
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performance of a nondramatic musical work by a 
governmental body or a nonprofit agricultural or 
horticultural organization, in the course of an annual 
agricultural or horticultural fair or exhibition conducted by 
such body or organization . . . . 
(It appears to be an open question whether the first gathering by a 
horticultural organization can be “annual” and thus qualify for the 
exception, or if litigants must wait until the following year to see if 
there is another one.)44 
It was this tangled body of law that content owners tried to reformulate 
in the digital age, now always with success.  
Most legislative proposals stalled in Congress, and the lawsuits 
against individual users were retired despite most targeted users 
choosing to settle. This might suggest a victory for Barlow’s way of 
thinking—a certain peace emerged that reformalized commercial 
relationships around activities that, to the users, could still seem 
organic. But the copyright wars didn’t see victory by one side or the 
other so much as a muddling through. Today, the chaos of self-
published Web pages, hosted on individual Web servers, has given 
way to the carefully indexed homogeneity of DMCA-takedown-
friendly Facebook, including the automatic monitoring of private 
chat for the presence of links to file sharing sites (as they are found, 
they are redacted), and Facebook’s silent tracking of all usage for 
the benefit of ad targeting.  
Today music and movies are much less ripped and copied freely 
than they are subscribed and linked to like a utility—via one of a 
handful of streaming titans like Spotify, Tidal, Netflix, or Apple—
with artists seeking to make a living from their work generally no 
better off than they were before the Internet came about . . . .45 
The result, Zittrain argues is a muddle, a tangled mixture of open and 
closed, artist-favoring and artist-exploiting rules. He closes his article 
with an ironic “synecdoche: Barlow’s A Declaration of the Independence 
of Cyberspace remains free, but the authoritative version of The 
Economy of Ideas (as rendered in a 1994 issue of WIRED) is . . . metered 
through a paywall.”46 
 In their article, Dancing on the Grave of Copyright?47 Madhavi 
Sunder and Anupam Chander choose what at first might seem a 
 
44 Id. at 138 (footnotes omitted). 
45 Id. at 140 (footnotes omitted). 
46 Id. at 142 (footnotes omitted). 
47 I do have a quibble with their title. They start by telling us that “John Perry 
Barlow would have wanted us dancing on the grave of copyright.” Anupam 
No. 1]                 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW                    56 
 
whimsical topic through which to approach Barlow’s ideas. They argue 
that “Barlow was right about where the economy would go. He was 
wrong that intellectual property would not follow.”48 Thus the subject of 
their contribution to the symposium: 
This essay considers IP in expressions of joy and shared meaning 
online in the form of emotes, GIFS, and memes: the stuff of which 
dreams are made. These aesthetic experiences bring playfulness and 
humanity to the internet. Are they the proper subject of intellectual 
property? Are such forms of cultural innovation and appropriation 
better addressed by ethics or law?49 
Barlow had predicted that the wine would float free of the bottles, that 
citizens would want the experience rather than the packaging it came in. 
Sunder and Chander believe he was correct, but that the law has shifted 
to match the new reality, sometimes in ways that seem overly 
appropriative and controlling. 
Intellectual property, however, has not only survived the doom 
of the information economy—it has thrived. Today, intellectual 
property has fully evolved from goods to a good time. As consumer 
researchers have become savvier about how to package and market 
the human need for fantasy, play, imagination, and haptic 
experience, areas of thought and expression once free as the air we 
breathe are increasingly becoming commodified and metered fare, 
regulated by licenses and royalties, requiring permission and 
payment.  
. . . .  
In recent writing, one of us (Sunder) has repudiated this 
expansion of rights, decrying the threat to fundamentally human 
activity, such as the ability to play, imagine, learn with others, and 
to reference the cultural works that shape our lives and societies. 
Unlike Barlow, the critique does not turn on the form in which 
information is conveyed—that is, bottles or no bottles, in Barlow’s 
 
Chander and Madhavi Sunder, Dancing on the Grave of Copyright?, 18 DUKE L. 
& TECH. REV. 143, 143 (2019).  I have to disagree. Indeed, in the very passage 
they quote to substantiate that claim, Barlow seems to me to say the reverse, that 
while dancing on the grave of copyright might seem enjoyable, it does not solve 
the problems we have. “While there is a certain grim fun to be had in it, dancing 
on the grave of copyright and patent will solve little, especially when so few are 
willing to admit that the occupant of this grave is even deceased, and so many 
are trying to uphold by force what can no longer be upheld by popular consent.” 
Barlow, supra note 12, at 14 (emphasis added). 
48 Chander and Sunder, supra note 47, at 145. 
49 Id. 
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parlance. Rather, the critique is premised on the nature of art itself . 
. . .50 
Sunder and Chander give many examples of the use of copyright law to 
regulate cultural creativity on the microlevel. They conclude by using 
memes to illustrate their point—and to close their article with an actual 
debate in meme form. To get that, you will have to read the article.51 
 Peter Jaszi—who introduced me to copyright law, Ring Lardner 
and a host of other fascinating subjects—has had a central role in 
copyright reforms and attempted copyright reforms over the last 25 
years. Most of all he has seen some of the successful campaigns to derail 
the kinds of copyright expansions that Samuelson and Hashimoto 
decried. In his essay for this volume, What Didn’t Happen: An Essay in 
Speculation,52 he celebrates the power of inaction. 
Some of the last 25 years’ most important positive developments in 
copyright policy have—in fact—been negatives: the collapse of the 
SOPA/PIPA bills in 2012, the congressional failure to enact 
categorical and comprehensive paracopyright legislation in 1998, 
and the long and ultimately successful effort (throughout the mid-
and late-90’s) to block enactment of sui generis database protection 
in U.S. law. The congress’s failure to enact term extension 
legislation (despite having been greenlighted by the Supreme Court 
in Eldred v. Reno) is another example.  
So one minor goal of this essay is to celebrate the power of 
inaction. Another is to acknowledge the pleasure of having your 
predictions proven wrong. I’m happy to say that in 1995 I told a 
Senate panel that a 20-year term extension would be “represent[] a 
down payment on perpetual copyright on the installment plan.” 
Obviously, and happily, it didn’t work out that way . . . .53 
Jaszi’s point is a good one. Most of the Barlowian energy over the last 25 
years has been devoted to a series of attempts to block attempts to 
expand copyright law, sometimes in ways that seemed to threaten 
fundamental and attractive components of the internet. Bills with 
acronym names like SOPA and PIPA tried to make the web safe for 
copyright, but in the process also seemed to make it safe for censorship. 
Jaszi, though, focuses in particular on a series of expansions of copyright 
that affect the network principally in denying to ourselves the ability to 
 
50 Id. at 146–148 (footnotes omitted). 
51 That comment was the academic equivalent of clickbait. 
52 Peter Jaszi, What Didn’t Happen: An Essay In Speculation, 18 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 162 (2019). 
53 Id. at 162–63 (footnotes omitted).  
No. 1]                 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW                    58 
 
use it to share the culture of the past: copyright term extension. He 
focuses on the terms of the debate. 
For decades, arguments on both sides of the issue were primarily 
made in what might be called a “consumerist” frame, with 
crisscrossing claims about whether a more robust public domain 
would (or wouldn’t) offer more conventional information goods at 
lower prices. For many (or most) of that era’s public domain 
advocates, myself included, engaged with the issue primarily, if not 
exclusively, in similar terms. Even the heroes of the early resistance 
to term extension, such as the late Professor Dennis Karjala, cast 
their arguments about the costs of a longer protection period 
primarily in terms of the loss to the public of specific finished 
derivative works (such as motion pictures based on public domain 
originals) that it might bring about—an expanded argument, to be 
sure, but one with roots in the dominant consumerist rhetoric 
nonetheless . . . .  
This narrow, market-oriented understanding of the value of the 
public domain enabled, in turn, another set of tropes, in which the 
public domain was figured as a kind of information limbo in which 
neglected works linger precisely because nobody owns them . . . .54 
But Jaszi argues that both the culture and the terms of the debate have 
changed, in precisely the way that Barlow might have predicted; because 
the network actually changes the way we experience culture. 
Thanks to sweeping changes in the way we think and talk about 
networked digital technology, no one ever again can refer to the 
Internet as a “series of tubes” without major risk of embarrassment.  
What once was viewed as a delivery system is now commonly 
figured as a space for virtual interaction and collaboration—in 
accord with Barlow’s foundational vision.  And it is this shift that 
(in turn) has enabled the emergence of what was for many a whole 
new way to think about the public domain: less as a repository for 
disregarded cultural cast-offs and more as a rich mine of source 
material.  To those of us with an early inchoate sense of the 
potential value inherent in the unowned, it provided a new wealth of 
practical and appealing examples of why the public domain really 
mattered. For others, direct experience online was a powerful 
teacher in its own right . . . .  
 . . . . 
In an environment marked by ubiquitous high-speed Internet 
connectivity, 200 million active websites, and a vast array of 
information tools, the Web hasn’t brought us everything we 
 
54 Id. at 168–69 (footnotes omitted). 
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hoped—and has brought much we might never have wished to see. 
Ultimately, though, it was the Internet itself that came to the rescue 
of copyright’s open spaces. In this at least, John Perry Barlow’s 
organic vision of cyberspace has been realized.55 
The final essay in this volume comes from Charles Nesson, one 
of the creators of Harvard’s Berkman (later Berkman-Klein) Center and a 
person who, like Barlow, embraced the possibilities that the network 
opened up for human freedom. Nesson closes the circle on Barlow’s 
Declaration by offering one of his own; A Declaration of the Mission of 
University in Barlowspace.56 Nesson takes seriously the ills that the 
network has unleashed or magnified, as well as the good that it has done. 
He argues, in fact, that we need closed spaces as well as open ones, 
curated bases of knowledge as well as free-form self-indexing ones. He 
has a candidate for these closed spaces: our universities. 
Universities and schools, on behalf of future generations, I ask 
you to preserve space for freedom of mind into the future. Only in 
such shared mindspace will human liberty of thought survive.  
. . . .  
. . . [T]rust is not an inherent feature of the open net. We must find 
and build trust within closed classrooms within the wider 
environment of the open net. Unless the cyberspace of our future 
contains interior closed spaces in which human trust and freedom of 
mind can live, truth as we have known it will not survive.  
. . . .  
. . . To find freedom of mind amid the enveloping surveillance and 
lurking trolls of the open net has proven to be more difficult than 
many expected. The game is not over. Create space for freedom of 
mind NOW. Let us call it Barlowspace in his honor.57 
*** 
There is much about the contemporary web to make one despair. 
Some of it has to do with the architecture of openness. The freedom and 
anonymity that empowers the dissident also protects the troll. Some of it 
has to do with basic problems in human psychology. We are not as 
rational as we would like to imagine ourselves and the web can be an 
echo chamber in which those psychological flaws are amplified in an 
endless feedback loop. Some of it has to do with regulatory mistakes we 
have made. The fights over net-neutrality or Europe’s Article 13 did not 
 
55 Id. at 171–73 (footnotes omitted). 
56 Charles R. Nesson, A Declaration of the Mission of University in 
Barlowspace, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 174 (2019). 
57 Id. at 174–75. 
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go well. Some has to do with the ability of corporations to replace open 
with closed, to move from the open web to the closed and controlling 
app. Some has to do with forms of economic concentration, arguably 
aided by lax antitrust enforcement, to which the web gives the additional 
winner-take-all power of network effects. In all of this it is particularly 
easy to lose hope, which perhaps explains the vitriol with which 
Barlow’s more hopeful (and naïve) pronouncements were attacked. No 
one is more bitter than the idealist who has lost his faith.  
Yet to succumb to doom and gloom would be a mistake. At the 
beginning of this essay I said “For all intents and purposes, the web that 
is so central to every aspect of your lives today did not exist at all until 
1991. Maybe 1994, if you talk about mediumly-widespread public use. It 
is as if I told you that no one had thought of roads, or wheels, or air, until 
25 years ago.” The converse is also true. We can see the current state of 
the network as so dreadful because we have become complacent about 
all of the good things it brings to our lives, our culture and our economy. 
This has been the greatest democratization of communicative ability in 
the history of the species. And it happened in a space of 25 years. Of 
course not everything went well! Duh! 
We have a long history of fearing openness: I call it cultural 
agoraphobia58—the ability to see the downside of open systems, 
networks and forms of communication with perfect clarity: 20-20 
downside vision—and yet to be blind to the positive possibilities they 
open up. This is not something new. When the Bible was translated into 
the language of the laity, or the franchise opened wide, people 
predicted—often accurately—the evils that would follow. Conflicting 
theologies, religious schism, demagoguery and ugly fanning of mob 
prejudice; it all actually happened. It happened on the network as well. 
Yet, to return to the question asked by my title, no, “the internet is not 
over.” It is 25 years old. Today’s travails should not make us forget what 
we have gained. Honoring the life and thought of John Perry Barlow 
seems a particularly fitting way to do so. 
 
58 JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 231–36 (2008).  
   
 
   
 
BARLOW’S LEGACY 
CORY DOCTOROW 
“Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the 
present controls the past.”1 
And now we are come to the great techlash, long overdue and 
desperately needed. With the techlash comes the political contest to 
assemble the narrative of What Just Happened and How We Got Here, 
because “Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the 
present controls the past.” 
Barlow is a key figure in that narrative, and so defining his 
legacy is key to the project of seizing the future. As we contest over that 
legacy, I will here set out my view on it. It’s an insider’s view: I met 
Barlow first through his writing, and then as a teenager on The WELL, 
and then at a dinner in London with Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(EFF) attorney Cindy Cohn (now the executive director of EFF), and 
then I worked with him, on and off, for more than a decade, through my 
work with EFF. He lectured to my students at USC, and wrote the 
introduction to one of my essay collections, and hung out with me at 
Burning Man, and we spoke on so many bills together, and I wrote him 
into one of my novels as a character, an act that he blessed. I emceed 
events where he spoke and sat with him in his hospital room as he lay 
dying. I make no claim to being Barlow’s best or closest friend, but I 
count myself mightily privileged to have been a friend, a colleague, and a 
protege of his.  
There is a story today about “cyber-utopians” told as a part of the 
techlash: Once, there were people who believed that the internet would 
automatically be a force for good. They told us all to connect to one 
another and fended off anyone who sought to rein in the power of the 
technology industry, naively ushering in an era of mass surveillance, 
monopolism, manipulation, even genocide. These people may have been 
well-intentioned, but they were smart enough that they should have 
known better, and if they hadn’t been so unforgivably naive (and, 
possibly, secretly in the pay of the future monopolists) we might not be 
in such dire shape today.  
In support of this contention, they cite aphorisms like “The Net 
interprets censorship as damage and routes around it,” coined by 
 
1 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 331 (Outside The Box Ebook 
Publishing 2018) (1949) (ebook). 
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Barlow’s EFF-co-founder and erstwhile roommate John Gilmore who 
rivals Barlow for the title of internet zelig. Gilmore has a hand in the 
invention of the Free Software movement, the legalization of civilian 
access to cryptography, the ISP industry, commercial open source, 
software-defined radio, marijuana legalization, and a hundred other 
projects large and small. 
But context is everything: “The Net interprets censorship as 
damage and routes around it” was a prescription as much as an 
observation. It was uttered in the context of a nascent internet whose 
technical caretakers disagreed on many ethical and technical points, but 
were united in a sense of civic duty to keep the technology open and 
universal and “free as in freedom.” Gilmore didn’t mean, “Stand down 
everyone, we’ve built a censorship-proof internet that will automatically 
maintain its integrity.” He meant, “To you, my comrades-in-arms who 
toil endlessly to make our balky, wonderful invention run, I say: the 
same measures that we take to re-knit our network when a technical 
failure tears holes in its fabric can be repurposed to resist censorship, to 
route around the nodes that have fallen under a censor’s thrall. Our 
shared civic mission, heretofore dedicated primarily to the technical task 
of preserving a forum for discourse, can and should be expanded to the 
political task of preserving that forum, and what’s more, the tactics that 
we have mastered so thoroughly for the former will serve us in the 
latter.”  
Critics of political slogans take note: the fact that a complex idea 
is reduced to a pithy bumper-sticker is not (necessarily) reductive; it can 
be a necessary and extremely valuable convenience. A URL is not a 
web-page and even the best URL rarely substitutes for the page it refers 
to. But requiring us to forego pointers and deal only in things, to refer to 
web-pages solely by their complete texts rather than the brief summaries 
that unambiguously point to them, would be a hard discourse. 
When Barlow advocated for a free internet––“free” in all the 
usefully overlapping and ambiguous senses of that word––he wasn’t 
doing so because he lacked an appreciation of the risks of a monopolized 
internet, or an internet that was under the thumb of a repressive state. 
Rather, he did so precisely because he feared that a globe-spanning 
network of ubiquitous, sensor-studded, actuating devices that were 
designed and governed without some kind of ethical commitment, 
without the pioneering spirit of the early internet and its yeoman 
smallholders who defended it from those who sought to dominate or 
pervert it, that we would arrive at a dystopian future where the 
entertainment industry’s Huxelyism was the means for realizing the 
nightmares of Orwell. 
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You don’t found an organization like the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation because you are sanguine about the future of the internet: 
you do so because your hope for an amazing, open future is haunted by 
terror of a network suborned for the purposes of spying and control.  
 
“If there is hope . . . it lies in the proles”2 
The techlash began within tech. Naturally. Notwithstanding the 
genuine privilege-blindness of techies who often live in a bubble of 
weath, technological competence, and agency, no one was better situated 
to spot the problems with tech––market-concentration, the reckless 
collection and warehousing of sensitive personal information, deceptive 
and manipulative business practices, the misuse of tech by repressive 
states, bullies, stalkers, and would-be ethnic cleansers––than people who 
understood precisely how the technology worked, knew the people 
responsible for the key decisions, and understood their frailty and 
capacity for self-deception. 
These early coalmine canaries were atomized and isolated. At 
EFF, we heard from some of them: whistleblowers who came in with 
printouts and wild tales. Think of Mark Klein, who wandered through the 
front door of the old Shotwell Street office in San Francisco’s Mission 
district with a sheaf of documents and a hard-to-believe tale about his 
years at AT&T building a secret room for the NSA to use while illegally 
wiretapping the whole internet. Klein wasn’t a crank. He was a hero, and 
the litigation spawned by his act of bravery is still underway, more than a 
decade later. 
Tech is a great force-multiplier. The canny user of technology 
can project their will over millions or even billions of devices, and, 
potentially, over the people who use those devices, too. That kind of 
power is terrifying, especially in the hands of unaccountable, frail, and 
fallible elites.  
The project of teaching “STEM” to everyone did not begin as an 
attempt to maximize the national GDP by raising a generation of startup 
founders: it was a prescient attempt at self-defense, a mission to pluralize 
the power of tech.  
“Tech” is not a force unto itself. Technology’s imperatives are 
the imperatives of the people who design, control, and use technology. 
Information doesn’t want to be free, but people do. 
 
2 ORWELL, supra note 1, at 94.  
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Barlow loved people. When Skype was invented, he kept it 
turned on at all hours, and allowed anyone in the world to initiate a 
session with him. Some were colleagues, some were admirers, and a 
good fraction were randos who were just exploring this new 
videoconferencing system. Barlow doted on these randos, and 
rhapsodized about the joy of helping a stranger halfway across the world 
practice their conversational English. 
The last time I spoke with Barlow, as he lay in a hospital bed in 
San Francisco, he told me that if he ever got out, he wanted to go drive a 
car for Lyft, and just meet new people all day long and talk to them about 
what they wanted and what he wanted and make human connections.  
Barlow was not naive about the ways in which humans could be 
terrible to other people and themselves. His posthumously published 
memoir, finished just weeks before he died, is simultaneously full of 
celebrations of the people who crossed his path and score-settling that 
verges on the unseemly or petty.  
It’s just that Barlow thought that the answer to human frailty was 
more humans. The answer to an empathy gap was spending time with the 
people for whom you lacked empathy. That while these things did not 
guarantee the development of an ethical stance, their absence guaranteed 
a kind of rootless, free-floating sociopathy.  
Doctrinal free-market thinkers have excused much sociopathy 
with the self-evident aphorism that “incentives matter.” As with “the Net 
interprets censorship, etc,” this saying references much subtext, notably 
the idea that kindness creates dependency and helplessness. It is a 
doctrine of cruelty, dressed up as pragmatism. 
But incentives do matter. Designing a system that can only be 
navigated by being a selfish bastard creates selfish bastardry, and the 
cognitive dissonance of everyday cruelties generates a kind of protective 
scar-tissue in the form of a reflex of judgment, dismissal, and cruelty. 
And contrariwise, designing a system where we celebrate civic 
duty, kindness, empathy and the giving of gifts without the expectation 
of a reward produces an environment where the angels of our better 
nature can shout down the cruel, lizard-brain impulses that mutter just 
below the threshold of perception. 
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“Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two makes four.”3 
Generations of elevation of selfishness to virtue has produced a 
public discourse where espousing a belief in human goodness marks you 
out as a patsy at best and a dangerous idiot at worst. 
There’s a statistical illiteracy in this proposition. After all, if 99.9 
percent of the world is composed of bastards, how unlikely is it that you 
and everyone you know are just unremarkably flawed vessels whose 
nature fluctuates between reaction and reason?  
But the idea that humans are mostly OK and made worse or 
better by the stories they tell about their own nature has been in disrepute 
since the Reagan years, and without the freedom to admit this otherwise 
obvious truth, we’ve had to compose all kinds of other excuses for our 
world. 
Take the concentration of tech into Big Tech: the theorists who 
insisted that unfettered markets and doctrinal selfishness would produce 
competitive and vibrant markets find themselves scrambling to explain 
the conversion of the internet from a crazy bazaar into five big services 
filled with screenshots from the other four. They field all manner of 
unconvincing explanations for this phenomenon, like “first-mover 
advantage”4 or “network effects,”5 because they can’t say, “Dismantling 
antitrust enforcement gave rise to a new wave of trusts on a scale not 
seen since the robber-barons.”  
But if first-movers and network effects predicted success, we’d 
all be searching the internet by logging into Altavista from our Crays.  
The utterly plausible explanation for Big Tech––that we stopped 
enforcing the rules that punished underhanded growth tactics like 
mergers to monopoly––is resisted with the fervor of an anti-vaxxer 
explaining away their kid’s measles: “It’s not because I didn’t get her 
vaccinated, it’s because of environmental toxins!” 
 
3  ORWELL, supra note 1, at 109. 
4 “In marketing strategy, first-mover advantage (FMA) is the advantage gained 
by the initial (‘first-moving’) significant occupant of a market segment.”  First-
mover advantage, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-
mover_advantage (last accessed June 9, 2019).  
5 “A network effect (also called network externality or demand-side economies 
of scale) is the effect described in economics and business that an additional 
user of a good or service has on the value of that product to others. When a 
network effect is present, the value of a product or service increases according to 
the number of others using it.” Network effect, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_effect (last accessed June 9, 2019). 
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Bigness multiplies all the risks of tech. Putting everyone’s social 
lives on Facebook creates a one-stop shop for mass-scale manipulation. 
Putting everyone’s mobile data in one of two silos creates an irresistible 
target for state surveillance. Putting everyone’s attention at the mercy of 
four or five gatekeepers turns their normal human foibles and cherishes 
illusions into facts of life that everyone else in the world must navigate.  
Think of this in analogy to climate change. Your racist Facebook 
uncle’s climate denial around the Thanksgiving table may ruin your 
digestion, but it won’t cook the planet. But change your uncle’s name to 
Koch, give him a multi-billion-dollar warchest, give it a generation, and 
before you know it we’ll be drinking our urine and digging through 
rubble looking for canned goods. 
In the same way, your idiotic college roommate’s social theory 
that “everyone should just be honest, all the time,” might make you want 
to change the locks on your dorm-room. But make that kid’s name 
Zuckerberg, put him in charge of the social lives of two billion people, 
and his bizarre belief that “Having two identities for yourself is an 
example of a lack of integrity”6 becomes an existential threat to human 
thriving. 
Implicit in the belief in bigness is a belief in a special kind of 
person, an Ayn Randian titan, whose innate superiority is so fabulous 
that any attempt to rein it in will redound to the detriment of all of us. 
Markets act as a kind of sorting hat, finding these natural rulers and 
elevating them to positions of power, and the scurrying little people’s 
misguided attempt to dethrone them must be resisted, for their own 
sakes. 
But no one is smart enough and competent enough to be the 
dictator of two billion peoples’ social lives. It’s not merely that Mark 
Zuckerberg is wrong about how people get along, it’s that no one is right 
enough to wield that power. 
Generations of insistence that some among us are born to rule, 
and revelations that the people who rise to power in that environment are 
at best fallible and at worst deplorable have created a massive 
dissonance, a great collective yearning for a One True King to lead us 
out of our dark times. 
There’s a narrative about Cambridge Analytica and the 2016 
election of a boorish white supremacist grifter to the US presidency: 
 
6 See Miguel Helft, Facebook, Foe of Anonymity, Is Forced to Explain a Secret, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/14/technology/14facebook.html. 
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Cambridge Analytica lied about everything except their sales literature, 
where they truthfully revealed that they had discovered a way to turn 
Facebook into a mind-control ray that would make decent people into 
racists. 
But there’s another, more plausible version of that narrative: 
Facebook spied on everyone and found all the racists, whose 
imperfections have a variety of causes, but prominent among them is the 
belief that some people are better than others and markets tell you who is 
and isn’t good. Having found the racists, Cambridge Analytica 
convinced them that voting for Donald Trump would advance their 
cause.  
This version of events suggests several countermeasures: make 
Facebook stop spying on people; help people see that the winners and 
losers in the marketplace are better predicted by cruelty and indifference 
to their neighbors than by virtue; ease the anxiety that everyone who 
doesn’t win big in the 21st Century lottery will lose terribly.   
That is: fix the incentives; find the better natures of people; help 
people understand and master their technology; reverse the forces that 
permit a few people to rise to dominate the rest of us.  
That is: treat the internet with the gravitas that it is due, as a 
system that could be a force for great human flourishing, but only if we 
ensure that it isn’t used to snuff out human dignity and agency. 
Barlow made his reputation by insisting, long before it was 
obvious to most people, that getting the internet’s future right would be a 
necessary precondition to getting humanity’s future right. By insisting 
that the toy network used for telling jokes and arguing about Star Trek 
would grow up to be the pluripotent network that allowed anyone, 
anywhere to talk to anyone else, anywhere, using any program or 
protocol they chose. By insisting that the internet be regulated with 
regard to all the ways that it would come to touch our lives in the 
future—and not merely as a better radio station, or a very convenient 
video-on-demand service, or a jihadi recruiting tool, or as the greatest 
pornography distribution system in human history. 
When a problem is a long way off, activists’ primary activity for 
many years is to simply convince people that there is a problem: that 
someday your cigarettes will give you cancer; that someday, climate 
change will threaten billions of lives; that someday, the text-messaging 
system called “the internet” will grow to be our species-wide, 
civilization-spanning nervous system. 
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But if the activist is right, then eventually convincing people that 
there is a problem will take care of itself. Your doctor finds a tumor. 
California burns. Burmese mobs visit genocide upon the Rohingya. 
I call that moment “peak indifference.” It’s the moment when the 
problem’s unchecked progress creates its own momentum, and every 
day, of their own accord, people recognize that the problem is there. 
After peak indifference, the activist’s job changes: now, they 
must convince people not to give in to nihilism. Because by the time a 
problem like cancer or climate or concentration is so manifest that we 
can’t deny it, it can seem like it’s too late to do anything about it.  
After peak indifference, the activist’s job changes to convincing 
people to have hope. 
Barlow never gave up hope. He was unabashedly, unashamedly, 
publicly and vocally hopeful. 
That hope plays into the narrative of techno-utopian naivete. But 
Barlow wasn’t naive. He knew how much trouble we were in––and he 
also knew how wonderful things could be, if we could only dig ourselves 
out of that trouble. The techlash isn’t a repudiation of Barlow’s 
hopefulness: it is his vindication. 
Barlow’s legacy, then, isn’t a foolish belief that history would 
steer clear of dystopia of its own accord; rather, his legacy is the noble 
belief that we, together, pluralistically and through collective reasoning 
and collective action, could navigate the dangerous waters we find 
ourselves in, patch the holes the rocks knocked in our ship, and find our 
way to a better land.  
INVENTING THE FUTURE:  
BARLOW AND BEYOND 
 
CINDY COHN 
We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or 
prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or 
station of birth. 
We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his 
or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced 
into silence or conformity. 
. . . . 
We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be 
more humane and fair than the world your governments have made 
before.1 
 I know the purpose of this volume is not to merely praise or bury 
John Perry Barlow, but to use him as a jumping off point. But I don’t 
think I can get to the second part without addressing what many of his 
critics miss about what he was trying to do with the A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace (Declaration).   
 Since Barlow’s death, I’ve spent a lot of time trying to ensure 
that the straw men who have Barlow’s face taped to them don’t 
overshadow the actual man. The basic straw man story goes like this: 
Barlow was the leader of a band of naïve techno-utopians who believed 
that the Internet would magically fix all problems without creating any 
new ones. History has shown that the Internet didn’t solve all problems 
and created many new ones, so Barlow was a fool or worse. Pieces like 
this showed up periodically during his lifetime too.   
 To be fair, the real Barlow definitely was an optimist and he 
loved all attention, positive or negative. You could argue that he 
sometimes pasted his own face on that straw man.  Especially in the 
Declaration, his language was expansive and visionary. You don’t start a 
legal or policy argument with: “you weary giants of flesh and steel.”2 
You don’t seek nuance with: “I declare the global social space we are 
building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose 
 
1 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 18 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5, 5–7 (2019), reprinted from John Perry Barlow, A 
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (FEB. 
8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.  
2 Id. at 5.  
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on us.”3 In talking about the Declaration at Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) many years later, Barlow admitted that when he 
stepped out of a party at Davos to write it, he was both a little drunk and 
trying desperately to channel Thomas Jefferson. So maybe some of the 
sweeping rebukes are just trying to match his original bravado.   
 But I think that this approach misses what Barlow was up to. 
Barlow wasn’t trying to predict the future; he was trying to invent it. 
Here’s what he wrote in response to one of those “straw men” articles in 
the Washington Post in 2015:   
I [] knew that we were building the most penetrating and total 
surveillance system that could be imagined, and I was no more 
comfortable with the Googles (which didn’t exist but predictably 
would) who would peer out through those All-Seeing Eyes than I 
was with an equally enhanced NSA, Chinese Government, or 
United States Cyber Command. However, just as Alan Kay said, 
“The best way to predict the future is to invent it,” I knew it’s also 
true that a good way to invent the future is to predict it. So I 
predicted Utopia, hoping to give Liberty a running start before the 
laws of Moore and Metcalfe delivered up what Ed Snowden now 
correctly calls “turn-key totalitarianism.” Which is now available to 
a number of secretive institutions, public and private (not that 
there’s a useful distinction).4   
 Barlow was trying to use the force of his will and mighty pen to 
bring a good future to pass in a world where it was far from certain. He 
was trying to get out ahead of what he knew would be the powerful 
forces against freedom online.   
To be truthful, I didn’t really understand that at first either. I 
used to start my early Internet law presentations with a quote from 
Ecclesiastes: “there is nothing new under the sun.”5 I would then 
proceed, like a good American litigator, to tie the liberties of the future 
Internet to the precedents in the founding of the country. I would tie 
anonymous online speakers to Publius of the Federalist Papers.6 I would 
tie the need for digital encryption to the physical encryption systems 
 
3 Id.  
4 Letter to the Editor from John Perry Barlow to the Wash. Post (sent in response 
to J. Silverman, The Internet’s First Anarchist, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2015 
(evening edition)).    
5 Ecclesiastes 1:9. 
6 A series of 85 essays, written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and 
John Jay, explaining the Constitution and urging its ratification in the State of 
New York. See generally THE FEDERALIST (Alexander Hamilton et al). 
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used by Madison and Jefferson.7 Later I would tie the fight against mass 
surveillance to James Otis’ fight against general warrants.8 Since 
Barlow’s assertions were factually wrong—of course people could be 
held accountable for what they did online as long as their feet touched 
down in the jurisdiction of some government somewhere—I worried that 
he risked us losing the civil liberties and human rights online that so 
many had worked so hard to win offline.  
In retrospect, we both had useful strategies for convincing 
different audiences to protect freedom online. It’s just that I aimed for 
the Supreme Court while Barlow aimed for the sky. Unlike me, he gave a 
big voice to the dream that the digital world could be a chance for a fresh 
start against the incumbents—governments, telecommunications 
companies, movie and record cartels and more. His vision drew strongly 
on that powerful American idea that one could, like Huck Finn, “light out 
for the territory” to start anew.9  
Remember, Barlow was writing in 1996 as the United States 
government tried to stop “indecent” speech online and demanded that all 
telecommunications lines be built to be easily tappable.10 Barlow co-
founded EFF with Mitch Kapor and John Gilmore in 1990 in response to 
government raids on online services like bulletin boards that reflected a 
nearly complete lack of understanding about the early users of public 
digital networks.11 Governments were the biggest worry for building a 
 
7 See Rachel B. Doyle, The Founding Fathers Encrypted Secret Messages, Too, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/h3ll0-mr-
pr3s1d3nt/521193/; see also Chris Campbell, Thomas Jefferson Used 
Encryption, LAISSEZ FAIRE BOOKS (Sept. 1, 2012), https://lfb.org/thomas-
jefferson-used-encryption/.  
8 See Kade Crockford, A Brilliant Young Man Who Left Plum Job in Opposition 
to General Warrants (in 1760), AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (June 18, 2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/secrecy/brilliant-young-man-who-
left-plum-job-opposition-general-warrants; see also David Snyder, The NSA’s 
“General Warrants”, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (2007), 
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/generalwarrantsmemo.pdf.  
9 MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 295 (Glassbook 
Classic N.D.) (1884) (ebook).  
10 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1021 (2012)); see 
also Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2012)). 
11 See John Perry Barlow, A Not Terribly Brief History of the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 8, 1990), 
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free technology future in the early to mid-1990s so it’s no surprise that 
Barlow focused his attention there.12 
Barlow did so much inventing of the future that sometimes we 
forget what has gone his way. Chief among them is that the digital 
revolution eliminated barriers that physical distance used to create for 
information sharing and connection. He inspired people to believe that 
this new network would let them speak and connect to anyone around the 
world. On that score, the Internet has given a voice to far more people 
than broadcast or cable television or newspapers. Barlow’s vision 
arguably led, along with some strong legal strategy, to the Supreme 
Court’s embrace of the Internet as a place protected by the First 
Amendment in Reno v. ACLU:  
From the publishers’ point of view, it constitutes a vast platform 
from which to address and hear from a world-wide audience of 
millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers. Any person or 
organization with a computer connected to the Internet can 
“publish” information. Publishers include government agencies, 
educational institutions, commercial entities, advocacy groups, and 
individuals.13  
 This promise is not over. At EFF we continue to work with 
people in remote (and not so remote) parts around the world who are 
struggling to make their voices heard and who still view the Internet as 
that best pathway to operating outside of repressive government control.  
Oppressed people worldwide continue to go to extraordinary lengths to 
use the Internet to get their message out to the world.   
Barlow’s early focus on governments as key obstacles to online 
freedom has helped us gain some protections that we might not have had 
without him. In order to ensure that the Internet became a place for 
formerly marginalized voices, we helped ensure that those places could 
 
https://www.eff.org/pages/not-terribly-brief-history-electronic-frontier-
foundation.   
12 Barlow didn’t just write about governments in the 1990s either and those who 
stop with the Declaration are selling him short.  In 1993, long before the 
Declaration, Barlow published Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of 
Mind on the Global Net. This essay, much longer and less expansive than the 
Declaration, recognized that the internet would create fundamental problems for 
intellectual property regimes and the companies that make their money from 
them. See John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of 
Mind on the Global Net, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8 (2019), also available at 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (1994), https://www.eff.org/pages/selling-wine-
without-bottles-economy-mind-global-net. 
13 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997). 
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exist, in part by standing up for the idea that, except in criminal 
circumstances, hosts should not be held legally responsible for what 
those voices say.14 We have also seen digital search and seizure laws 
move slowly in the right direction, most importantly through the growing 
recognition from the Supreme Court, that the Fourth Amendment must 
be interpreted to reflect the realities of the modern world.15 We lifted 
government restrictions on developing and sharing tools that protect 
privacy and security.16  
Today we take it for granted that we can type or talk or scheme 
or build a tool or product or share or store information with someone in 
Gabon, Sao Paolo, or Bali just as easily as we can someone across town. 
People build friendships, create and grow political movements, fall in 
love and make each other laugh or cry across incredible physical 
distances instantaneously. We create mixes and remixes of our culture, 
building on each other’s ideas with insight and ease. We have 
collaborative projects from Wikimedia to the Tor Project to Creative 
Commons Network, which span the globe in ways that were unthinkable 
in 1990. The same is true for businesses large and small. That this sort of 
distance-hopping would become commonplace was not obvious in the 
1990s. Barlow’s impact, “We will spread ourselves across the Planet so 
that no one can arrest our thoughts[,]” is undeniable.17 
But there are major differences in the world we inhabit now and 
the world Barlow tried to invent. One of the key areas that has emerged 
as critical is a focus on how, through network effects, a lack of 
competition and stifled innovation, a small set of private entities has 
 
14 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012) (protecting, through the safe harbor provisions of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, service providers who meet certain 
conditions from monetary damages for the infringing activities of their users and 
other third parties on the Internet); 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012) (providing, in the 
safe harbor provision of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider”).  
15 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (stating that as 
“technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas 
normally guarded from inquisitive eyes,” the Supreme Court must assure 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted).  
16 See Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that software source code was speech protected by the First 
Amendment and that the government’s regulations preventing its publication 
were unconstitutional).   
17 Barlow, supra note 1, at 7.  
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ended up having a tremendous impact on our civil liberties even if they 
are not the primary focus of the Constitution. While in the 1990s it was 
reasonable to focus on the government as the biggest risk to freedom 
online, we now have to address the problem of centralized corporate 
power, both as a tool of governmental repression and as its own problem 
for privacy, speech, and innovation.18 Governments didn’t go away, 
though. With the rise of authoritarian governments around the world we 
may soon see more focus on Barlow’s original targets and there are now 
far more of them that have the technical wherewithal to censor, 
undermine and attack activists. The growth in the importance of the 
Internet means that the fronts on which we have to defend it have grown 
too.  
Unlike the early days of the Internet, where a somewhat blank 
slate allowed the powerful offline incumbent companies to be cheerfully 
upended by upstart new players, we now have a set of big Internet 
companies that, having created their fortresses, are now trying to pull up 
the ladder. This is in addition to the long-ago success of the big 
telecommunications companies in eliminating serious competition in the 
broadband market. So, from the top layer of the Internet infrastructure to 
the bottom we have fewer choices and leverage than we should.   
Sadly, the big Internet companies are now backing away from 
the kinds of protections that helped make it possible for them to exist. 
They are too often abandoning any commitment to provide a forum for 
marginalized people to speak, including the legal protections necessary 
for someone to create a new speech platform. They attack or fail to 
defend the right to build interoperable and competitive tools. They use 
one-sided click-wrap “contracts” to both disempower their users and 
support technical and legal claims that prevent reverse engineering and 
other sorts of follow-on innovation. These Internet giants may not need 
the protection of these laws anymore, but their future competitors will.   
This centralization of corporate power has other consequences as 
well. Barlow believed that new approaches to solving conflicts would 
emerge, “Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will 
identify them and address them by our means. We are forming our own 
Social Contract.”19 At this point in our contentious Internet history, it’s 
clear that this hasn’t occurred, at least not yet and not at scale. 
 
18 Note that Barlow himself recognized this concern about corporate power in 
2015. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  There are smatterings of it in 
earlier writings as well—Barlow had no love for monopolies or cartels, even if 
that wasn’t his primary concern in the Declaration. 
19 See Barlow, supra note 1.  
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Harassment, hatred and other serious problems online have instead 
spurred calls for large online platforms to serve as judge, jury and 
executioner of what people may say online, even as the business models 
of these platforms arguably feed this behavior. The big companies have 
obliged, and now happily report how much speech they have censored 
rather than how well they have done differentiating the bad speech from 
the good or providing a forum for marginalized voices, much less 
adjusting their business models.   
Finally, we have not succeeded in building a world “without 
privilege or prejudice,” instead all too often re-creating or even making 
worse offline discrimination of marginalized people. While technology 
has made it possible for marginalized groups to find each other, associate 
and build communities together, this has not translated into the kind of 
political, financial or social power Barlow envisioned. Worse, the 
technology companies that have reaped the most financial benefits of this 
new world are even less diverse at the top than the corporate dinosaurs 
they replaced.   
In the end, I think Barlow was right to focus on technological 
advances empowering users and communities to self-organize to respond 
to bad actors and actions online, even if we aren’t there yet. But we also 
need law and policy to ensure that we can create and support the tools 
necessary to keep the Internet free. Without that, the big corporations are 
inevitably going to cater to those with the most power and voice, rather 
than stand with the less powerful. And governments will happily put 
pressure on them to do so. By pressuring our corporate dictators to 
protect us, without efforts to empower users and communities to protect 
themselves, we risk further re-creating online the marginalization that the 
powerless have long experienced.   
In short, we are seeing that in many ways the new bosses are the 
same as the old bosses. Offline prejudices and power differentials are 
more easily replicated online than Barlow had hoped—and they are just 
as difficult to undo.  
INVENTING 2039 
So on to the fun question posed by this symposium. What should 
we take from today into the next 20 years? Or as Barlow might put it, 
what do we need to say and do today to invent the future we want? While 
a short answer could be that we want to win our current fights: rein in 
government surveillance, protect coders, privacy and freedom of 
expression, ensure neither copyright nor overbroad criminal laws squelch 
freedom of expression, freedom to tinker or innovation online, and more.   
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But Barlow would want us to go further. I brainstormed a bit 
with my EFF colleagues and the theme that came up consistently in our 
conversations was envisioning a future where power and control rested to 
the end points in the network—the humans. Here are some of the ideas 
we generated, presented with a light touch of Barlow-style rhetoric:   
We are building a civilization that empowers humans as the 
users, builders and beneficiaries of technologies. Governments, 
businesses, religions, cultures, communities and robots all matter, but 
they all work under, and are transparent to, the bright light of the humans 
they serve. We’re building a society that gives power back to people, 
especially those who have been robbed of it for too long. We 
unflinchingly recognize the bias and prejudices that have forestalled 
equity and caused our visions of a just society to fall short, and we use 
the power of technology and law to ensure those wrongs cannot invade 
further into our digital societies.   
We are building a world where the users have primary control 
over their tools, devices and networks. Technology serves us, not the 
other way around, and it treats efforts to surveil, track or profile us as 
hostile measures that should be blocked. Where it cannot, we have 
protected pathways—legal, technological, policy and cultural—so that 
we can leave those walled gardens, panopticons and crystal prisons to 
build our own new worlds.    
We’re building a society where technological advances serve to 
empower humans rather than tricking, manipulating or replacing them. 
Builders take care to ensure that all technologies, no matter how 
sophisticated, are fundamentally accountable to the humans who are 
impacted by them, not just the humans who build or deploy them.  
We are building a society where control has moved from 
centralized systems—from the Facebooks and Amazons and 
Alphabets—to the end points, the users. A society where power is 
distributed along with technology, including the power to control who 
can see what we do and say and to keep ourselves secure. We are 
building a civilization where people not only have the right to speak, 
they have the right to have their voices heard and heeded. A civilization 
where people can gather together to build a better world, free of 
government or corporate surveillance. A civilization where agreements 
must really be “agreed” to, because all those party to them have the 
power to require a real negotiation and meeting of the minds. A 
civilization where the consequences of inevitable technological mistakes 
and glitches are borne by those who implement and benefit from the 
technology, not just those who are affected by their mistakes or lack of 
care.  
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We seek a civilization governed not by corporate policies but 
primarily by self-governing communities of trust, where protections for 
users come from their tools and communities, who have careful, 
thoughtful mechanisms for stepping in when users are harassed, 
threatened or harmed, along with mechanisms to correct mistakes and 
redress wrongs. If that fails, people can obtain real legal redress from 
those who have harmed them, but also have an easy path to leave, 
including to choose or start a community that better reflects their values 
and protects them. We seek a world where people have many such 
communities to choose from and can participate in multiple ones 
seamlessly, including choosing a separate identity for each. Ultimately, 
we seek a civilization that contains multiple options, laboratories and 
experiments for how to organize a society, so that we can all learn and 
make conscious choices to move forward.   
We are building a civilization where empowerment is not 
expressed through property rights, ownership and one-sided adhesion 
contracts as much as by protecting autonomy and control while still 
promoting free expression and transparency. Just as Barlow recognized 
the need for new methods of monetizing creative work,20 in the next 20 
years we will evolve new ways to establish control and protection over 
our personal data. We will recognize both the need for personal and 
associational privacy and control and the critical role of free flowing 
information in keeping us informed and empowered.  
In short, we are building a world where everyone has free (as in 
speech) access to read, speak, create, and control their experience, 
including creating their own tools and protecting their own privacy. A 
world where humans have the legal, policy and cultural support and 
protection to do so. Where individuals have the strength and processing 
power to take on larger organizations, whether government or corporate, 
as well as to be protected from them. A world where our technology, 
whether as simple as an email or as complex as an AI system, is 
trustworthy and loyal to us.   
May it be more humane and fair than the world your 
governments and giant companies have made before. 
 
20 See Barlow, supra note 12.  
A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UTOPIA? 
YOCHAI BENKLER 
 John Perry Barlow’s two essays capture a yearning to escape the 
oppressive clutches of the two most important institutional forms in 
modernity: the state and market society.  A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace is explicitly against the modern state.  One 
might say, “All right, but apart from the sanitation, the medicine, 
education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a fresh water system, and 
public health, what have the Romans ever done for us?”1  The 
Declaration reflected not only a libertarian utopia that assumed that if 
only the state were to back off markets will take care of it all, but also a 
left-anchored critique of the state as a critical site of protecting the power 
and privilege of elites, insistence that individual self-actualization 
demanded a state contained within narrow boundaries, and a deep 
skepticism of all forms of authority, as Fred Turner showed in From 
Counterculture to Cyberculture.2  Selling Wine Without Bottles is not 
against markets or payment as such, but rather a resistance to the 
totalizing vision of commodity exchange as all there is.  In this, for me a 
telling passage was:  
[M]ost of what a middle class American purchases has little to do 
with survival. We buy beauty, prestige, experience, education, and 
all the obscure pleasures of owning. Many of these things can not 
only be expressed in non-material terms, they can be acquired by 
non-material means.  
And then there are the inexplicable pleasures of information 
itself, the joys of learning, knowing, and teaching. The strange good 
feeling of information coming into and out of oneself. Playing with 
ideas is a recreation which people must be willing to pay a lot for, 
given the market for books and elective seminars. We’d likely 
spend even more money for such pleasures if there weren’t so many 
opportunities to pay for ideas with other ideas.  
This explains much of the collective “volunteer” work which 
fills the archives, newsgroups, and databases of the Internet. Its 
denizens are not working for “nothing,” as is widely believed. 
 
1 MONTY PYTHON’S LIFE OF BRIAN (Sony Pictures 1979). 
2 FRED TURNER, FROM COUNTERCULTURE TO CYBERCULTURE (2006). 
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Rather they are getting paid in something besides money. It is an 
economy which consists almost entirely of information.3  
 Here was the nub of it.  An ambition to live in spaces where the 
commodity form was not everything.  Where we could produce with and 
for each other in relations of social exchange.  The problem was not so 
much markets as markets.  It was the totalizing sense that markets are all 
there is.  Nothing captured this so clearly at the time than the battles over 
music copyright, where the Recording Industry Association of America’s 
(RIAA) vision of a celestial jukebox meant that music was a relationship 
that should be fully mediated by money, down to the briefest moments of 
pleasure or cultural reference.  The position that Barlow presented here, 
widely shared by many of us who worked to theorize and practically 
construct the public domain, was a vision that music was a social 
relationship and that markets had to be cabined alongside a robust 
commons-based cultural production.   
 I spent much of the last twenty-five years focused primarily on 
the latter of the two problems—the extent of the market and how we can 
escape its totalizing reach.  Only occasionally, and quite late in my own 
work, did I turn to how we think about how we counter the oppressive 
potential of the state without losing the benefits of its ability to deliver 
public goods, contain market power, and redistribute wealth.   
 As I was preparing for the oddly introspective exercise of writing 
my contribution here, I dug up an August 1995 draft of the job talk with 
which I tried to persuade law schools to hire me.  I opened with this: 
Recognizing this historical moment presents us with a rare instance 
at which we can make choices about the architecture of the new 
technological base upon which our society and economy will be 
built. Choices we make now will affect investment and use patterns, 
which in turn will further affect the paths along which technology 
itself will develop, and will affect how we conceive of information 
and knowledge, and how we produce and consume that information 
and knowledge. The network architecture and the patterns of use of 
electronic communications that will develop from these choices will 
have significant effects on our cultural, social, and economic 
structure. 
And then closed with: 
Because the attributes of digital communications technology have 
the potential to effect profound changes in the way we interact with 
 
3 John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottes: The Economy of Mind on the 
Global Net, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, 23–24 (2019). 
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one another, the stakes of how we regulate the networks through 
which we will interact are very high. We could move ourselves 
towards a society in which the production and consumption of 
information and knowledge is decentralized and diversified, 
emphasizing those attributes of digital technology that make 
possible nonhierarchical, open communications available on a 
more-or-less equal basis to all end users. We could also move our 
society towards a centralized economy, in which a few large 
information conglomerates have such fine-tuned information about 
our preferences, powers, and vulnerabilities, that they can exert a 
tremendous amount of control over our every choice. We will likely 
move towards something that is neither Cybertopia nor Orwell’s 
dystopia.  But where along the spectrum from phobia to utopia our 
society will actually end up will likely be affected by accumulated 
choices we make today and tomorrow about who controls the 
various components and aspects of the communications 
infrastructure upon which our information society will be built. That 
is where legislators, judges, and lawyers come in, for in every legal 
decision, regulatory action, or law that effects an institutional 
determination about who controls which resources that are pertinent 
to the development of the electronic communications network, a 
piece of our future is being determined. 
Plus ça change.  
 In the 1990s, the particular institutional battle over power to 
control the information economy and society were battles over the scope 
of commons. I thought that the most important choices would be about 
property and commons—in particular how building robust commons 
could provide a steady resource base on which decentralized, self-
governing communities and individuals could construct a robust system 
of information, communications, knowledge, and cultural production that 
was not dependent on market relations and could provide a measure of 
freedom from powerful market actors, as well as from the state. 
 The primary failure of that vision was that except in important 
isolated settings, where commons-based practices took root early and 
were able to outcompete the state and the market, expansion of the 
domain of nonmarket production has stalled. 
 The fundamental battle that I think Barlow insisted we join, and 
that I too focused on, was the right battle for its time.  It continues to be 
the case that battles over the shape of property rights and technological 
affordances will shape bargaining power within markets, and will shape 
the existence and relative prevalence or importance of non-market forms 
of production and social exchange.  It’s still the case that in principle, as 
we project twenty-five years forward, we might be in a world in which a 
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core set of basic materials is pumped into our homes as electricity and 
water are, and feed distributed fabricators (3D printers) become as 
ubiquitous as laundry machines or microwaves.  Such a system would 
allow us to share designs as free and open source software (FOSS), user 
innovation, or fan fiction are shared today, and to fabricate much of the 
stuff we need in non-commodified, household production for our own 
use and to share and exchange with others.  No one has captured the 
potential for such a non-commodified society like Cory Doctorow in 
Walkaway.  It’s still the case that the pattern of control over energy 
generation could shift toward a distributed system, as solar panels and 
wind turbines get connected over a neutral, public grid.  It’s still the case 
that services that depend on platforms could be structured as 
cooperatives.  Whether any of these developments will emerge will 
depend in large measure on what institutional choices we make about the 
technology and about how it is used in actual institutional settings and 
firms. It will depend on whether this time (unlike in the 1990s), we will 
succeed in seeing a population-level cultural change from people 
perceiving themselves as consumers to people seeing themselves as 
producers.  And it will depend on whether we can integrate that shift into 
our day to day practice as a revised view of the state and the market, 
rather than as a displacement. 
 And there’s the rub.  Because the kind of optimism that typified 
Barlow’s writing, as well as at least some of my own, is much harder to 
sustain now that we’ve seen how the successes of the first generation of 
battles over the commons have turned out.   
 Facebook runs over TCP/IP and WiFi.  The fact that the 
underlying carrier technology and the Internet Protocol are open access 
commons turned out not to have been enough to preserve people’s 
freedom from the power of a small number of corporations.  Both on the 
consumer end, like Roku, and on the cloud services side, Linux is 
everywhere.  The Internet of Things could not run on anything other than 
FOSS and spectrum commons.  And yet, these devices are all centrally 
controlled, and many function as the sensors for pervasive surveillance 
systems.  Just as industrial manufacturers cheerfully emitted pollutants 
and effluents into the commons of the air and water to externalize some 
of their costs, so too are Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple finding 
ways of constructing new bottlenecks above and below the open layers, 
creating new toll booths and points of observation,4 and using the “free” 
nature of the open parts of the infrastructure as low cost input from 
 
4 See generally Yochai Benkler, Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power, 145 
DAEDALUS 18 (2016). 
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which to then mine our “biopolitical public domain,” as Julie Cohen puts 
it.5 
 What the past quarter century has taught us is that there are five 
basic failure modes of commons-based strategies to construct more 
attractive forms of social relations. 
1. Companies and countries can usually sustain focused 
strategic efforts for longer and more actively than 
distributed networks of users.  They can and do use these 
advantages strategically to re-centralize control over 
consumers and voters using mechanisms that are layered 
over or circumvent the still-open parts of the ecosystem.  
This is not true in all cases; Wikipedia has enough 
activated users that they are able to overcome concerted 
efforts to distort information; major FOSS development 
projects of core pieces of infrastructure beat out proprietary 
solutions.  But, as Wikipedia approaches its 20th 
anniversary, we have to recognize that these major 
examples of successful distributed commons-based social 
production continue to be our prime examples.  Time and 
again over the past twenty years we have seen companies 
spending money to harness relatively passive consumers—
whether it is in carrier-operated WiFi networks that 
completely overshadowed the emergence of community 
wireless networks, or whether it is in the App economy that 
Apple introduced, based on the App Store model, that 
increasingly has displaced for most people the open-
standards based personal computer running an open-
standards based html browser.  And in the past five years 
we have seen countries find ways of using the open nature 
of communications to engage in propaganda and 
manipulation, as well as to track dissidents and opponents 
by tapping into the surveillance capabilities that companies 
developed to continuously gather information about their 
users for commercial sale.  
2. Distributed social relations can themselves develop internal 
hierarchies and inequities (the Iron Law of Oligarchy), as 
current debates over Wikipedia and FOSS gender 
participation ratios and governance make clear. 
 
5 See generally Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal 
Construction of the Surveillance Economy, 31 PHILOSOPHY & TECH. 213 (2018). 
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3. Distributed open communications have provided enormous 
play for genuinely hateful and harmful behavior, such that 
we find ourselves seeking some power to control the worst 
abuses—the power of the platforms we want to hold 
democratically accountable, or the power of countries to 
regulate those platforms for us.  As early as Gamergate, 
when networked gamers mobilized to harass and intimidate 
women: game developers and media critics, in the name of 
geek masculinity and free speech, and more prominently 
since the various elections of 2016, we have come to 
appreciate the extent to which fully distributed networks 
can underwrite abusive behavior. 
4. More fundamentally, as long as we live in a society where 
people have to make money to eat and keep a roof over 
their heads, markets produce stuff we really like and want.  
For all the broad complaints about Amazon, it has 
produced enormous consumer welfare.  More directly, for 
all the romanticization of fan videos and remix, the 
emergence of subscription streaming services like Netflix 
and Amazon Prime has been a boon to professional video 
creators and underwritten a golden age of professional 
video entertainment and narrative, both fiction and non-
fiction.   
5. States are still necessary to counter market power, provide 
public goods on a sustained and large-scale basis by using 
coercive taxing and spending powers, redistribute wealth, 
and provide basic social and economic security for the 
majority of the population. 
 Markets and states have proved remarkably resilient and 
adaptive.  Even where technological standards and institutions made it 
possible for commons-based, distributed action to take root, both market 
actors and states have found ways to impose their goals on most of the 
population.  This occurred primarily when the population engaging with 
technology shifted from the more active and technically capable early 
adopters to encompass a broader range of users, most of whom couldn’t, 
or didn’t care to, use the freedoms that early adopters had put in place for 
themselves.  In part, this “domestication” of user creativity was done as a 
sustained, intentional campaign, like the RIAA and MPAA’s litigation 
and legislation campaign against remix culture in favor of the celestial 
jukebox.  In part, it may simply reflect the diversity of motivation among 
human beings and the prevalence of the culture of passive consumption 
when it is available.  Perhaps there simply are more sheep than cats.   
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 Beyond the simple fact that market and state actors re-emerged 
as central sources of power, states in particular seem to present a much 
more likely source of accountable power and counteracting force to 
market-based power than was the prevailing sense among both left- and 
right-libertarians in the 1990s.  A resurgent progressive movement is 
fighting hard to change the basic narrative on how important it is to 
harness the state, accountably and democratically, to play its core roles.   
 So this, to me, is the great challenge facing those of us who still 
want to think of technological change in terms of its effects on social 
relations.  We need a clearer and more fully articulated political economy 
of technology.  We need a better understanding of what the state and the 
market are for, in the context of a genuine three-way interaction between 
state, market, and commons-based production specifically or social, 
nonmarket production more generally.  And we need to internalize the 
limits of anarchism, whether of the right or left spin.  I see present 
debates over blockchain, cryptocurrencies, and re-decentralizing the net, 
and I see in them a rededication to the ideals that Barlow expressed so 
poetically.  The words are still there, but the music seems out of sync 
with the beat of the times.  
INTERNET UTOPIANISM AND THE PRACTICAL 
INEVITABILITY OF LAW 
JULIE E. COHEN 
INTRODUCTION 
 Writing at the dawn of the digital era, John Perry Barlow 
proclaimed cyberspace to be a new domain of pure freedom. Addressing 
the nations of the world, he cautioned that their laws, which were “based 
on matter,” simply did not speak to conduct in the new virtual realm.1 As 
both Barlow and the cyberlaw scholars who took up his call recognized, 
that was not so much a statement of fact as it was an exercise in 
deliberate utopianism. But it has proved prescient in a way that they 
certainly did not intend. The “laws” that increasingly have no meaning in 
online environments include not only the mandates of market regulators 
but also the guarantees that supposedly protect the fundamental rights of 
internet users, including the expressive and associational freedoms 
whose supremacy Barlow asserted. More generally, in the networked 
information era, protections for fundamental human rights—both on- and 
offline—have begun to fail comprehensively. 
 Cyberlaw scholarship in the Barlowian mold isn’t to blame for 
the worldwide erosion of protections for fundamental rights, but it also 
hasn’t helped as much as it might have. In this essay, adapted from a 
forthcoming book on the evolution of legal institutions in the information 
era,2 I identify and briefly examine three intersecting flavors of internet 
utopianism in cyberlegal thought that are worth reexamining: utopianism 
about platforms for distributed cultural and political production (and 
concomitant failure to reckon with the transformative force of 
informational capitalism); utopianism about anonymity as a force for 
institutional disruption (and concomitant failure to acknowledge the 
essential role of institutions in cabining the human capacity for malice 
and mayhem); and utopianism about the relationship between 
information and communication networks and human freedom (and 
concomitant failure to contend with the powerful and inherently 
informational mechanisms by which existing protections for human 
rights are increasingly outflanked and coopted). It has become 
increasingly apparent that functioning legal institutions have 
 
1 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 18 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5, 5 (2012) (originally published on Feb. 8, 1996). 
2 JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS 
OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2019). 
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indispensable roles to play in protecting and advancing human freedom. 
It has also become increasingly apparent, however, that the legal 
institutions we need are different than the ones we have.  
I. THE PLATFORMIZATION OF EVERYTHING:  
DISTRIBUTED PRODUCTION, DATA PRIVACY, AND THE  
PROBLEM OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 
 Some of the scholars and activists who took up Barlow’s call 
prophesied that decentralized coordination of cultural and political 
activity by networked communities of peers would increasingly displace 
centralized, top-down control of cultural and political production, with 
transformative and broadly freedom-promoting effects.3 Without 
question, decentralized production strategies have expanded access to 
information and political capacity-building for people all around the 
world and have come to be regarded as essential tools for fostering 
human freedom in the networked information era. The grander visions of 
wholesale, democratizing transformation in political economy and in 
government have not materialized, however. Instead, strategies for 
decentralized cultural and political production have fueled a very 
different kind of transformation, organized around the emergence of 
dominant global platforms that afford new vantage points for 
surveillance, data harvesting, surplus extraction, and manipulation. 
 Some of the obstacles to commons-based cultural and political 
production were predictable. Leading software firms initially waged 
public and creative campaigns against open source software, labeling it 
unreliable, insecure, and a point of entry for organized crime. Although 
open source products and accompanying services eventually achieved 
widespread penetration in certain industry sectors and some once-
formidable opponents have become adherents, persistent, thorny issues 
continue to surround the interfaces between open source and proprietary 
systems and modules.4 The major content industries have resisted 
 
3 See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); Dan Hunter & F. 
Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951 (2004); 
David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A 
Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in 
COORDINATING THE INTERNET 62–91 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 
1997). 
4 See David S. Evans & Anne Layne-Farrar, Software Patents and Open Source: 
The Battle over Intellectual Property Rights, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004); Bryan 
Pfaffenberger, The Rhetoric of Dread: Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD) in 
Information Technology Marketing, 13 KNOWLEDGE, TECH. & POL’Y 78 (2000). 
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commons-based production and open-access distribution strategies for 
educational and cultural materials and have devised a continuing stream 
of legal and technological methods for asserting control over their 
products and business models.5 Political activists, for their part, quickly 
learned that the networked digital information environment afforded not 
only unprecedented scope for dissent and resistance but also new, hidden 
control points for state censorship and surveillance.6 
 Other failure modes for commons-based production were wholly 
unanticipated, and that was so in part because internet utopian projects 
elevated openness and freedom from control over all other priorities, 
most notably including privacy and data protection. Evangelists for 
internet openness, confident in the ability of enlightened netizens to 
assert their own privacy interests, painted calls for stricter regulation as 
threats to the net’s most fundamental values.7 But openness has proved a 
double-edged sword. The allure of open content models has been a 
powerful factor driving the emergence of new information businesses 
whose revenue models are based on harvesting and monetizing the data 
flows generated by content developers and content users, including 
global platform giants Google, Facebook, and Amazon and a host of 
 
5 See, e.g., Andi Sporkin, Publishers Applaud “Research Works Act,” 
Bipartisan Legislation to End Government Mandates on Private-Sector 
Scholarly Publishing, ASS’N OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS (Dec. 23, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/M5Y5-UJZC; Ian Graber-Stiehl, Science’s Pirate Queen, 
VERGE (Feb. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/DY7H-7D4Y. See generally Anne-
Marie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online 
Copyright Enforcement, 89 ORE. L. REV. 81 (2010); Anne-Marie Bridy, Internet 
Payment Blockades, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1524 (2015); Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively 
Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1 (2006); Julie E. Cohen, The 
Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005); Rebecca 
Tushnet, All of This Has Happened Before and All of This Will Happen Again: 
Innovation in Copyright Licensing, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1447 (2014).  
6 REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE 
STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 51–66 (2012); ZEYNEP TUFECKI, TWITTER 
AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED PROTEST 251–54 
(2017). 
7 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 142–62 
(1998). But see James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty 
and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997); Julie E. Cohen, 
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1373 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look 
at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996). 
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others.8 Platform protocols invite commons-based production 
arrangements, and commons-based production arrangements in turn 
reinforce platform logics of data harvesting and proprietary, algorithmic 
knowledge production.9 
 The results of distributed cultural and political production also 
are not inevitably democracy-promoting, and predictions to the contrary 
have, in retrospect, come to seem extraordinarily naïve. The particular 
quality-control mechanisms that keep open source software robust and 
secure and Wikipedia reliable and (mostly) objective work far less well 
(or not at all) within massively-intermediated environments that are 
optimized to advertiser-driven platform revenue models. In such 
environments, the vaunted “wisdom of crowds” is a scalar, not a vector. 
Algorithmic processes optimized to boost click-through rates and prompt 
social sharing heighten the volatility of online interactions, and 
surveillant assemblages designed to enhance capabilities for content 
targeting and behavioral marketing create powerful—and easily 
weaponized—stimulus-response feedback loops.10 The result is a 
sociotechnical apparatus that is also optimized for stoking outrage and 
deepening preexisting political, ideological, and cultural divisions. 
 Under conditions of pervasive, data-driven intermediation—
enabled in part by thought leaders’ failure to take privacy and data 
protection seriously as worthy and freedom-advancing projects—power 
from below becomes power directed toward whatever purpose its 
organizers want to advance. Platform-based, massively-intermediated 
environments have become fertile breeding grounds for conspiracy 
theories (including coordinated campaigns to foster denialism about 
climate change, vaccination, and similar matters), disinformation 
campaigns designed to discredit political actors and institutions, and 
virulent forms of bigotry, ideological extremism, and ethnic 
 
8 See TOM SLEE, WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING ECONOMY 
(2017); Guy Pessach, Beyond IP—The Cost of Free: Informational Capitalism 
in a Post IP Era, 54 OSGOODE HALL L. REV. 225 (2016). 
9 See Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction 
of the Surveillance Economy, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 213 (2018); Julie E. Cohen, Law 
for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 153–61 (2017). 
10 On clickbait and social sharing strategies, see Bryan Gardiner, You’ll Be 
Outraged at How Easy It Was to Get You to Click on This Headline, WIRED 
(Dec. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/4QXK-5M56; Alice Marwick, Why Do People 
Share Fake News? A Sociotechnical Model of Media Effects, 2 GEO. L. TECH. 
REV. 474 (2018), https://perma.cc/DT4C-94E. On surveillance as behavioral 
conditioning, see generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 
CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF 
POWER (2019). 
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nationalism.11 At the same time, and paradoxically, the increasingly 
pronounced orientation toward manufactured outrage and political 
polarization within such environments also dissipates other kinds of 
political energy. It has become more difficult to enlist networked publics 
in the work of building movements capable of growing, sustaining 
themselves, and organizing for change in the real world.12  
 Among scholars and commentators who write about digital 
media, a debate has raged about whether it is fair to blame dominant 
platforms for these problems. According to media scholar Siva 
Vaidhyanathan, “the problem with Facebook is Facebook,” and more 
specifically the combination of Facebook’s global reach, its 
optimization-based business model, and the ways that its information 
feeds have displaced other, potentially moderating sources of 
information.13 Others argue that such explanations unfairly blame 
platforms for longstanding dysfunctions that are not of their creation.14 
Without question, part of the problem with Facebook and others is the 
preexisting social and cultural divisions that information cascades 
amplify. That logic, though, undercuts the optimism about bottom-up 
organization that the Internet’s founding visionaries expressed. Part of 
the problem with Facebook and other platforms is people, easily 
distracted, highly susceptible to misinformation, and prone to herd 
behavior. It also undercuts the logic that designated the internet and its 
networked virtual spaces as sites of utopian separation for the life of the 
mind. Platform-based environments are inextricably embedded in real-
world societies; platform governance requires real-world, institutional 
(i.e., non-utopian) solutions. 
 
11 See Jonathan Albright, Untrue-Tube: Monetizing Misery and Disinformation, 
MEDIUM (Feb. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/Y6BM-CQCD; Rob Faris, et al., 
Partisanship, Propaganda, and Disinformation: Online Media and the 2016 
U.S. Presidential Election, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOCY’ AT 
HARVARD UNIV. (Aug. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/8SCW-R9HE; Alice 
Marwick & Rebecca Lewis, Media Manipulation & Disinformation Online, 
DATA & SOC’Y (2017), https://perma.cc/356L-XZQA; Christopher Paul & 
Miriam Matthew, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model: 
Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It, RAND CORP.: PERSPECTIVES 
(2016), https://perma.cc/CLB5-A5AG; Julia Carrie Wong, How Facebook and 
YouTube Help Spread Anti-Vaxxer Propaganda, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/3NN6-R5Q7. 
12 See TUFECKI, supra note 6, at 189–222 (discussing examples). 
13 SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS 
US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 1 (2018). 
14 See, e.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, India’s Lynching Epidemic and the Problem 
with Blaming Tech, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/MBA8-LNYZ. 
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II. UNBUNDLING INSTITUTIONS:  
ANONYMITY, TRUST AND THE PROBLEM OF SCALE 
 Other scholars and activists who took up Barlow’s call focused 
on enabling capabilities for distributed, anonymous communication and 
coordination, and here again the scorecard is mixed. It is indisputable 
that anonymity has played an essential structural role in modern 
democratic societies and equally indisputable that networked information 
and communication technologies have provided anonymous dissenters 
with invaluable tools for naming and challenging abuses of economic 
and political power. Around the world, both activists pursuing social 
change and journalists reporting on controversial topics now rely on 
capabilities for anonymous, networked communication to protect 
themselves and their sources, and projects dedicated to creating, 
maintaining, and improving such capabilities have become sites of 
ongoing research and activism in their own right.15 Persistent and 
intractable questions remain, however, about the extent to which 
behaviors that historically have functioned as safety valves within more 
complex institutional structures can assume more central roles in the 
project of securing fundamental rights and freedoms for all people.  
 To begin with, and continuing the themes developed in the 
previous section, anonymous online activity has valences that are more 
complicated than romanticized narratives equating anonymity with press 
freedom and democratic self-determination acknowledge. The projects of 
building and sustaining utopia require utopians—people united in their 
unequivocal commitment to the ground truths and operating norms of a 
utopian project. Some utopian ground truths and operating norms are 
ugly and unworthy of anyone’s allegiance. In networked spaces, cadres 
of technological cognoscenti wield anonymity as a new and potent 
source of social and political power to be deployed toward a wide variety 
of ends. They orchestrate large-scale whistleblowing, operate safe 
channels for journalists, and distribute samizdat on behalf of political 
dissidents—and also spread hate speech, disinformation, and fascist and 
nationalist ideologies.  
 
15 See MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 227–37; Eva Galperin, Cell Phone Guide 
for Occupy Wall Street Protesters (and Everyone Else), ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Oct. 14, 2011), https://perma.cc/7NAC-M9YB; Eva Galperin, Don’t Get Your 
Sources in Syria Killed, COMMITTEE TO PROJECT JOURNALISTS (May 21, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/37NY-TZAQ; Andy Greenberg, Laura Poitras on the Crypto 
Tools That Made Her Snowden Film Possible, WIRED (Oct. 15, 2014); Jenna 
McLaughlin, The FBI vs. Apple Debate Just Got Less White, INTERCEPT (Mar. 8, 
2016), https://perma.cc/LM53-CRJG.  
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 More generally, the trajectories of projects designed to scale up 
certain types of anonymous interaction and communication demonstrate 
that breaking things is easier than rebuilding them. Consider two much-
discussed examples involving anonymous infrastructures for enabling 
fundamental market and governance functions. The first is the 
blockchain, a set of technological protocols for enabling distributed, 
secure authentication of transactions and credentials. In theory, such 
technologies might be deployed within existing institutional fabrics in 
ways that eliminate opportunities for corruption, waste, and rent-
seeking.16 But uses for private surplus extraction and self-interested (and 
environmentally destructive) speculation are far more widespread, and 
some argue that the highest and best uses of blockchain technologies 
involve the creation of alternative currencies to displace state-sponsored 
fiat currency and ultimately the state itself.17 The second example is 
WikiLeaks, which rapidly attained heroic status among civil liberties 
advocates for its stated commitment to facilitating anonymous 
whistleblowing about powerful wrongdoers. WikiLeaks, however, is not 
a free press advocacy organization. It rejects certain essential editorial 
and quality control functions that the press as an institution typically has 
performed and espouses an endgame that is far more disruptive.18 
WikiLeaks’ evolving role in the era of ascendant platform-based 
disinformation campaigns is proof that the distinction matters.19  
 
16 See generally PRIMAVERA DEFILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND 
THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE (2018). 
17 See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Is Bitcoin a Waste of Electricity, or 
Something Worse?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/7G2H-W9T6; 
Nellie Bowles, Making a Crypto Utopia in Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 
2018), https://perma.cc/BZL4-AC5K. See generally KEVIN WERBACH, THE 
BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST (2018). 
18 Compare Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the 
Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 311 (2011) (painting WikiLeaks heroically), with ANDY GREENBERG, THIS 
MACHINE KILLS SECRETS: HOW WIKILEAKS, CYPHERPUNKS, AND HACTIVISTS 
AIM TO FREE THE WORLD’S INFORMATION 285–313 (2012) (developing a more 
neutral account); see also Bill Keller, Dealing With Assange and the Wikileaks 
Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 26, 2011), https://perma.cc/XP5Y-525Z 
(discussing editorial considerations). On the institutional functions of the press, 
see Erin C. Carroll, Platforms and the Fall of the Fourth Estate: Looking 
Beyond the First Amendment to Protect Watchdog Journalism, 79 MD. L. REV., 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3300966. 
19 See Mark Fenster, ‘Bullets of Truth’: Julian Assange and the Politics of 
Transparency (Univ. of Fla. Levin Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 19-12, Jan. 
27, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3323950; David 
A. Graham, Is WikiLeaks a Russian Front?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 29, 2018), 
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 As both of those examples illustrate, moreover, other obstacles 
to coding scalable, anonymity-centered, democratic institutions are 
cultural. As Gabriella Coleman has shown, hacker culture speaks the 
intertwined languages of liberal individualism and libertarianism and 
posits enlightened self-reliance and, by necessary implication, technical 
meritocracy as cardinal virtues.20 Those commitments in turn complicate 
efforts to transform digital anonymity from a tool for resistance to the 
foundation of a stable framework for guaranteeing fundamental rights 
and freedoms. Understood as (anti-)institutional projects, both 
WikiLeaks and blockchain-based cryptocurrency projects reflect 
ideologies that are powerfully utopian but not particularly democratic. 
They express and reproduce a particular kind of moral and ideological 
purity that is inconsistent with a broadly inclusive social compact. And 
they illustrate powerfully that, although capabilities for anonymous 
online communication and coordination have played and will continue to 
play an important role in efforts to secure fundamental rights and 
freedoms for all people, such capabilities cannot stand in for other kinds 
of institution-building. Structurally speaking, anonymous dissent and 
opposition are safety valves. Achieving durable, effective protection for 
fundamental rights and freedoms also requires other mechanisms.  
III. UNRAVELING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:  
INFORMATION, NETWORKS, AND THE PROBLEM OF POWER 
 Both strands of utopian thinking about internet-enabled 
governance that I have just described are rooted in a more general habit 
of utopian thinking about the relationship between information and 
human freedom. That habit is deeply ahistorical. Networked information 
technologies are not simply instruments of liberation, nor do they simply 
afford new avenues for control and cooptation. Over the course of many 
decades, social and legal institutions have come to reflect the shaping 
influence of the “control revolution” that began with the introduction of 
automated information systems into industrial-era factories and 
 
https://perma.cc/W3HT-RMV5; see also Andy Greenberg, How Reporters 
Pulled Off The Panama Papers, The Biggest Leak in Whistleblower History, 
WIRED (Apr. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/WJF9-EUMP (describing investigative 
journalists’ use of encryption tools to coordinate a controlled leak of documents 
detailing a massive scheme for global tax evasion). 
20 See generally GABRIELLA COLEMAN, HACKER, HOAXER, WHISTLEBLOWER, 
SPY: THE MANY FACES OF ANONYMOUS (2014); GABRIELLA COLEMAN, CODING 
FREEDOM: THE ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF HACKING 183–205 (2012). 
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businesses.21 The processes of institutional evolution have produced new 
institutional configurations and competencies that are intensively 
informational in character and that have posed difficult challenges for 
traditional approaches to conceptualizing and enforcing fundamental 
human rights.  
 The same networked capabilities that enable widespread public 
access to information also have enabled powerful corporate entities to 
build and manage far-flung global empires. As a practical matter, such 
entities wield increasing power over the conditions of human freedom. 
Giant transnational corporations that construct global networked supply 
chains enjoy nearly unlimited authority over their workers and outsize 
influence over the surrounding communities. The state-centered human 
rights discourses and institutions that emerged in the post-World War II 
era did not contemplate such rearrangements, and both powerful 
economic actors and the developed economies of the Global North have 
resisted reform efforts that might bring transnational norms and domestic 
constitutional obligations to bear directly on private economic activity.22  
In the U.S., at least, the direction of constitutional reform has run the 
other way.23 
 Capabilities for networked digital communication and for highly 
informationalized, managerial oversight also have catalyzed profound 
changes in the structure and operation of regulatory and governance 
institutions, and those changes have unfolded in ways that have 
accelerated the marginalization of human rights commitments. The 
increasing power and prominence of network-and-standard-based legal-
institutional arrangements for economic governance—arrangements that 
exist to facilitate global flows of extractive activity and that tend to treat 
protective regulation as network damage—has left older human rights 
institutions increasingly sidelined.24 Meanwhile, as emergent human 
rights discourses and practices organized around capabilities for human 
flourishing and sustainable development have encountered and engaged 
 
21 See generally JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: 
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
(1986). 
22 See generally STEFANIE KHOURY & DAVID WHYTE, CORPORATE HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: GLOBAL PROSPECTS FOR LEGAL ACTION (2017). 
23 See generally ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN 
BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018). 
24 On network-and-standard-based governance arrangements, see Julie E. Cohen, 
Networks, Standards, and Network-and-Standard-Based Governance, in AFTER 
THE DIGITAL TORNADO (Kevin Werbach, ed., forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3339351. 
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with economic governance arrangements, they have become increasingly 
expert-driven and inaccessible to the populations whose futures they 
affect. In particular, activists and advocates have raised persistent 
concerns about the methodological tyranny of utilitarianism in the 
articulation of development goals and benchmarks.25 Efforts to reorient 
human rights discourse and practice toward the problem of private 
economic power also have undergone a novel form of institutional 
cooptation that relocates those efforts inside corporations themselves and 
restyles them as “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) practice. 
Initiatives such as the UN Global Compact rely on hortatory strategies to 
extract commitments that may or may not be honored and project an 
image of consensus around gradual forward progress that may or may 
not correspond to reality.26 
 The powerful global platform businesses that have emerged in 
the twenty-first century did not cause any of these changes, but they have 
proved apt at exploiting them. So, for example, as the European Union 
has worked to export its high standards for personal data protection to the 
rest of the world, U.S. platform businesses have supported efforts to 
insert strengthened mandates for cross-border flow into bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements, including especially agreements involving 
the Asian nations that are increasingly significant players in the emerging 
cross-border data servicing economy.27 Platform businesses also have 
taken an entrepreneurial approach to the CSR movement. The Global 
Network Initiative, founded in 2008 by a coalition of platform firms, 
academics, and human rights NGOs, represented an attempt both to 
 
25 See Sally Engle Merry & John M. Conley, Measuring the World: Indicators, 
Human Rights, and Global Governance, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S83 
(2011); AnnJanette Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Trust in Indicators: 
Measuring Human Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 253 (2009). See generally 
KEVIN E. DAVIS, ANGELINA FISHER, BENEDICT KINGSBURY & SALLY ENGLE 
MERRY, EDS., GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH 
QUANTIFICATION AND RANKINGS (2012).  
26 See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John 
Ruggie); The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS 
GLOBAL COMPACT, https://perma.cc/5LZV-AJYY (last accessed June 26, 2018); 
KHOURY & WHYTE, supra note 22, at 48–61. 
27 See Svetlana Yakovleva & Kristina Irion, The Best of Both Worlds? Free 
Trade in Services, and EU Law on Privacy and Data Protection, 2 EUR. DATA 
PROTECTION L. REV. 191 (2016); Graham Greenleaf, Free Trade Agreements 
and Data Privacy: Future Perils of Faustian Bargains, in TRANSATLANTIC 
DATA PRIVACY RELATIONS AS A CHALLENGE FOR DEMOCRACY 181–212 (Dan 
Svantesson  & Dariusz Kloza eds., 2017). 
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coordinate resistance to censorship demands by authoritarian states and 
to respond to criticisms levied at platforms for acceding to such 
demands.28 Compliance with the GNI’s principles, however, remains 
voluntary and inconsistent, even as the vast and growing extent of 
commercial surveillance—encompassing information of an astonishing 
variety, granularity, and intimacy—deepens the symbiosis between 
public and private surveillance power.29  
 Last but not least, data-driven, algorithmic processes multiply 
both obstacles to accountability and opportunities for cooptation of 
accountability structures. Smart digital technologies produce decisions 
that are ad hoc, personalized, and pattern-based rather than principled 
and generalizable. They don’t give reasons for—or even draw attention 
to—the choices they make, and those choices are continually evolving. 
The design of automated machine-learning processes also includes a 
number of steps that scrutiny of their end results does not capture.30 
Those attributes sit in profound tension with traditional articulations of 
the institutional features that a commitment to the rule of law requires, 
and they create oversight problems that extend far outside the traditional 
competencies of courts.31 And here again, efforts to devise new oversight 
mechanisms have offered new avenues for the assertion and reproduction 
of informational power: Consider, for example, the Federal Trade 
Commission’s privacy and data security consent decrees, which rely 
heavily on attestations of compliance by private sector auditors that are 
 
28 GNI Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy, GLOBAL NETWORK 
INITIATIVE (May 2017), https://perma.cc/J32J-GMXB; see MACKINNON, supra 
note 6, at 138–39, 179–82. 
29 See, e.g., Daithi Mac Sithigh & Mathias Siems, The Chinese Social Credit 
System: A Model for Other Countries? (EUI Dept. of Law Working Paper 
2019/01), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3310085; David 
Cole, “We Kill People Based on Metadata,” N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 10, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/ERY2-Z44L; Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, 
The Perpetual Lineup: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, CTR. 
ON PRIVACY AND TECH., GEORGETOWN LAW (Oct. 18, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/8FUT-RR3R; Caroline Haskins, Dozens of Cities Have Secretly 
Experimented with Predictive Policing Software, VICE MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 6, 
2019), https://perma.cc/ZY4B-HDCH; Tim Cushing, Cops Wanting To Track 
Movements Of Hundreds Of People Are Turning To Google For Location 
Records, TECHDIRT (Mar. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/3K3Z-T8P9. 
30 See David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars 
Should Learn about Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653 (2017). 
31 See generally MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE 
END(S) OF LAW: NOVEL ENTANGLEMENTS OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 133–56, 
174–85 (2015); Julie E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL 
INQ. L. 1, (2019). 
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largely unverifiable and that bootstrap self-defined standards of 
adequacy.32 Or consider emergent regimes for “content moderation at 
scale,” which rely on a combination of privatized algorithmic governance 
and standardized performance reporting as a means of demonstrating 
compliance to the outside world.33 Both developments reflect beliefs 
about the best uses of new informational capabilities to manage legal and 
regulatory processes; neither expresses a commitment to robust public 
accountability.  
CONCLUSION 
 None of the problems I have described, of course, is Barlow’s 
fault. But those who would advance the intertwined projects of human 
freedom and democratic self-government should choose their prophets 
carefully—or, perhaps, should not place their faith in prophets at all. 
Advancing human freedom through the absence of law was never really 
in the cards. The difficulty, rather, is that the information-era problems 
now requiring institutional solutions are profoundly unfamiliar to 
institutional actors whose established modes of both action and self-
legitimation are backward-looking. New informational capabilities 
demand both new governance modalities and new institutional 
arrangements capable of deploying them effectively. Due in part to hard-
to-break habits of framing such questions as anti-openness, anti-
innovation, or conducive to censorship (or, more usually, all three), we 
still have vanishingly little idea what such capabilities and structures 
might look like and how they might be conformed in some recognizable 
way to rule-of-law ideals. Those are urgent projects for a post-utopian 
era. 
 
 
32 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common 
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014); Megan Gray, Understanding 
and Improving Privacy Audits under FTC Orders (May 5, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3165143. 
33 See generally TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: 
PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE 
SOCIAL MEDIA (2018). 
REVISITING BARLOW’S MISPLACED 
OPTIMISM 
BENJAMIN EDELMAN†  
 Barlow’s A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace calls 
for a “civilization of the mind in cyberspace,” and he says it will be 
“more humane and fair” than what governments have created.1  Barlow’s 
vision is unapologetically optimistic, easily embraced by anyone who 
longs for better times to come.  Yet twenty years later, it’s easy to see 
some important respects in which reality fell short of his vision.  
Alongside the Internet’s many pluses are clickbait, scams, hacks, and all 
manner of privacy violations.  Ten thousand hours of cat videos may be 
delightful, but they’re no civilization of the mind.  With a bit of 
hindsight, Barlow’s techno-utopianism looks as stilted as other 
utopianism—and equally far removed from reality. 
Beyond being overly optimistic about how perfectly the ‘net 
would unfold, Barlow was also needlessly skeptical of plausible 
institutions to bring improvements.  He writes: “The only law that all our 
constituent cultures would generally recognize is the Golden Rule.”2  But 
the moral suasion—and practical effectiveness—of the Golden Rule 
presupposes participants of roughly equal power and status.  It is no 
small feat to meaningfully consider what Joe User might want from 
Mega Social Network if the tables were turned and Joe owned the 
goliath.  As a practical matter, any claim a user has against a goliath 
requires state institutions to adjudicate and enforce.  When Barlow wrote 
A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, tech goliaths were 
much smaller.  Plus, the Internet’s early users were in a certain sense 
more sophisticated than the mainstream users who eventually joined.  So 
the gap from little to big was much narrower then, arguably making 
governments less important in that era.  But as the big get bigger and as 
the Internet attracts average users who lack the special sophistication of 
early adopters, governments play key roles—adjudicating disputes, 
enforcing contracts and beyond. 
 
 
† Benjamin Edelman is an economist at Microsoft.  He presents his personal 
views, not the views of his employer.  His other writings are at 
www.benedelman.org. 
1 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 18 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5, 7 (2019).  
2 Id. at 6. 
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I. THE SUCCESSES OF RECENT TECH-POLICY 
It’s easy to criticize government interventions that are ham-
handed or worse, and even easier to mock the occasional politician 
abusing terminology.  (Think Ted Stevens’ “series of tubes.”3)  But 
stepping back, I’m struck by the important work that governments have 
done with relative success.  Let me offer some specific examples: 
First, government succeeded in reining in some of the most 
clear-cut violations of copyright.  Consider Napster.  It was a remarkable 
moment when internationally-known tech startups, VC-backed firms, 
and even publicly-traded firms were fairly alleged to have intentionally 
facilitated copyright infringement, and indisputably profited from it.4  
Against that backdrop, Barlow presented piracy as both inevitable and 
appropriate, and he made the arguments well.  But the fact of piracy in 
the shadows nowhere necessitates investors getting rich—or content 
creators giving up the rights plainly provided by longstanding law.  More 
recently, rights-holders and service providers found room to disagree 
about copyright treatment of peer-to-peer video sites,5 news articles,6 
image thumbnails,7 and countless other issues arguably at the boundaries 
of copyright.  If one of these is your life’s work or your income source, it 
may seem like no small matter.  One wouldn’t say courts have offered an 
overwhelmingly compelling approach to these questions.  Nonetheless, 
 
3 Senator Ted Stevens, Remarks at Senate Commerce Committee Hearing on 
Net Neutrality (June 28, 2006).  
4 For example, Napster counted among its funders some of Silicon Valley’s 
most well-regarded investors.  In separate litigation against video-streaming 
service Veoh, Universal Music Group alleged that three of Veoh’s investors 
were so intertwined with company operations that they should themselves be 
liable for the infringement UMG saw at Veoh’s site—the Ninth Circuit 
disagreed. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners L.L.C., 718 
F.3d 1006, 1013, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2013). Meanwhile, litigation documents 
revealed that YouTube co-founders personally uploaded infringing material, 
embracing a strategy of using infringing videos to attract users and increase the 
site’s valuation.  See Viacom’s Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Its 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 8–10, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube 
Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:07-cv-02103). 
5 See e.g., Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 514.  
6 See e.g., EU Copyright Directive, Art. 11 (not yet in force); see also Ley De 
Propiedad Intelectual (B.O.E. 2014, 11404) (Spain) (limiting how news 
aggregators and other online services can use news from publishers, and broadly 
requiring licenses and payments); Achtes Gesetz Zur Änderung des 
Urheberrechtsgesetzes [Copyright Law], May 7, 2013, BGBL I at 23 (Ger.)   
(same). 
7 See e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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courts successfully put a stop to the most brazen illegality, and to those 
who sought to profit most directly from it.  Napster and Grokster, good 
riddance.8 
Second, government has made important progress opposing 
online scams.   
• Post-transaction marketers placed ambiguous buttons like 
“continue” onto retailers’ confirmation screens.  Pressing 
such a button enrolled a user in a high-priced monthly 
subscription from a company whose site she had never 
even visited.  “But wait!” you might protest: “She never 
gave that company her credit card number.”  That’s true 
but oddly irrelevant: Post-transaction marketers copied a 
customer’s credit card numbers from the just-completed 
transaction, making it altogether too easy to “agree” to a 
monthly charge that was genuinely unexpected.9   
• Online platforms sold games and virtual trinkets to kids 
and denied parents’ requests for refunds.  It’s Hornbook 
law that kids broadly have the right to void transactions,10 
most of all those entered in the “weakness of youth.”  
Online games, designed to addict, fit the rule in spades.  
Nonetheless, game and app platforms argued that they had 
always said “all sales are final,” so they refused refunds.  
Litigation by private attorneys (this author among them) 
and the FTC delivered refunds for many who were 
harmed.11   
• Tech support scammers claimed to call from well-known 
tech companies, but charged big money for snake oil or 
 
8 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(effectively shuttering the firm); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 
913 (2005) (same).   
9 See MAJORITY STAFF OF OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, STAFF OF 
S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI. & TRANSP., 11TH CONG., AGGRESSIVE SALES 
TACTICS ON THE INTERNET AND THEIR IMPACT ON AMERICAN CONSUMERS 
(Comm. Print 2009); Benjamin Edelman, Deception in Post-Transaction 
Marketing, BENEDELMAN.ORG (Nov. 19, 2009), 
http://www.benedelman.org/posttransaction/. 
10 See 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 9:5 (4th ed. 2018). 
11 See, e.g., Bohannon v. Facebook, Inc., No. 12-cv-01894-BLF, 2019 WL 
188671 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 1, 2019); see also FTC proceedings against 
Amazon.com, Inc. (F.T.C. File No. 122 3238, Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-01038, 
W.D. Wash.), Apple Inc. (F.T.C. File No. 112 3108), and Google, Inc. (F.T.C. 
File No. 122 3237). 
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worse.  After a series of raids in the United States and 
abroad, key perpetrators were brought to justice, and these 
schemes much reduced.12   
Super-libertarians sometimes blame victims for their gullibility in falling 
for these schemes.  But I doubt Barlow would have had that instinct.  
Barlow was always a friend to the little guy, and I never knew him to 
blame anyone even for the clearest of foolishness.  In any event these 
practices are basically offensive to most Americans.  To its credit, the 
judicial system saw the offense and stepped into action.   
Notably, all these successes were achieved via traditional 
mechanisms of state power.  Lawyers wrote complaints and filed 
motions.  Judges heard witnesses and wrote decisions.  Politicians held 
hearings and talked of new legislation.  (Occasionally, though only 
occasionally, they actually passed bills on these subjects.)  The industry 
details would be unfamiliar to the Founding Fathers, but the procedure 
was as they intended it.  Government doesn’t look so hopeless after all.  
Though the misbehavior occurred online, the perpetrators were flesh-
and-blood—unavoidably subject to legal proceedings. 
II. WORK TO BE DONE 
Despite these successes, much important work remains to be 
done in making online communication all it can be.  Some examples: 
First, competition policy demands renewed attention.  The 
leading online social network has grown so large that its founder-CEO 
can’t name a viable alternative.13  In many countries, the leading search 
engine outranks competitors fifty-to-one.  Even sectors with competition 
are a far cry from the models in economics textbooks.  In online travel 
booking, two behemoths together control all the brands you’ve heard 
of.14  Competition in smartphone operating systems is similarly just two 
choices.  Some argue that consolidation results from proper factors, 
causes little harm, or is otherwise unobjectionable.  Reasonable people 
can disagree.  But as politicians on both sides of the aisle turn their focus 
to market concentration, we can’t assume unchecked market forces are 
the end of the story. 
 
12 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Elite IT Partners, No. 2:19-cv-00125-RJS (D. Utah 2019).  
13 Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data: Joint 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Sci., & Transp., 115th Cong. (2018) (testimony of Mark Zuckerberg).  
14 Benjamin Edelman, Impact of OTA Bias and Consolidation on Consumers, 
BENEDELMAN.ORG (July 12, 2017), 
http://www.benedelman.org/publications/ota-bias-12jul2017.pdf. 
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Second, consumers demand improved handling of hacking, 
ransomware, and the like.  It is an outrage for an anonymous villain to 
hack your computer, encrypt your files, and demand, quite literally, a 
ransom for release of your hard-earned data.  Equally outrageous are the 
sites that specialize in hosting material designed to harm—sites designed 
for negative reviews of small businesses (removable only if businesses 
pay for that privilege); sites that solicit photos of ex-lovers (again, 
removed only upon payment).  Apparently market forces create these 
abominations.  But no one should be surprised if a civilized democracy 
elects to prevent them. 
Third, cyber-bullying is unsustainable.  This isn’t just schoolkid 
antics; careers have been ruined, and lives lost.  Tech goliath platforms 
host these attacks, and they’ve been troublingly indifferent to the harm 
they facilitate.  
I credit the predictable practical difficulties in government 
interventions on these subjects.  Some schemes cross jurisdictions, 
creating a longstanding challenge.  Do citizens of Illinois want to pay 
their police to pursue a hacker who mostly targets New Yorkers?  How 
about the citizens of India?  Russia?  Yet everyone is somewhere.  A 
perpetrator may think himself safe by staying far from his victims, but 
organized victims can nonetheless seek satisfaction—whether by 
themselves paying the cost of pursuit, or by targeting the miscreant’s 
inevitable local assets and resources. 
Fixing other problems will require consensus on who should 
actually be blamed.  When a user is hacked, should we blame that user 
(for failing to keep her computer or phone secure), the company whose 
software or service was too easily hacked, or the hacker who actually 
pressed the button?  Does the answer change when the harm is money 
lost versus privacy versus life itself?  In the abstract, few people endorse 
blaming the victim.  Yet the experts who examine these problems often 
cannot resist telling victims how they went astray.  
Reflecting on these situations, I inevitably turn back to Barlow’s 
reference to the Golden Rule as the supposed only source of authority.  
The victim of a cyber-mob would be thrilled to agree not to bully anyone 
in exchange for not being bullied.  But that imagined agreement does her 
little good.  The reality is that she is being bullied.  Either someone will 
help, or no one will help.  The Barlow I knew would have wanted to 
help, but with the departure of his body, we’re left only with his text 
which calls for every man to himself.  I don’t see why that’s the right 
result or a necessary result.  Anyone who cares about a victim—really, 
anyone who knows a victim—should want better. 
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III. LOOKING FORWARD  
In offering a vision of government making genuine progress on 
these challenges, I’m reminded of the bold government programs that are 
today largely beyond dispute.   
A century ago, the Pure Food and Drug Act sought to assure 
accurate labeling, purity, and ultimately safety to products Americans 
consume every day.15  By all accounts this seemed difficult at the time.  
What stops a factory from changing its process or ingredients when the 
inspector leaves?  And who’s to say what consequences a drug might 
entail years later.  Yet today the FDA achieves substantial success, and 
the problems of that era are delightfully in the past.   
A generation later, the GI Bill of Rights stood for the principle 
that after defending the nation, a serviceman deserved a quality 
education and the reliable job it would usually bring.16  The next 
generation established Medicare—a safety net to assure that our nation’s 
elderly would get sustenance and medical care befitting the nation’s 
prosperity.17  For both of these, there were serious questions about cost 
and sustainability from the outset—but the moral imperative was clear, 
and the projects went forward.  I never discussed these subjects with 
Barlow, and so far as I know he never wrote about them or spoke 
publicly about them.  But each of these programs faced genuine 
challenges, arguably at least as fundamental as the technology 
architecture Barlow considered so important.  We should be emboldened 
by our prior successes and no less willing to take on great challenges as 
we look ahead. 
Ultimately, we can’t have an important area of commercial and 
social activity that is above the law.  Barlow excitedly envisioned a tech 
sector that was de facto above the law.  The past twenty years, and 
especially the past few, have shown why that’s every bit as dangerous as 
it sounds.  In Barlow’s honor, we should aspire for better. 
 
 
15 See Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). 
16 See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 
284. 
17 See Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 1801–1844, 79 Stat. 
286. 
THE ENIGMA OF DIGITIZED PROPERTY: 
A TRIBUTE TO JOHN PERRY BARLOW 
PAMELA SAMUELSON† & KATHRYN HASHIMOTO†† 
  John Perry Barlow was a seer as well as a great songwriter. His 
provocative prose from The Economy of Ideas1 speaks to us today as 
though it was written yesterday: 
Throughout the time I’ve been groping around cyberspace, an 
immense, unsolved conundrum has remained at the root of nearly 
every legal, ethical, governmental, and social vexation to be found 
in the Virtual World. I refer to the problem of digitized property. 
The enigma is this: If our property can be infinitely reproduced and 
instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost, without 
our knowledge, without its even leaving our possession, how can 
we protect it? How are we going to get paid for the work we do with 
our minds? And if we can’t get paid, what will assure the continued 
creation and distribution of such work?2 
Twenty-five years after WIRED’s publication of Barlow’s poetically 
prescient essay, the enigma of digitized property remains a serious 
concern to many creators. Recording artists loudly complain that the 
digital platforms that monetize their music are undercompensating them.3 
Surveys of published authors report falling incomes from 
 
† Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of Law, Berkeley Law School 
and Vice Chair of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (John Perry Barlow’s 
successor in that role). I had the pleasure of serving on the EFF Board with 
Barlow for almost 20 years. 
†† Copyright Research Fellow, Berkeley Law School. 
1 John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED (Mar. 1, 1994), also 
available as Selling Wine Without Bottles:  The Economy of Mind on the Global 
Net, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8 (2019) (reprinted from ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (1993), https://www.eff.org/pages/selling-wine-without-bottles-
economy-mind-global-net (earlier version)). 
2 Barlow, supra note 1, at 85, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 8 (“The riddle is this 
. . . .”). Google Scholar reports that this essay has been cited in 580 publications, 
278 of which were in law review articles.  
3 See, e.g., Charlotte Hassan, Reasons Why Some Artists Absolutely Hate Spotify, 
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/ 
2016/03/21/why-artists-pull-their-music-from-spotify-but-not-youtube/. 
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commercializing their creative work.4 Layoffs of news reporters at both 
conventional and digital newspapers are all too common.5 Peer-to-peer 
file sharing of movies and music continues to be remarkably prevalent,6 
notwithstanding prodigious efforts by entertainment industry groups to 
curtail it through lawsuits and private enforcement arrangements with 
Internet access providers.7 Photographers report widespread infringe-
ments of their works on the Internet.8 Software “piracy” remains at least 
as rampant today as it was twenty-five years ago.9 
  Although Barlow predicted that copyright would not survive in 
the digital age,10 Part I explains that legislatures in the U.S. and EU have 
 
4 See, e.g., Six Takeaways from the Authors Guild 2018 Author Income Survey, 
AUTHORS GUILD (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.authorsguild.org/industry-
advocacy/six-takeaways-from-the-authors-guild-2018-authors-income-survey/. 
5 See, e.g., Elizabeth Grieco et al., About a Third of Large U.S. Newspapers 
Have Suffered Layoffs Since 2017, PEW RES. CTR. (July 23, 2018), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/23/about-a-third-of-large-u-s-
newspapers-have-suffered-layoffs-since-2017/. 
6 See, e.g., File Sharing, TECXIPIO MAG., https://www.tecxipio.com/statistics-
file-sharing (last accessed Mar. 27, 2019) (reporting that an average of 28 
million Internet users per day engage in peer-to-peer file sharing). 
7 See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private 
Ordering for Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 ORE. L. REV. 81, 101 (2010). 
8 See, e.g., Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2017: 
Hearing on H.R. 3945 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 
(2018) (statement of David P. Trust), https://uscopyrightreform.org/ 
202018/09/29/house-judiciary-committee-hearing-the-case-act-2017/. 
9 Barlow, supra note 1, at 88, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 14. For an example 
of recent estimates about software piracy, see Joseph Noonan, 2018 Revulytics 
Software Piracy Statistics and Thoughts on the BSA Global Software Survey, 
REVULYTICS BLOG (June 7, 2018), https://www.revulytics.com/blog/2018-
revulytics-software-piracy-statistics (estimating the commercial value of 
unlicensed software at $46.3 billion). 
10 John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas, 8.10 WIRED 238, 242 (Oct. 
2000), https://www.wired.com/2000/10/download/. A rich legal literature 
emerged in the 1990s and 2000s that resonates with Barlow’s skepticism about 
the future of copyright in the digital age and his celebration of free culture. See, 
e.g., KEITH AOKI, JAMES BOYLE, & JENNIFER JENKINS, BOUND BY LAW: TALES 
FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (2006); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: 
ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (2008); THE COMMODIFICATION OF 
INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2001); 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF 
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); JESSICA 
D. LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2000); SIVA VAIDYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS 
AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT 
THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001). 
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sought to address the enigma of digitized property by strengthening 
copyright rules and insisting that some previously unregulated uses must 
be licensed. That Part also discusses Barlow’s cry for Internet freedoms, 
some of which have been echoed by commentators in the EU and U.S. in 
reaction to stricter copyright rules. Part II explores some ideas Barlow 
had about how the digitized property enigma might be addressed without 
tightening copyright rules. He had confidence that creative people would 
figure out ways to thrive in the economy of ideas. Part III provides 
evidence that the entertainment, book publishing, and other conventional 
copyright industries have indeed found ways to overcome the enigma of 
digitized property. New economies of creativity have emerged that 
Barlow would have celebrated. 
I. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO BOLSTER COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 
  Legislatures in the U.S. and EU have responded to copyright 
owner claims about losses due to unauthorized online uses of their works 
by proposing or enacting new laws. A recent U.S. example is the Music 
Modernization Act (MMA) which established a revised framework for 
compulsory licensing of recorded music by online digital services such 
as Pandora.11 The MMA also extended federal protection to sound 
recordings produced prior to 1972, which had previously been protected 
only by state laws.12 Congress has also considered legislation to allow 
copyright owners to bring small claims to a review board in the 
Copyright Office to get compensation for online infringements that now 
go unremedied because of the high costs of litigation.13 
 
11 See Pub. L. No. 115-264, — Stat. — (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 
115th-congress/house-bill/1551/text. For a discussion of how the MMA changed 
the regulation of sound recording copyright rules and licensing framework, see 
Tyler Ochoa, An Analysis of Titles I and III of the Music Modernization Act, 
Part 2 of 2, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/01/an-analysis-of-title-i-and-title-iii-
of-the-music-modernization-act-part-2-of-2-guest-blog-post.htm. 
12 For an explanation of the part of the MMA that deals with pre-1972 
recordings, see Tyler Ochoa, An Analysis of Title II of Public Law 115-264: The 
Classics Protection and Access Act, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Oct. 28, 
2018), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/10/an-analysis-of-title-ii-of-
public-law-115-264-the-classics-protection-and-access-act-guest-blog-post.htm. 
13 Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement (CASE) Act, H.R. 3945, 
115th Cong. (2017). For a discussion of the main features of this Act, see 
generally Pamela Samuelson & Kathryn Hashimoto, Scholarly Concerns About 
a Proposed Copyright Small Claims Tribunal, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 689 
(2018). 
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  A far more ambitious and far-reaching initiative is the Council of 
the European Union’s proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market (DSM).14 Article 11 of this Directive (sometimes known 
as the “link tax” provision) would create a new set of exclusive rights for 
EU press publishers to control online reproductions and distributions of 
more than a few words from the contents of their sites.15 Article 13 
(sometimes known as the “upload filter” provision) would impose new 
obligations on Internet content sharing sites (such as YouTube) to block 
uploads of digital content unless the upload files were either licensed or 
otherwise known to be non-infringing.16 Failure to comply with this 
blocking obligation would result in the sites being directly liable for any 
user infringements.17 Article 13 represents a stark break from the “notice 
and takedown” rules adopted in the late 1990s that provided Internet 
service providers (ISPs) with a safe harbor from liability for user 
infringements of which they were unaware or unable to control.18 The 
main goal of these significant expansions of ISP liability rules is to give 
European content owners greater leverage to induce the content sharing 
 
14 Council of the EU, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market—Outcome of 
Proceedings, ST 6637 2019 INIT (Feb. 20, 2019) [hereinafter Proposed DSM 
Directive], https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6637-2019-
INIT/en/pdf. As of this writing, the European Commission, Council, and 
Parliament completed a “trilogue” on a final text for this Directive, which the 
European Parliament approved in March 2019 and the EU Council adopted in 
April 2019. Article 11 is now Article 15; Article 13 is now Article 17. See, 
Carlton Daniel, What to Make of the European Directive on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market, THE HILL (Apr. 25, 2019, 3:00 PM), https://thehill.com/ 
opinion/technology/440683-what-to-make-of-the-european-directive-on-
copyright-in-the-digital-single. The final step is for each member state of the EU 
to transpose the Directive into its national laws by 2021. See Eleanora Rosati, 
BREAKING: Council Adopts DSM Directive, IPKAT (Apr. 15, 2019), 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/04/breaking-council-adopts-dsm-
directive.html. Some parts of this article’s discussion of the DSM Directive are 
drawn from Pamela Samuelson, Questioning a New Intellectual Property Right 
for Press Publishers, 61 COMM. ACM 20 (Mar. 2019) and Pamela Samuelson, 
The EU’s Controversial Digital Single Market Directive, 60 COMM. ACM 20 
(Nov. 2018). 
15 Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 14, art. 11. 
16 Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 14, art. 13. 
17 Id. 
18 Directive 2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13; 17 
U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). 
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platforms to license EU digital contents or face large damage awards in 
court.19 
Barlow would have been among the fiercest critics of these new 
liability rules had he lived just a little bit longer. As he wrote in The 
Economy of Ideas: 
[W]hen the primary articles of commerce in a society look so much 
like speech as to be indistinguishable from it, and when the 
traditional methods of protecting their ownership have become 
ineffectual, attempting to fix the problem with broader and more 
vigorous enforcement will inevitably threaten freedom of speech. 
The greatest constraint on your future liberties may come not from 
government but from corporate legal departments laboring to 
protect by force what can no longer be protected by practical 
efficiency or general social consent.20 
Barlow back then believed that “digital technology [was] erasing the 
legal jurisdictions of the physical world and replacing them with the 
unbounded and perhaps permanently lawless waves of cyberspace.”21 
But initiatives such as the DSM Directive vividly demonstrate that 
conventional copyright industries, their lobbyists, and governments that 
attend to these industries’ concerns are determined to make and enforce 
strict copyright rules that will tame the electronic frontier that Barlow so 
cherished and championed. 
Barlow would have been heartened, though, by the many 
European scholars who have taken up the freedom of expression banner 
he waved so vigorously way back when. In April 2018, for example, a 
group of 169 IP academics sent a Statement to the EU Parliament 
 
19 Articles 11 and 13 are not the only articles of the DSM Directive that aim to 
enhance licensing of EU creative contents and ensure that authors and other 
rights holders have more opportunities to receive compensation for their 
creations or databases. See, e.g., Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 14, art. 7 
(providing framework for licensing of out-of-commerce works); Proposed DSM 
Directive, supra note 14, arts. 14–16 (aiming to facilitate fair remuneration for 
authors and performers). 
20 Barlow, supra note 1, at 86, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 11. 
21 Barlow, supra note 1, at 86, 18 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. at 12 (“digital 
technology is also erasing the legal jurisdictions . . . .”). For a legal analysis that 
resonated with Barlow’s conception, see generally David R. Johnson and David 
G. Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1367 (1996) (suggesting that cyberspace should be regarded as its own 
jurisdiction). 
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strongly opposing Article 11.22 These academics believe that Article 11 
would likely impede the free flow of news and other information vital to 
a democratic society, would harm journalists and others involved with 
news-related content, and would create uncertainty about the Article’s 
coverage and scope.23 Also unclear was how the new publisher right 
would interact with existing copyright laws, which typically allow for 
fair quotations, and database rights, which allow extractions of 
insubstantial parts of database contents.24 
Signatories of this Statement were also unpersuaded by the 
economic argument for Article 11.25 A new press publisher right would 
considerably increase transaction costs as well as exacerbate existing 
power asymmetries in media markets. There was “no indication 
whatsoever that the proposed right will produce the positive results it is 
supposed to.”26 Moreover, “considering current high levels of market 
concentration on online advertising markets and in media, a publishers’ 
right may well backfire: further strengthening the power of media 
conglomerates and of global platforms to the detriment of smaller 
players.”27 
Another report on Article 11 observed that online journalists 
perceive the new right as a threat to the nature of news communication in 
 
22 Marco Ricolfi, Raquel Xalabarder & Mirelle van Eechoud, Academics Against 
Press Publishers’ Right, INST. FOR INFO. LAW (2018), 
https://www.ivir.nl/academics-against-press-publishers-right/. See also MAX 
PLANCK INST. FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION, Position Statement on 
Proposed Modernisation of European Copyright Rules, Part E Protection of 
Press Publications Concerning Digital Uses, 
https://www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/content/stellungnahmen/MPI_Position_
Statement_PART_E_Publishers_2017_02_21_RMH_VM-def-1.pdf; Martin 
Kretschmer et al., The European Commission’s Public Consultation on the Role 
of Publishers in the Copyright Value Chain: A Response by the European 
Copyright Society, 38 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 591 (2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2801595. 
23 Ricolfi et al., supra note 22. 
24 Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Information Society, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L. 167) 10, 16; Directive 
96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
Legal Protection of Databases art. 8, 1996 O.J. (L. 77) 20, 26. 
25 Ricolfi et al., supra note 22. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
109              THE ENIGMA OF DIGITIZED PROPERTY:          [Vol. 18 
                     A TRIBUTE TO JOHN PERRY BARLOW 
 
the modern era: “Paying for links is as absurd as paying for citations in 
the academy would be.”28 
Even more dangerous for freedom of expression on the Internet 
is Article 13. Critics have argued that Article 13 would effectively 
mandate monitoring and filtering across all platforms, violating user 
privacy and free speech interests as automated systems would be obliged 
to scan all content and block even legitimate, noninfringing uses of 
copyrighted works such as quotations and parodies.29 Article 13 also 
raises competition concerns, as it would likely favor and entrench major 
existing platforms, which already have or can afford to implement the 
necessary surveillance and filtering technologies, while disadvantaging 
smaller and newer entrants to the market.30 
Dozens of European intellectual property (IP) scholars have 
written articles criticizing the Article 13 filtering mandate on various 
grounds, including the threat it poses for freedom of expression on the 
Internet.31 Among the prominent critics of Article 13 is David Kaye, the 
United Nation’s Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, who 
wrote a nine-page letter explaining why Article 13 is inconsistent with 
EU’s commitments under international human rights instruments.32 In 
 
28 LIONEL BENTLY ET AL., STRENGTHENING THE POSITION OF PRESS PUBLISHERS 
AND AUTHORS AND PERFORMERS IN THE COPYRIGHT DIRECTIVE: A STUDY 
COMMISSIONED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 34 (2017) (internal quotes 
omitted), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596810/ 
IPOL_STU%282017%29596810_EN.pdf. 
29 See, e.g., Benjamin Austin, Proposed EU Copyright Directive Poses Risks to 
Free Expression, Consumer Privacy, and Competition, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE 
(June 12, 2018), https://www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/proposed-
eu-copyright-directive-poses-risks-to-free-expression-consumer-pri.  
30 Id. 
31 See Article 13 Research: Studies, Opinions and Sources of Data, CREATE 
(UK Copyright and Creative Economy Centre: Univ. of Glasgow), 
https://www.create.ac.uk/policy-responses/eu-copyright-reform/article-13-
research/ (listing critiques of Article 13); see, e.g., Martin Senftleben et al., The 
Recommendation on Measures to Safeguard Fundamental Rights and the Open 
Internet in the Framework of the EU Copyright Reform, 40 EUR. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 149 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3054967. 
32 David Kaye (Special Rapporteur), Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 7–8, 
U.N. Doc. OL OTH 41/2018 (June 13, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL-OTH-41-2018.pdf (detailing specific 
concerns and concluding that “I am very seriously concerned that the proposed 
Directive would establish a regime of active monitoring and prior censorship of 
user-generated content that is inconsistent with Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.”). 
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addition, Tim Berners-Lee, Vint Cerf, and numerous other Internet 
pioneers signed an open letter urging the EU Parliament to drop Article 
13: 
By requiring Internet platforms to perform automatic filtering [on] 
all of the content that their users upload, Article 13 takes an 
unprecedented step towards the transformation of the Internet from 
an open platform for sharing and innovation, into a tool for the 
automated surveillance and control of its users.33 
More than 145 civil society organizations have expressed opposition to 
adoption of Article 13,34 as have more than 5 million people who signed 
a petition against it.35 
Copyright industry lobbying groups, however, have succeeded in 
persuading EU policymakers to maintain and even strengthen the new 
rules that will impose strict infringement liability on websites that allow 
users to upload contents.36 Whether Articles 11 and 13 will achieve the 
intended goal of boosting compensation to EU content providers from 
Internet platforms remains to be seen. 
Google and Facebook are among the most obvious targets of 
these new regulations. While these firms may ultimately decide against 
licensing uses of EU contents,37 at least they can afford to pay such fees 
 
33 Letter from Vint Cerf et al. to Antonio Tajani, President of the European 
Parliament (June 12, 2018), https://www.eff.org/files/2018/06/12/article13
letter.pdf. See also Rhett Jones, The Founding Fathers of the Internet Plead with 
EU to Squash Its Bad Copyright Bill, GIZMODO (June 13, 2018, 11:57 AM), 
https://gizmodo.com/the-founding-fathers-of-the-internet-plead-with-eu-to-s-
1826792360. 
34 See, e.g., Open Letter to Member of the European Parliament, https://
copybuzz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Copyright-Open-Letter-on-EP-
Plenary-Vote-on-Negotiation-Mandate.pdf. See also ASS’N FOR PROGRESSIVE 
COMMC’NS, Call to Members of the European Parliament: Open Letter on the 
EU Copyright Reform (July 2018), https://www.apc.org/en/pubs/call-members-
european-parliament-open-letter-eu-copyright-reform. 
35 See, e.g., Foo Yun Chee, EU Lawmakers to Vote on Copyright Overhaul Next 
Tuesday, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2019, 12:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-eu-copyright/eu-lawmakers-to-vote-on-copyright-overhaul-next-tuesday-
idUSKCN1R228Z (linking to the change.org online petition with more than 5 
million signatures). 
36 Cory Doctorow, The Final Version of the EU’s Copyright Directive Is the 
Worst One Yet, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.eff.org/ 
deeplinks/2019/02/final-version-eus-copyright-directive-worst-one-yet. 
37 See, e.g., Matthew Karnitschnig & Chris Spillane, Plan to Make Google Pay 
for News Hits Rocks, POLITICO (Feb. 15, 2017, 7:36 PM), 
https://www.politico.eu/article/plan-to-make-google-pay-for-news-hits-rocks-
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if they decide that doing so is their best option. Smaller online services 
are likely to be much more constrained. 
TechDirt, for example, a prominent site for online technology 
news and commentary, doubts that it can continue publishing in the EU: 
Article 13 makes a commenting system untenable, as we simply 
cannot setup [sic] a filter that will block people from uploading 
copyright-covered content. Article 11 potentially makes our posts 
untenable, since we frequently quote other news sites in order to 
comment on them . . . .38 
TechDirt notes that the goal of those who support Articles 11 and 13 
is not just to close the (made up, mythical) “value gap.” It is to 
fundamentally change the internet away from an open system of 
communications—one that anyone can use to bypass traditional 
gatekeepers, to a closed “broadcast” system, in which key legacy 
gatekeepers control access to the public, via a complicated set of 
licenses that strip all of the benefits and profits from the system.39 
TechDirt perceives Articles 11 and 13 to have serious negative 
implications for the general public as well as for individual creators: 
Not only will [these new rules] do great harm to the general public’s 
ability to communicate freely over the internet, it will do massive 
harm to artists and creators—especially more independent ones, 
who will be effectively blocked from using these platforms to 
connect directly with their fans. Rather they will be required to go 
through “licensed” intermediaries, who will demand a huge cut of 
any money. In other words, it’s a return to the pre-internet days, 
where if you wanted to become a professional creator, your only 
options were to sign away all your rights to giant conglomerate 
record labels/studios/publishers.40 
Barlow would have been appalled at the curtailment of freedom of 
expression and access to knowledge on the Internet that Articles 11 and 
13 will almost certainly bring about. 
 
copyright-reform-european-commission/ (noting Google refused to license 
contents from Spanish and German rights holders when those countries adopted 
Article 11-like press publisher rights).   
38 Mike Masnick, EU Moves Forward with Agreement to Fundamentally 
Change the Internet from Open to Closed, TECHDIRT (Feb. 14, 2019, 2:10 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20190213/12071341588/eu-moves-forward-
with-agreement-to-fundamentally-change-internet-open-to-closed.shtml. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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The EU’s adoption of Article 13 will undoubtedly embolden 
copyright industries with a global reach to try to export that mandate to 
other countries. The next target will likely be the U.S. Copyright Office, 
which has been considering whether to recommend changes to the safe 
harbor rules Congress adopted in 1998 for ISPs.41 Under current law, 
ISPs are not liable for user infringements unless copyright owners 
provide them with specific notice about the presence of infringing 
materials on their sites and the ISPs fail to promptly take down the 
infringing materials.42 The U.S. safe harbor rules have, in the view of 
many, supported freedom of expression on the Internet to a considerable 
degree.43 Barlow would have considered it a great tragedy for freedom of 
information, speech, and expression on the Internet if Congress abandons 
these safe harbors and adopts an EU-style filtering mandate in the 
misguided hope that doing so would solve the enigma of digitized 
property, as Barlow so eloquently phrased it. 
II. JOHN PERRY BARLOW’S IDEAS FOR ADDRESSING THE ENIGMA OF
DIGITIZED PROPERTY 
Barlow may have been insightful enough to recognize the 
enigma of digitized property a quarter of a century ago, but he was not 
enough of a prophet to articulate a framework for a comprehensive 
solution. Yet, The Economy of Ideas offered some thoughts about 
plausible strategies. He perceived, for example, the emergence of “a 
parallel economy developing, mostly among small, fast moving 
enterprises who protect their ideas by getting into the marketplace 
quicker than their larger competitors” such as incumbent industries “who 
base their protection on fear and litigation.”44 First-mover advantages 
have indeed proven very important to attaining competitive advantage in 
the software industry.45 Barlow recognized that “people seem to 
eventually buy the software they really use. Once a program becomes 
41 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECTION 512 STUDY, https://www.copyright.gov/ 
policy/section512/. 
42 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
43 See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Comment Letter on Section 512 
Study before the U.S. Copyright Office (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.eff.org/files/ 
2016/04/01/eff_comments_512_study_4.1.2016.pdf; Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, Additional Comment Letter on Section 512 Study before the U.S. 
Copyright Office (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.eff.org/files/2017/02/22/2015-
7_additional_comments_of_eff_512_study.pdf. 
44 Barlow, supra note 1, at  88–89, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 16. 
45 Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent 
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1255, 1289–90 (2009). 
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central to your work, you want the latest version of it, the best support, 
the actual manuals, all privileges attached to ownership.”46 The software 
industry has been very creative over the years in finding ways to 
monetize its digitized property.47 
Unsurprisingly, Barlow offered his experience with the Grateful 
Dead, the rock band for whom he often wrote songs, as an example of 
how creators can achieve success by encouraging fans to make and share 
copies of their creations.48 The Dead used this strategy of allowing their 
fans to freely record the band’s live performances to become “the largest 
concert draw in America.”49 Creators who can build relationships with 
consumers find ways to get paid. Doctors, lawyers, architects, and 
consultants, for instance, “are already being paid directly for their 
intellectual property. Who needs copyright when you’re on a retainer?”50 
More generally, Barlow thought that the ability to monetize 
creations would depend on “the quality of performance, the uniqueness 
of your point of view, the validity of your expertise, its relevance to your 
market, and underlying everything, the ability of that market to access 
your creative services swiftly, conveniently and interactively.”51 A point 
of view, Barlow observed, “is an asset which cannot be stolen or 
duplicated.”52 
Barlow was skeptical, though, about crypto bottling of digital 
content as a solution to the digitized property enigma.53 In the years after 
his WIRED article, copyright industries, such as producers of motion 
pictures and sellers of e-books, have employed technical protection 
measures (TPMs) to enable them to sell digital copies without undue risk 
that those digital copies would “leak” and lead to mass infringements.54 
To provide legal reinforcement for these TPM protections, Congress 
enacted laws to outlaw bypassing of copyright-protective TPMs as well 
46 Barlow, supra note 1, at 128, 18 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. at 25. 
47 See, e.g., James Bessen & Walter Frick, How Software Is Helping Big 
Companies Dominate, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 19, 2018), 
https://hbr.org/2018/11/how-software-is-helping-big-companies-dominate 
(explaining how software enables companies to spread into different areas and 
creates new business models). 
48 See Barlow, supra note 1, at 126, 18 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. at 21. 
49 Id. 
50 Barlow, supra note 1, at 128, 18 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. at 26. 
51 Barlow, supra note 1, at 128, 18 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. at 27.  
52 Barlow, supra note 1, at 126, 18 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. at 22. 
53 See Barlow, supra note 1, at 129, 18 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. at 27–29. 
54 See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 96, 102 (2010) (describing content owners’ use of TPMs). 
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as the development and dissemination of tools to bypass the TPMs.55 
Barlow’s prediction that crypto bottles would fail was, it seems, off the 
mark. Consumers have adjusted to TPMs more than might have seemed 
likely in 1994.56 
Barlow circled back to the digital property enigma in a second 
WIRED article, The Next Economy of Ideas, in 2000.57 This article 
discussed the “paradigm-shattering” Napster phenomenon.58 Millions of 
Internet users downloaded Napster’s client-side software and used it to 
interact with Napster’s server-side search and directory functions to 
share many billions of copies of popular music with one another.59 
“[T]he geriatrics of the entertainment industry,” Barlow observed, 
“didn’t see this coming. They figured the Internet was about as much of a 
threat to their infotainment empire as ham radio was to NBC. Even after 
that assumption was creamed, they remained as serene as sunning 
crocodiles.”60 These crocodiles, however, didn’t stay serene for very 
long. They sued Napster for contributory copyright infringement and 
were able to get an injunction to shut down that service.61 
That injunction notwithstanding, Barlow articulated three 
significant problems for the recording industry: first, network-based 
technologies such as Napster gave ordinary people “distributive power 
equal to Time Warner’s,”62 second, users of these technologies “don’t 
give a flying byte about the existing legal battlements,”63 and third, “[n]o 
law can be successfully imposed on a huge population that does not 
 
55 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012). The origins of this legislation are discussed in 
LITMAN, supra note 10, at 136–45. For critical commentary on these anti-
circumvention rules, see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the 
Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999). 
56 For an informative discussion of TPMs used to protect copyrights, see, for 
example, JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN, TECHNOLOGICAL COMPLEMENTS TO 
COPYRIGHT (2005). 
57 See Barlow, supra note 10. For a discussion about consumer issues with 
technically protected content, see, for example, NATALI HELBERGER ET AL., 
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT AND CONSUMER ACCEPTABILITY (Dec. 2004), 
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/INDICAREStateoftheArtReport.pdf. 
58 Barlow, supra note 10, at 240. 
59 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
60 Barlow, supra note 10, at 240. 
61 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019, 1029. 
62 Barlow, supra note 10, at 240. 
63 Id. 
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morally support it and possesses easy means for its invisible evasion.”64 
Barlow was confident that “[t]he future will win; there will be no 
property in cyberspace.”65 
Initially seeming to bear out Barlow’s prediction, a number of 
more decentralized peer-to-peer file sharing technologies were developed 
to enable ordinary music lovers to continue file sharing to their heart’s 
content. Although some of these services were also shut down by 
copyright injunctions,66 the BitTorrent protocol has enabled file sharing 
to continue apace.67 Barlow would not have been surprised at estimates 
that more than 27.4 million people worldwide engaged in file sharing on 
a daily basis in 2017.68 
As an alternative to the seemingly ubiquitous file sharing 
phenomenon, Apple persuaded the recording industry to license digital 
music to Apple’s iTunes service so that consumers who wanted to 
lawfully acquire music could do so conveniently and at a modest price-
point.69 Spotify, Pandora, and TIDAL are among the entities that have 
subsequently obtained licenses to popular recorded music.70 Spotify 
alone has about 200 million active monthly users, of whom 
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 241. 
66 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 
2d 1197, 1241 (N.D. Cal. 2007). For a discussion of why Grokster was not as 
much of a win for MGM as it had hoped, see Pamela Samuelson, Three 
Reactions to the Grokster Decision, 13 MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L. REV. 177 
(2006). 
67 See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1026–28 (9th Cir. 
2013) (explaining BitTorrent’s architecture and how it can be used to engage in 
infringing conduct). 
68 File Sharing Landscape 2017: Where Did Peer-to-Peer Network Users Share 
Which Files During 2017?, TECXIPIO MAG. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.
tecxipio.com/single-post/file-sharing-in-peer-to-peer-networks-2017; see 
generally MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011) 
(reporting on international studies of media piracy, recommending against heavy 
enforcement of copyrights). 
69 See, e.g., Steve Knopper, iTunes’ 10th Anniversary: How Steve Jobs Turned 
the Industry Upside Down, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 26, 2013, 6:45 PM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/itunes-10th-anniversary-
how-steve-jobs-turned-the-industry-upside-down-68985/. 
70 See, e.g., Craig Grannell, A History of Music Streaming, DYNAUDIO (May 16, 
2018), https://www.dynaudio.com/dynaudio-academy/2018/may/a-history-of-
music-streaming. 
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approximately 91 million pay for the service.71 The upshot is that 
hundreds of millions of users now have lawful access to an almost 
unimaginably rich array of digital music through these licensed services. 
Others, of course, continue to prefer to obtain the music they love 
through file sharing. 
Barlow’s prediction that Napster was going to spell the death of 
copyright72 may have been wrong, but that industry weathered the 
Napster and subsequent file sharing storms only by making considerable 
adjustments to their business models and providing consumers with a 
wider array of content at more reasonable prices and with fewer technical 
restrictions than the industry would have preferred in the immediate 
aftermath of the Napster case. 
III. THE SKY IS RISING: THE NEW ECONOMY OF IDEAS IS THRIVING 
In The Next Economy of Ideas, Barlow predicted that creators 
would find innovative ways to be rewarded for their works in the new 
economy: “artists and writers of the future will adapt to practical 
possibility. Many have already done so. They are, after all, creative 
people.”73 He foresaw a creative milieu in cyberspace in which corporate 
interests would exercise less control and barriers to entry would be low. 
Barlow imagined a future of creative output and compensation as part of 
a larger and more fertile digital ecosystem, available to all. “We can 
enter into a convenient and interactive relationship with audiences, who, 
being human, will be far more ethically inclined to pay us than the 
moguls ever were. What could be a stronger incentive to create than 
that?”74 
Yet, even conventional copyright industries have been thriving 
as never before. Although the Recording Industry of America 
Association may have been convinced that the “easy availability of freely 
downloadable commercial songs will bring on the apocalypse,”75 
empirical data in 2000 showed that “during the two years since MP3 
music began flooding the Net, CD sales have risen by 20 percent.”76 
Several economic studies from the 2010s bear out Barlow’s skepticism 
 
71 Daniel Sanchez, Spotify Now Has 200 Million Monthly Active Users, But How 
Many of Them Are Paying?, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www 
.digitalmusicnews.com/2019/01/11/spotify-200-million-monthly-active-users/. 
72 Barlow, supra note 10, at 240. 
73 Id. at 252. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 241. 
76 Id. 
117              THE ENIGMA OF DIGITIZED PROPERTY:          [Vol. 18 
                     A TRIBUTE TO JOHN PERRY BARLOW 
 
about the “death knell” warnings from legacy industries77 that 
technological change would cause the destruction or decline of most 
cultural businesses. These studies show that digitization has ushered in a 
thriving new creative economy and indeed, a “golden age” of creativity, 
bringing new products to market and enabling new revenue 
opportunities. One report published in 2012 stated that the value of the 
worldwide entertainment industry had grown from $449 billion to $745 
billion between 1998 and 2010.78 Moreover, the share of U.S. household 
spending on entertainment from 2000 to 2008 had increased 15 percent, 
and new content creation overall ballooned.79 A 2014 update of this 
report, focusing on the U.S. market, confirmed the continued growth of 
creative outputs among a more diverse array of independent creators,80 
just as Barlow had predicted. In the digital age, music, video, and books 
can be produced and distributed by almost anyone who has access to a 
computer and an internet connection. 
Statistics bear out that the entertainment industry is growing both 
in terms of revenue and quantity of content. According to the latest 
iteration of this report, “[t]he internet has provided new tools and 
services that have enabled more creation, more distribution, more 
promotion, more access to fans and more ways to make money than ever 
before.”81 Looking specifically at four sectors—music, film and video, 
 
77 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, No, RIAA, It’s Not the End of the World for 
Musicians, 83 UMKC L. REV. 287, 287–88 (2014) (describing dire statements 
made by music industry representatives). See also supra notes 3–9. 
78 MICHAEL MASNICK & MICHAEL HO, THE SKY IS RISING: A DETAILED LOOK 
AT THE STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 2 (2012 ed.) [hereinafter SKY 
IS RISING 2012], https://www.techdirt.com/skyisrising/ (drawing upon data 
compiled from PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), iDATE, and the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics). 
79 Id. at 2–3. 
80 MICHAEL MASNICK & MICHAEL HO, THE SKY IS RISING: A DETAILED LOOK 
AT THE STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 4–5, 26 (2014 ed.) 
[hereinafter SKY IS RISING 2014], https://www.techdirt.com/skyisrising2014/. 
Two additional reports by the same authors looked, respectively, at similar 
patterns in Europe and the luxury goods market online. See MICHAEL MASNICK 
& MICHAEL HO, THE SKY IS RISING: REGIONAL STUDY (2013), 
https://www.techdirt.com/skyisrising2/ (analyzing six European countries); 
MICHAEL MASNICK & MICHAEL HO, THE SKY IS RISING: LUXURY GOODS 
(2014), https://www.techdirt.com/skyisrising/luxury. 
81 MICHAEL MASNICK & LEIGH BEADON, THE SKY IS RISING; A DETAILED LOOK 
AT THE STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 2 (2019 ed.) [hereinafter SKY 
IS RISING 2019], https://skyisrising.com/TheSkyIsRising2019.pdf. See also 
Carrier, supra note 77, at 297–98 (describing Kickstarter, “which, as of 
November 2014, raised $1 billion from more than 7 million people to fund 
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books, and video games—the report found that much more content is 
being produced, the industries are growing, and the internet is largely 
responsible for the growth.82 The report describes the following success 
stories in the creative economy: 
• music: sources show an increased number of new music 
releases, by more artists, and more ways for fans to 
consume their music and support them;83 
• video entertainment: new and traditional forms of video, 
including television, film, online streaming services, and 
user-generated content, are seeing a significant expansion 
in investment, content creation, and consumer 
consumption;84 
• books, ebooks, and audio books: more than ever before, 
books of all types—digital and print, in the U.S. and 
elsewhere—are being published (including a growing self-
publishing industry) with a wide array of consumer access 
opportunities;85 
• video games: with the rise of the mobile gaming market, 
live game streaming, and e-sports events, online gaming 
appears to be rapidly expanding, with even more exciting 
creative possibilities ahead.86 
Furthermore, content industries—even those that were struggling 
earlier—are all now thriving. According to the 2019 report, global 
 
73,000 creative products.”); Steven Johnson, The Creative Apocalypse That 
Wasn’t, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 19, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/magazine/the-creative-apocalypse-that-
wasnt.html?_r=1 (“Writers, performers, directors and even musicians report 
their economic fortunes to be similar to those of their counterparts 15 years ago, 
and in many cases they have improved. Against all odds, the voices of the artists 
seem to be louder than ever.”). 
82 SKY IS RISING 2019, supra note 81, at 4. 
83 Id. at 5–12. See also GLYNN S. LUNNEY, JR., COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS: MONEY 
AND MUSIC IN THE U.S. RECORDING INDUSTRY (2018) (correlating the rise of file 
sharing and decline in recorded music sales with the creation of more new 
music). 
84 SKY IS RISING 2019, supra note 81, at 13–24. 
85 Id. at 25–31. See also JOEL WALDFOGEL, DIGITAL RENAISSANCE: WHAT DATA 
AND ECONOMICS TELL US ABOUT THE FUTURE OF POPULAR CULTURE 133 
(2018) (“Between 2006 and 2015, the number of new self-published e-books 
rose from essentially zero to just over 150,000 titles per year.”). 
86 SKY IS RISING 2019, supra note 81, at 32–40. 
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entertainment and media revenues hit the $1.88 trillion mark in 2017; 
experts predict these industries will reach $2.2 trillion in 2021 and 
continue to grow 4 to 5 percent beyond that. The sky indeed appears to 
be rising in the age of online creativity and prosperity, just as Barlow had 
imagined. 
Economist Joel Waldfogel has been studying data on the impact 
of digital technology for creative industries for over a decade. His recent 
book reports on sales data and critics’ and users’ reviews and “best of” 
lists, from which he ascertained that digitization has reduced production 
costs for creative output and distribution, yet the quality of content has 
remained high.87 Although Waldfogel acknowledges that certain trade-
offs occurred, including initial revenue reductions in some legacy media 
sectors, he concludes that a net gain has resulted from the increased 
number and quality of new products created: 
While declining revenues are creating real pain for many creators 
and intermediaries, the volume of new materials created, and the 
apparent satisfaction that consumers and critics derive from the new 
content, are both very high by historical standards. So the first 
takeaway is that we are living through a digital renaissance.88 
Other studies have reached similar conclusions. Focusing on independent 
creators who have posted their works on nine online platforms, a 2018 
ReCreate study found that the internet had enabled a substantial infusion 
of new creators developing new works, often interacting directly with 
their audiences and earning revenues from online posting activities 
without the need to rely on traditional gatekeepers such as book 
publishers, record labels, and movie studios.89 That study reported that an 
estimated 14.8 million Americans posted their works on Amazon, eBay, 
Etsy, Instagram, Shapeways, Tumblr, Twitch, WordPress, and YouTube 
in 2016 and earned approximately $5.9 billion from commercializing 
their online contents.90 Moreover, the number of such creators in 2017 
 
87 Waldfogel, supra note 85. 
88 Id. at 252–53. 
89 ROBERT SHAPIRO & SIDDHARTHA ANEJA, UNLOCKING THE GATES: 
AMERICA’S NEW CREATIVE ECONOMY 3 (2018), 
https://www.recreatecoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ReCreate-New-
Creative-Economy-Study-Report-508.pdf; see also Carrier, supra note 77, at 
287 (“[I]nnovations in technology have made it easier for musicians to 
participate in every step of the creation, development, and marketing process. 
And . . . forg[e] stronger connections with their fans.”). 
90 SHAPIRO & ANEJA, supra note 89, at 3. 
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grew to 16.9 million (+16.6%) and total revenues to $6.8 billion 
(+14.8%).91 
  Still other studies confirm Barlow’s anecdotal observation that 
live performances would complement recorded music, importantly 
contributing to the financial well-being of musicians.92 Concert revenues 
and ticket prices have continued to rise in the digital era: 
Concert revenues continue to be a bright spot for the music 
industry, as the North American concert industry grossed a record-
breaking $5.1 billion in 2013, . . . PwC estimated the U.S. concert 
business at $8.61 billion for 2013, growing to $9.2 billion in 2014 
with a compound annual growth rate of 3% through 2017. The 
actual scarcity for seeing a musical performance live appears to be a 
healthy and sustainable practice for the foreseeable future.93 
Moreover, employment in the U.S. entertainment sector increased by 
nearly 20 percent between 1998 to 2008.94 Another study by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) found that wage trends for 
creative workers in the digital age in several countries generally 
 
91 ROBERT SHAPIRO & SIDDHARTHA ANEJA, TAKING ROOT: THE GROWTH OF 
AMERICA’S NEW CREATIVE ECONOMY 2 (2019), 
https://www.recreatecoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ReCreate-2017-
New-Creative-Economy-Study.pdf. The study also surmised that additional (and 
as-yet unreported) income will have derived from mobile traffic directed from 
social media. Id. at 3; see also Giancarlo F. Frosio, Digital Piracy Debunked: A 
Short Note on Digital Threats and Intermediary Liability, 5 INTERNET POL’Y 
REV. 1, 9 (2016), https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/digital-piracy-
debunked-short-note-digital-threats-and-intermediary-
liability#footnoteref16_g7fp0et (describing increased numbers of independent 
artists and labels in the current music industry). 
92 See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
93 SKY IS RISING 2014, supra note 80, at 7; see also Carrier, supra note 77, at 
299 (noting that “[t]ours also offer the opportunity for sponsorship deals that, in 
the aggregate, are worth billions” including other complements such as apparel); 
Frosio, supra note 91 (citing studies showing that sales of high-priced 
complements has added to artists’ incomes); Joel Waldfogel, How Digitization 
Has Created a Golden Age of Music, Movies, Books, and Television, 31 J. 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 195, 211 (Summer 2017) (citing studies correlating 
digitization with increased concert ticket sales and ticket prices). 
94 SKY IS RISING 2012, supra note 78, at 2. Following the U.S. recession in late 
2008, employment reportedly rose again in some entertainment industries. See 
SKY IS RISING 2019, supra note 81, at 9–10 (music); id. at 19 (television and 
cable TV).  
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outperformed other occupations.95 Based on these findings, the study 
concluded: 
From a policy perspective, these results do not lend support to the 
idea that creators’ income situation has systematically worsened 
with the rise of the internet and its intermediaries, as argued by 
some commentators in ‘value gap’ discussions. The income changes 
creators experience over time are not aligned with general trends in 
the total population: we see creators losing less or even gaining a 
better income position in relative terms.96 
Although the recent studies discussed above have focused 
mainly on major entertainment industries (i.e., movies, television, books, 
music, and video games), digitization has had profound impacts on other 
significant industries, and none more so than computer software. In The 
Next Economy of Ideas, Barlow remarked that the software industry, 
despite “widespread piracy” was “booming.”97 Why? Barlow asked. 
“Because the more a program is pirated, the more likely it is to become a 
standard.”98 Barlow thus concluded from this and other examples that 
“[n]oncommercial distribution of information increases the sale of 
commercial information. Abundance breeds abundance . . . . And nothing 
makes you famous faster than an audience willing to distribute your 
work for free.”99 
Despite the continued prevalence of software piracy, a 2017 
report from the Business Software Alliance estimated the software 
industry had directly contributed $564.4 billion to the annual U.S. GDP, 
with a total value-added to GDP, including indirect impacts, in excess of 
a trillion dollars a year.100 It also reported significant job growth of 2.9 
million jobs (10.5 million jobs including indirect impacts), which 
represents a 14.6 percent increase since 2014.101 Software-as-a-service 
(SaaS) operating in the “cloud” is an increasingly successful business 
 
95 Alexander Cuntz, Creators’ Income Situation in the Digital Age (WIPO, 
Economic Research Working Paper No. 49, Dec. 2018), http://www.
lisdatacenter.org/wps/liswps/755.pdf. 
96 Id. 
97 Barlow, supra note 10, at 241. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 241–42. 
100 See The Growing $1 Trillion Economic Impact of Software, BSA FOUND. 
(Sep. 2017), https://software.org/reports/2017-us-software-impact/ (based on 
2016 figures). 
101 Id. 
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model for software companies, one that isn’t vulnerable to software 
piracy.102 
In the 1990s, there was considerable skepticism about the 
commercial viability of an open source sector of the software industry,103 
perhaps in part because the open-source software movement seemed to 
exemplify the open, collaborative spirit that Barlow celebrated in his 
essays. Yet, somehow and quite remarkably, free and open-source 
software has become a major force in the industry, not only as an 
accepted norm in enterprise computing environments, but also through 
the evolution of financially viable business models.104 The Linux 
operating system is perhaps the highest profile example of community 
developed open-source software,105 but millions more such projects are 
ongoing today.106 Mainstream global corporations, such as IBM, Adobe, 
and Google, are contributing substantial resources in support of Linux 
and other open-source projects.107 Indeed, IBM recently made a $34 
 
102 Cory Capoccia, The Final Frontier for SaaS Is CRM for Main Street, FORBES 
(Feb. 22, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/02/22/the-final-frontier-
for-saas-is-crm-for-main-street/#c605b2188cc9 (forecasting the global SaaS 
market to reach $186 billion by 2024); see also Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy 
Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1746, 1779 
(2011) (discussing software-as-a-service and cloud computing). 
103 See, e.g., Matt Germonprez et al., Open Source Communities of Competitors, 
20 INTERACTIONS 54, 54 (Nov–Dec 2013); Samuelson, supra note 102, at 1777–
78. 
104 See, e.g., STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004); Katherine 
Noyes, Open Source Software Is Now a Norm in Businesses, PC WORLD (May 
18, 2011, 10:07 AM), 
https://www.pcworld.com/article/228136/open_source_software_now_a_norm_i
n_businesses.html; Max Schireson & Dharmesh Thakker, The Money in Open-
Source Software, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 9, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016
/02/09/the-money-in-open-source-software/. 
105 See, e.g., Paul Venezia, Linux at 25: How Linux Changed the World, 
INFOWORLD (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.infoworld.com/article/3109204/
linux-at-25-how-linux-changed-the-world.html. 
106 For example, GitHub, a software development platform, reported hosting 31 
million developers and 96 million repositories in 2018. See The State of the 
Octoverse 2018, GITHUB BLOG (Oct. 16, 2018), https://github.blog/2018-10-16-
state-of-the-octoverse/. 
107 See, e.g., Sid Sijbrandij, How Open Source Became the Default Business 
Model for Software, FORBES (Jul. 16, 2018, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/07/16/how-open-source-
became-the-default-business-model-for-software/#62fcdb974e72 (noting open 
source investments by Google, Facebook, and Adobe, among others); see also 
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billion offer to buy Red Hat, a leading firm that supplies Linux and other 
open source software and services to enterprise companies.108 Another 
highly successful open source product is the Android platform for 
smartphones, which Google has been able to monetize in other ways than 
by sales of copies of the program.109 Open-source software providers 
often recoup investments in software development through providing 
value-added services, such as installation, customization, and 
maintenance, or complementary assets, such as proprietary add-on 
programs that perform specialized functions.110 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The enigma of digitized property may not have been resolved for 
all creative sectors. Yet it is remarkable how well the economy of ideas, 
to use Barlow’s term, has evolved over the last quarter-century. Yes, 
copyright infringement is widespread in the online environment, but 
millions of people make a multitude of non-infringing uses of 
copyrighted works online as well. The netizens (to use another now 
archaic term from the 1990s) of cyberspace have been creating and 
sharing their creations, thereby promoting the greater public good, as 
well or better now than at any time in human history. 
As much as Barlow would have celebrated the financial 
successes of so many millions of creators in cyberspace, he would also 
have been pleased that the economy of ideas includes many millions of 
people who create and share their creations online for free. Barlow 
eloquently recognized “the inexplicable pleasures of information itself, 
the joy of learning, knowing, and teaching; the strange good feeling of 
 
Pamela Samuelson, IBM’s Pragmatic Embrace of Open Source, 49 COMM. 
ACM 15 (Oct. 2006). 
108 See Alex Sherman & Lora Kolodny, IBM To Acquire Red Hat in Deal Valued 
at $34 Billion, CNBC (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/28/ibm-
to-acquire-red-hat-in-deal-valued-at-34-billion.html. Also in 2018, Microsoft 
acquired GitHub for $7.5 billion. See Klint Finley, Why 2018 Was a Breakout 
Year for Open Source Deals, WIRED (Dec. 23, 2018, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/why-2018-breakout-year-open-source-deals/. 
109 See, e.g., Bogdan Petrovan, How Does Google Make Money from Android?, 
ANDROID AUTHORITY (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.androidauthority.com/how-
does-google-make-money-from-android-669008/ (surmising that mobile 
advertising and app sales contribute to Google’s Android business). 
110 See, e.g., Paul-Noël Guély, Open-Source Software: From the Periphery of 
Tech to the Mainstream of Finance, FORBES (Sep. 3, 2018, 7:45 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulnoelguely/2018/09/03/open-source-software-
from-the-periphery-of-tech-to-the-mainstream-of-finance/#4472149269ab. 
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information coming into and out of oneself.”111 Those who share their 
creations freely, said Barlow, “are getting paid in something besides 
money,” for there is joy for many in the act of sharing.112 
Those who like to tinker with digital copies of creative works, 
such as by making remixes or mashups, have been able to participate in 
the new creative economy as never before.113 Digitization has made it 
possible not only to playfully build upon existing works, but also to share 
those playful creations with others via online video-sharing services.114 
Fan fiction has also emerged as another robust sector of the new 
economy.115 This resonates with Barlow’s contention that ideas and 
information are “conveyed by propagation, not distribution.”116 As with 
jazz improvisations, stand-up comedy routines, and mime performances, 
Barlow characterized information as an activity, oblivious of copyright 
protection, flourishing with a life of its own.117 
 
111 Barlow, supra note 1, at 127, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 23. 
112 Barlow, supra note 1, at 127, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 24. For a 
theoretically rich account of this transformation, see, for example, YOCHAI 
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2007). 
113 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE 
IN A HYBRID ECONOMY (2008). 
114 See, e.g., David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the 
Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1992); Pamela Samuelson, Freedom to Tinker, 17 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 563, 564 (2016). See generally ERIC VON HIPPEL, 
DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005); KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER 
SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION 
(2012) (describing several industry sectors in which the freedom to copy 
promotes creativity). 
115 See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS, WHAT WE 
BELIEVE, http://www.transformativeworks.org/what_we_believe/ (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2019). 
116 Barlow, supra note 1, at 89, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 17. 
117 Barlow, supra note 1, at 90, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 18. Barlow also 
observed that “[i]nformation is a relationship.” Barlow, supra note 1, at 126, 18 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 20. The WIPO study also recognized that  
[a]rtists do not have uniform motivations to create. Policy deliberations 
should thus take into account non-monetary sources of artists’ 
motivation and carefully build incentive schemes targeting overall 
psychic income, rather than focusing on income issues alone. For 
example, changes in legal and other mechanisms can affect peer 
recognition and ease of attribution of works, which ultimately influence 
creators’ job satisfaction and further creativity. Income-focused 
reforms might effectively lead to missing policy goals. 
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Barlow was an enthusiastic endorser of open access for 
copyrighted works when he spoke at the 2003 launch of the Creative 
Commons (CC).118 The uptake of CC licensed works since then may 
have exceeded the high expectations of its founders. Over 1 billion 
creative works are now available under CC licenses on millions of 
Internet sites.119 While many (and perhaps most) of these CC licensed 
works are freely shared without restrictions, authors can retain rights to 
control commercial exploitations by making their works available under 
CC-NC licenses, which only allows free use for non-commercial 
purposes. Many well-known authors have published digital versions of 
their books under CC licenses so they are widely available to all online 
users, but the authors still earn royalties on the sale of physical books.120 
Millions of scholarly works are now freely available through digital 
repositories, as colleges and universities have increasingly adopted open 
access policies for their faculties’ scholarly research outputs.121 
Digitization has been beneficial not only for the creation and 
dissemination of new works, but also in extending the “long tail” of in-
copyright works that previously would have faded from public view as 
they went out of print. Mass digitization of books from research 
institutions has enabled older works to be rediscovered and used in novel 
ways.122 By digitizing millions of books from research library 
collections, indexing them, and serving up snippets of the books in 
response to search queries, Google made it possible for researchers to 
discover books relevant to their work and provide information on where 
 
See Cuntz, supra note 95, at 46. 
118 See John Perry Barlow at Creative Commons Launch (2002), https://archive.
org/details/lreincclaunch2a-jpbarlow-lres. 
119 List of major Creative Commons licensed works, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_major_Creative_Commons_licensed_works (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2019). 
120 See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Giving It Away, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2006, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/2006/11/30/cory-doctorow-copyright-tech-
media_cz_cd_books06_1201doctorow.html#36825d278c20; Made with 
Creative Commons: Knowledge Unlatched, MEDIUM (Sep. 18, 2017), 
https://medium.com/made-with-creative-commons/knowledge-unlatched-
a36a822bc77c (describing case studies). 
121 See, e.g., OPEN ACCESS AND SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING, HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL, https://hls.harvard.edu/library/for-faculty/open-access-and-scholarly-
publishing/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2019). 
122 See, e.g., Matthew Sag, Orphan Works as Grist for the Data Mill, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1503 (2012). 
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copies of those books could be located.123 The HathiTrust digital library, 
which was formed by Google’s library partners pooling digital copies of 
books from their collections, now allows researchers from consortium 
members to conduct searches across a corpus of more than 16 million 
books to find ones that are relevant.124 Barlow would have been pleased 
by this development and would have supported the initiative of some 
libraries to engage in controlled digital lending of books that libraries 
initially acquired in physical form,125 following the lead of the Internet 
Archive with its online Open Library.126 
John Perry Barlow had a vision of an economy of ideas in which 
information would flow freely through the Internet ether. While his hope 
that copyright would disappear in the new creative economy is unlikely 
to transpire, there is some reason to hope that policymakers will come to 
recognize that creative sectors of the economy are thriving. Barlow 
insisted that 
we have a profound responsibility to be better ancestors. What we 
do now will likely determine the productivity and freedom of 20 
generations of artists yet unborn. So it is time to stop speculating 
about when the new economy of ideas will arrive. It’s here. Now 
comes the hard part, which also happens to be the fun part: making 
it work.127 
As a tribute to Barlow, let’s not screw things up by adopting stronger 
copyright rules that will inhibit rather than promote the progress of 
science, as the Constitution directs.128 
 
123 See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir. 2015); 
Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014). 
124 September 2018 Update, HATHITRUST, 
https://www.hathitrust.org/september-2018-update. A recent article presents 
evidence that digitization may in fact enhance demand and increase the sales or 
reprintings for certain types of physical books. See Abhishek Nagaraj & Imke 
Reimers, Digitization and the Demand for Physical Works: Evidence from the 
Google Books Project (Feb. 21, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339524. 
125 See POSITION STATEMENT ON CONTROLLED DIGITAL LENDING, CONTROLLED 
DIGITAL LENDING BY LIBRARIES (Sept. 2018),  
https://controlleddigitallending.org/statement. 
126 See Open Library, INTERNET ARCHIVE, https://openlibrary.org/ (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2019). 
127 Barlow, supra note 10, at 252. 
128 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
IMAGINARY BOTTLES1 
JESSICA LITMAN† 
i.  
In 1994, John Perry Barlow published The Economy of Ideas in 
WIRED magazine.2   Subtitled “A Framework for patents and copyrights 
in the Digital Age (everything you know about intellectual property is 
wrong),” the article argued that commercializing copyrighted material in 
a digital age was akin to selling wine without bottles.   
 Barlow’s metaphor was startlingly apt.  For more than 200 years, 
U.S. copyright law had defined the rights of both owners and users 
primarily by regulating the creation and distribution of the tangible 
objects in which copyrighted works were embodied.3  Networked digital 
technology enabled the promiscuous copying and broad distribution of 
works completely detached from tangible objects. 
The enigma is this: if our property can be infinitely reproduced and 
instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost, without 
our knowledge, without its even leaving our possession, how can 
we protect it? . . . . 4  
                                                
1 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivatives 
4.0 International License (CC BY-ND 4.0). 
† John F. Nickoll Professor of Law and Professor of Information, University of 
Michigan.  Jon Weinberg made extremely helpful comments on earlier versions 
of this essay. 
2 John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED (Mar. 1, 1994), reprinted 
as Selling Wine Without Bottles:  The Economy of Mind on the Global Net, 18 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8 (2019).   
3 See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for 
Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 581 (1986); L. Ray Patterson, 
Copyright and the “Exclusive Right” of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 33 
(1993); R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital 
Networks, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 577, 583–610 (2003). As Barlow noted, the 20th 
century dissemination of works using the broadcast spectrum had also posed a 
wine-without-bottles problem, but most practical uses of broadcasting involved 
the creation of copies. Live television and radio programming received no 
copyright protection at all until the program was embodied in a tangible object. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 101, 102 (2012); Barlow, supra note 2, at 91, 18 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. at 19 (“[B]roadcast transmissions all lack the Constitutional 
requirement of fixation as a ‘writing.’”). 
4 Barlow, supra note 2, at 85, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 8 (as “[t]he riddle is 
this . . .”). 
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 Barlow’s answer was that we needed to reexamine our 
assumptions about the value and nature of the information that copyright 
law seeks to secure.  Once that authorship was detached from its 
containers, it would no longer work to assume that container-centric 
regulation would treat it appropriately.   
 Some of Barlow’s initial musings on the nature and value of 
information seem startlingly prescient 25 years later.  His prediction that, 
in the near future, “information will be generated collaboratively by the 
cyber-tribal hunter-gatherers of Cyberspace,”5 was an eerily accurate 
description of Twitter.  Barlow’s suggestion that information itself was 
supplanting money as our dominant currency6 presaged a future ruled by 
Google, Facebook, and Amazon, three companies that derive much of 
their monetary value from trafficking in information.  He proposed that 
we reconceptualize information in the networked digital environment as 
more akin to a living organism than a static package of knowledge.  As a 
non-carbon-based life form, Barlow suggested, information evolves, 
spreads, and, over time, it spoils.  It creates relationships and meaning. 
Some information’s value depends on exclusivity; other information is 
worth more the more common it becomes.7  
 Legacy owners of intellectual property, he complained, were 
engaging in futile efforts to buttress the old, container-centric rules to 
enable them to stretch around the new reality.  He predicted that the 
disconnect between traditional copyright law and digital technology 
would prove to be unbridgeable: 
Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or 
expanded to contain digitized expression any more than real estate 
law might be revised to cover the allocation of broadcasting 
spectrum (which, in fact, rather resembles what is being attempted 
here).  We will need to develop an entirely new set of methods as 
befits this entirely new set of circumstances.8 
 Twenty-five years later, though, it appears that Barlow might 
have underestimated the tenacity of legacy copyright owners.  Despite 
significant missteps, bad bets, and massive investment in stupid 
initiatives, they seem to have emerged into a new world where, from 
                                                
5 Barlow, supra note 2, at 90, 18 DUKE L. & TEC. REV. at 19. 
6 See Barlow, supra note 2, at 127, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 24 
(“[Information] may become the dominant form of human trade.”). 
7 See Barlow, supra note 2, at 89–90, 126–27, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 19–
21. 
8 Barlow, supra note 2, at 85, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 9. 
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their vantage point, the copyright rules are startlingly similar to the rules 
that governed the old world, only better. 
ii. 
 Initially, copyright owners relied on a combination of two 
strategies.  First, they put their hopes in what Barlow described as 
“crypto bottling.”9  Second, they backed up that plan with hefty helpings 
of relentless litigation.  In the 1990s, many lobbyists for legacy copyright 
businesses insisted that, although consumers might enjoy content created 
by amateurs if it were free, the only good reason for a consumer to pay 
for Internet access would be to enjoy commercially-produced 
entertainment and information products.  It followed that one could make 
a profit from providing Internet access by selling subscriptions to 
consumers eager for that content.  If copyright owners could prevent 
consumers from gaining unlicensed access or making unlicensed copies, 
they’d be able to charge them lots of money for licensed access.  They 
figured that devising a technological system to prevent unauthorized 
access or use was just around the corner, and if hacking technological 
protection were unlawful, that would effectively deter folks from piracy. 
 Copyright lobbyists persuaded Congress to protect copyright on 
the Internet by enacting a law that made it illegal to circumvent copy 
protection technology for any reason.10  Then, they sat back and waited 
impatiently for software engineers to invent technology that could encase 
copyrighted works in impregnable containers of encryption code.  And 
waited.  Meanwhile, they delayed making their works available online.  
While they were waiting, they sued upstart businesses that dared to offer 
music or video over the Internet, or even to help consumers do it 
themselves.11  Book publishers, movie studios and record labels were 
reluctant to launch less-secure offerings, and wary of cannibalizing their 
                                                
9 See Barlow, supra note 2, at 129, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 28. 
10 See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 
2860 (1998). 
11 See, e.g., MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005); UMG Recordings v. 
Shelter Capital Partners, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011); Arista Records, L.L.C. 
v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2009); A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001);  Warner Bros. Entm’t v. WTV 
Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Cal 2011); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Hummer-
Winblad, 377 F. Supp. 2d 796 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta 
Books L.L.C, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 
2002); UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1831 (W.D. Pa. 
2000). 
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existing bricks-and-mortar business models.12  When they finally made 
their works available over digital networks, they offered pallid and 
overpriced digital services with terrible user interfaces, often constrained 
by extremely buggy and annoying digital rights management 
technology.13  So, there was a bunch of pent-up demand and no real 
competition when a few well-capitalized businesses decided it was worth 
the litigation risk to enter the digital market with offerings of their own.  
Apple, Amazon, and Google soon became providers of online music, 
books, and video.  They were willing to defend expensive lawsuits, and 
faced very little competition.  Soon, all three had become obligatory 
partners for content owners hoping to distribute their works online.  
Online platforms figured out that they could make more money by 
selling eyeballs to advertisers than they could by selling movies to 
viewers or music to listeners.  Apple, Amazon, and Google then 
proceeded to become impossibly wealthy.14 
 Copyright owners resent that.  They’ve coined the term “value 
gap” to describe the injustice of the fact that platforms have too much 
bargaining power and can therefore shape the terms of copyright licenses 
to call for lower royalty payments than copyright owners believe they 
ought to pay.15  It isn’t that platforms don’t purchase licenses for the 
copyrighted content that appears on their services––they do.  Because of 
their market dominance, though, they have the upper hand in 
negotiations and can insist on paying lower royalties than copyright 
owners believe would be fair.  Given how much money the big online 
platforms are raking in, copyright owners figure they ought to be sharing 
a bigger piece of it.16 
Of course, we know now that all of the assumptions underlying 
the impenetrable crypto-bottle strategy were misguided.  There was 
                                                
12 See, e.g., ANDREW ALBANESE, THE BATTLE OF $9.99 (2013). 
13 See Jessica Litman, Antibiotic Resistance, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 
53–58 (2012). 
14 See id. at 58–66. 
15 See American Assoc. of Independent Music et al., Joint Comments before the 
US Copyright Office in re Section 512 Study, No. 2015-7 (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2015-0013-89806; Warner 
Music Group, Comments before the US Copyright Office in re Section 512 
Study, No. 2015-7 (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2015-0013-86022. 
16 See Jessica Litman, What We Don’t See When We See Copyright as Property, 
77 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 536, 537–42 (2018). 
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never going to be an impregnable crypto-bottle.17  The electronic game 
industry has managed to make good-enough encryption work, but for 
owners of copyrights in other works, the legal prohibition on hacking 
copy-protection technology has been a bust.18  The additional deterrent 
effect of making it illegal to circumvent digital rights management turned 
out to be negligible.  Moreover, the prohibition is so broadly worded that 
it seems to forbid an independent mechanic from fixing any car 
containing software,19 so people tend not to believe that the behavior it 
prohibits is unlawful.  Anyone can find easy-to-follow circumvention 
instructions in respectable newspapers and online magazines; 
circumvention software is ubiquitous.20  Several major media companies 
have decided not to bother with digital rights management protection at 
all, since it costs them something to encode every copy, and that 
encoding doesn’t in fact provide meaningful protection. 
 As the crypto-bottle strategy failed, though, copyright owners 
stumbled into a second tactic that has been far more effective.  The key 
to this approach was a breathtakingly expansive reinterpretation of the 
exclusive right to reproduce a work in copies, predicated on a very broad 
definition of “copy.”21  Fans of this new understanding maintain that 
whenever a work appears in the working memory of any computer 
anywhere, an actionable copy has been made, in violation of the statutory 
reproduction right.22  By insisting, again and again, that the word “copy” 
                                                
17 See CORY DOCTOROW, INFORMATION DOESN’T WANT TO BE FREE:  LAWS FOR 
THE INTERNET AGE (2014). 
18 See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2010). 
19 See Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of 
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg. 
54010, 54021-23 (Oct. 26, 2018) (discussing proposed exemption “allowing for 
circumvention of access controls controlling the functioning of motorized land 
vehicles for purposes of diagnosis, repair, or lawful modification of a vehicle”). 
20 See, e.g., Catherine Ellis, The Best Free DVD Copier 2019, TECHRADAR (Feb. 
11, 2019), https://www.techradar.com/best/the-best-free-dvd-copier; Kirk 
McElhearn, How To Rip DVDs and Blu-Ray Discs with Make MKV and 
Handbrake, MACWORLD (Mar. 13, 2017), 
https://www.macworld.com/article/3179350/how-to-rip-dvds-and-blu-ray-discs-
with-makemkv-and-handbrake.html; MacTheRipper, GUSTAVUS ADOPHUS 
COLLEGE, https://gustavus.edu/gts/Mac_the_Ripper (last visited Mar. 6, 2019). 
21 See Jessica Litman, Fetishizing Copies, in RUTH OKEDIJI, COPYRIGHT IN AN 
AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 107 (2017). 
22 See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 104 Report: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. 96–112 (2002) (testimony of Emery Simon, Business Software Alliance); 
see generally Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
1067 (2010). 
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had long been understood in this broader sense, and by behaving as if 
they were right about that, copyright owners were able to persuade some 
courts that the copyright law, if properly interpreted, afforded them 
extensive rights to control any appearance of their works over digital 
networks. 
 The new definition requires some mental gymnastics for readers 
who pay attention to statutory language.  The copyright statute has, since 
1976, defined “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a work is 
fixed.”23  Congress hasn’t revised that definition, and copyright owners 
haven’t asked Congress to do so.  Being attached to a material object, 
though, is precisely the characteristic that Barlow argued that digital files 
lack.  The modern revisionist interpretation expands the understanding of 
a “copy” beyond the idea of a tangible material object to include 
temporary and ephemeral instantiations.  Essentially, it reads the words 
“material objects” out of the statutory definition.24  
 Over the past 20 years, this expanded meaning of “copy” has 
ceased to be seen as radical.25   That has allowed copyright owners to sell 
their wine in what I would call make-believe bottles.  Like the digital 
                                                
23 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
24 Most defenses of the expanded conception of “copy” focus only on the  
wording of the definition of “fixation,” which imposes the additional 
requirement that the work’s instantiation in a material object must be 
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 
U.S.C. § 101.  See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 104 Report: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
104th Cong. (Dec. 12 & 13, 2001) [hereinafter Section 104 Hearing] (statement 
of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights). They assume that since computers 
and computer memory chips are themselves material objects, any time 
expression occupies a memory chip for a period of more than transitory 
duration, a copy has been made. Proponents of the view that RAM copies 
infringe copyrights argue that as long as the computer or other machine is on—
and it could be on indefinitely—a copy of the copyrighted work stored there can 
be perceived or reproduced, thereby satisfying the “more than transitory 
duration” standard. By that logic, a broadcast tower is a material object, an 
unrecorded live television broadcast would therefore necessarily result in a 
copy, and Congress’s conclusion that it did not must have been mistaken. See 
Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The NII Intellectual Property Report, 
COMM. ACM, Dec. 1994, at 21, 23 (“[H]olding a mirror up to a book would be 
infringement because the book’s image could be perceived there for more than 
transitory duration.”).  
25 See, e.g., DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT, 
CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 12 (2013). 
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instantiations of the works, these imaginary bottles are not tangible.  That 
lack has turned out to carry with it unexpected advantages for rights 
holders.  Because the bottles are made-up creations, copyright owners 
can imbue them with whatever characteristics they fancy.  By encoding 
restrictions in the terms of an end user license agreement, distributors of 
copyrighted works have succeeded in limiting the uses consumers are 
permitted to make of lawful copies of copyrighted works.26  It has 
become conventional for copyright owners to insist that digital copies are 
“licensed,” not “sold,” even in transactions that are expressly 
denominated as sales.27  Because the terms of the license may permit or 
forbid any encounter with the work that results in a digital copy, the 
licensor is entitled to subject the purchaser’s use to whatever conditions 
it chooses to impose.  In particular, copyright owners have insisted that 
their make-believe bottles are not subject to the first sale doctrine, and 
the purchasers of those bottles may not pass them on to new owners.28  
That’s a neat trick: a digital file may be a copy for the purpose of 
infringement liability but not a copy for the purpose of transferring 
ownership.  
 Copyright owners have even persuaded some courts that their 
entitlement to denominate transactions as licenses rather than sales also 
permits them to characterize transfers of physical media containing 
copyrighted works as licenses of the material objects that may preclude 
the purchaser from transferring the material object.29 
                                                
26 The topic of the use of end user license agreements to negate user’s rights 
under copyright law is much too involved and important for this short essay. 
Peggy Radin and Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz have published 
excellent books with masterful discussions of the ramifications. See AARON 
PERZANOWSKI & JASON SHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP (2016); MARGARET 
JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE (2012). 
27 See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Even Amazon Can’t Keep Its EULA Story Straight, 
BOING BOING (Jan. 12, 2010), https://boingboing.net/2010/01/12/even-amazon-
cant-kee.html. 
28 See, e.g., First Sale Doctrine, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE, https://copyrightalliance
.org/policy/position-papers/first-sale-doctrine/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2019); Amici 
Curiae Brief of Motion Picture Ass’n of America & Recording Industry Ass’n of 
America at 7–9, Capitol Records v. Redigi, 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 
16-2321), https://copyrightalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ReDigi-
RIAA-Amicus-Brief.pdf; see generally First Sale Under Title 17: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the H. Judiciary Comm., 114th Cong. (June 
2, 2014), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU03/20140602/102290/HHRG-
113-JU03-Transcript-20140602.pdf. 
29 Compare Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2010), with UMG 
Recordings v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). In Disney Enterprises v. 
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Twenty years ago, proponents of the broad reconstruction of 
“copy” argued that the expansive understanding was an essential tool to 
prevent digital piracy, but acknowledged that the law should find some 
way to allow temporary digital copies that were incidental to legitimate 
uses.30  Today, the fact that an otherwise legitimate use requires the 
creation of a unauthorized digital copy is itself enough to make the use 
illegitimate.31 
iii. 
In 2019, then, make-believe copyright bottles have given 
copyright owners more legal control over uses of their works than they 
enjoyed under the old-fangled bricks-and-mortar law.  That enhanced 
legal control hasn’t necessarily translated into actual control, but the 
businesses that call themselves the “core copyright industries” report that 
they are earning more money than ever,32 so things seem to be working 
out okay for them so far. 
Redbox Automated Retail, Disney claimed that language on the outside of its 
boxed blu-ray disk, DVD, and digital download code combo packs that said 
“codes are not for sale or transfer” and “this product . . . cannot be sold or rented 
individually,” bound purchasers of the combo packs.  Redbox purchased combo 
packs and sold the three components separately. Disney claimed that a consumer 
who purchased a download code from Redbox infringed its copyright when she 
or he downloaded the movie, and that Redbox should be held liable as a 
contributory infringer. The court initially ruled that the language did not create 
an enforceable contract, both because it didn’t indicate that opening the box 
would constitute assent and because the purported prohibition on transfer of 
BluRay discs and DVDs sought to impose an unenforceable condition in 
contravention of the first sale doctrine in section 109. Indeed, the district court 
concluded that the overreaching terms of the purported license should be 
considered copyright misuse. See Disney Enters. v. Redbox Automated Retail, 
No. CV 17-08655 DDP (AGRx), 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 61903 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 
20, 2018). Disney revised the language to give purchasers clearer notice on the 
outside of the combo pack box and added lengthy terms and conditions to its 
digital download site. The court agreed that Disney could now succeed on its 
claim that Redbox encouraged its customers to infringe Disney’s copyrights by 
using the digital download, and entered a preliminary injunction. See Disney 
Enters. v. Redbox Automated Retail, 336 F. Supp 3d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2018). 
30 See, e.g., Section 104 Hearing, supra note 24 (statement of Mary Beth Peters, 
Register of Copyrights); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE , DMCA SECTION 104
REP. 106-48 (Aug. 2001). 
31 See Capitol Records v. Redigi, 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018). 
32 See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE
2018 REPORT (2018), https://pmcdeadline2.files.wordpress.com/2018/12/
copyright-industry-report-wm.pdf. 
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Was Barlow wrong about the intellectual property crisis?  He 
predicted in 1994 that the extant system of IP law would fall under its 
own weight: 
It’s fairly paradigm warping to look at information through fresh 
eyes––to see how very little it is like pig iron or pork bellies, and to 
imagine the tottering travesties of case law we will stack up if we go 
on legally treating it as though it were. 
As I’ve said, I believe these towers of outmoded boilerplate will 
be a smoking heap sometime in the next decade, and we mind 
miners will have no choice but to cast our lot with new systems that 
work.33 
That didn’t happen, or, at least, it didn’t happen in that way or in 
that time frame.  Most of what was idiotic and counterproductive about 
the ways that copyright law worked in 1994 is still idiotic and 
counterproductive in 2019.  If the purpose of copyright law is to 
compensate creators for the products of their minds,34 it hasn’t yet come 
close to achieving that goal.35  Oodles of money flood into the copyright 
system.  Most of that money is siphoned off before it reaches creators’ 
pockets, and where and why the money goes where it goes is kept a 
closely guarded secret.36  Creators across a wide swathe of fields 
complain of a shocking lack of transparency.  Proposals to replace the 
current system with “new systems that work” have so far failed to attract 
enough support to make them feasible. 
Yet Barlow’s musings about the organic and volatile nature of 
information remain compelling; they seem even truer today than they 
seemed 25 years ago.  Remove information from its containers and it 
spills.  Spills spread.  As different individual creators and researchers 
discover closely-held details of how money and rights move through the 
33 Barlow, supra note 2, at 127, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 24. 
34 See Barlow, supra note 2, at 85, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 8. 
35 I’ve discussed this problem elsewhere.  See Litman, supra note 16, at 539–50; 
Litman, supra note 18, at 8–12.  
36 See, e.g., Peter C. DiCola & David Touve, Licensing in the Shadow of 
Copyright, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 397 (2014); Eriq Gardner, Fox Rocked by 
$179M ‘Bones’ Ruling: Lying, Cheating and “Reprehensible” Studio Fraud, 
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/fox-rocked-by-179-million-bones-ruling-lying-cheating-reprehensible-
studio-fraud-1190346;  Eriq Gardner, ‘Walking Dead’ Producers Say AMC 
Won’t Explain Basis for Denying Hundreds of Millions in Profits, HOLLYWOOD
REP. (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/walking-dead-
producers-say-amc-wont-explain-basis-denying-hundreds-millions-profits-
1192470. 
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copyright system,37 that knowledge may itself transform the ways that 
copyright owners do business.  Recent statutory amendments include 
provisions designed to encourage music and sound recording rights 
holders to disclose more data about the works they control;38 secrets 
revealed as a result of publicized legal disputes have shone light on the 
ways that some rights-holders conceal facts about their earnings and 
payment.39  Even if the heavily fortified legacy copyright system fails to 
crumble under its own weight, a flood of newly revealed information 
may enable the rest of us to piece together a truer picture of where and 
how the system is failing, and what interventions might help creators to 
wrest back some control, or at least some money, from the legacy rights 
holders seeking to preserve the old regime.  
  
                                                
37 See, e.g., Zoe Keating, Another Year, TUMBLR,  http://zoekeating.tumblr.com/
post/181269142164/another-year (last visited Mar. 9, 2019); Daniel Sanchez, 
What Spotify Paid One Artist in 2018, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/12/19/zoe-keating-spotify-2018-
payout/. 
38 See Hatch-Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-264 (2018). 
Cynics suggest that the incentives in the new law will not suffice to persuade 
major music publishers and labels to give up their secrets.  
39 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Wark Ent., Inc., Amended 
Final Award, No. 1220052735 (JAMS Feb. 20, 2019) (Liu, Arb.), 
https://pmcdeadline2.files.wordpress.com/2019/02/final-amended-award-
redactions.pdf. 
 
JOHN PERRY BARLOW’S CALL FOR 
PERSUASION OVER POWER 
JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN 
 John Perry Barlow’s insights were inseparable from his lyrical 
way of conveying them. Paragraphs like this from his seminal 1994 essay 
The Economy of Ideas come to mind: 
What was previously considered a common human resource, 
distributed among the minds and libraries of the world, as well as 
the phenomena of nature herself, is now being fenced and deeded. It 
is as though a new class of enterprise had arisen that claimed to own 
the air and water. 
What is to be done? While there is a certain grim fun to be had 
in it, dancing on the grave of copyright and patent will solve little, 
especially when so few are willing to admit that the occupant of this 
grave is even deceased and are trying to force what can no longer be 
upheld by popular consent.1 
 Barlow’s expression mates joy and canniness, and one of his 
talents in writing about new technologies was to flip our conception of 
the status quo in order to correct it. In 1994, the conventional sense was 
that the Internet and its champions were heedlessly upsetting a 
longstanding set of relationships and legal entitlements, with copyright as 
a signal example. And while that was superficially true, it wasn’t the 
whole story. 
 Copyright was a natural first area of contention during the 
mainstreaming of the Internet because there was readily-tallied money at 
stake; widespread Internet use absolutely stood to put a dent in 
established, legally-protected cash flows; and polarized cultures of 
righteousness had developed around views of the ethics of file sharing, 
also known as “piracy.” The young hackers and dot-com founders 
responsible for much of the internet’s mischief––having built the likes of 
Napster, Gnutella, Napigator, KaZaA––were, to the Hollywood 
establishment, right out of central casting as barbarians at the gate. 
 Barlow told us that those appearances were wrong. In fact, the 
settled relationships of copyright holders comprised the unusual artifice 
around the centuries-long production of entertainment. The practices of 
copyright might comfortably apply to the highly stylized dealings to 
carve up rights to the distribution of a movie, but the average citizen held 
                                                
1 John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the 
Global Net, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, 14 (2019).  
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 138 
 
an even longer-established set of expectations around performance and 
sharing with which the free transfer of bits dovetailed very well. 
 A glance at the U.S. copyright code by the time of Napster 
showed just how far Title 17 had quietly diverged from day-to-day 
reality. The idea that singing a song aloud at a birthday party could result 
in thousands of dollars in “damages” was counterintuitive, to say the 
least, even as there’s legitimate rationale for the core “performance 
right” within copyright. The statutory limitations to the right are tellingly 
mincing, such as 17 U.S.C. § 110(6), which establishes that 
notwithstanding the public performance right, there are some limited 
exceptions, such as: 
performance of a nondramatic musical work by a governmental 
body or a nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization, in the 
course of an annual agricultural or horticultural fair or exhibition 
conducted by such body or organization . . . .2 
(It appears to be an open question whether the first gathering by a 
horticultural organization can be “annual” and thus qualify for the 
exception, or if litigants must wait until the following year to see if there 
is another one.) 
 The performance right was visited again in the 1998 Fairness in 
Music Licensing Act, which sought to settle a longstanding dispute 
between the NRA––that is, the National Restaurant Association––and 
ASCAP, the leading U.S. organization coordinating licenses for public 
performances of songs. The dispute was over restaurants’ playing of the 
radio while people ate. While radio stations already paid for the rights to 
broadcast music, ASCAP wanted restaurants3 to have to license the 
music as well. The NRA made great hay of the fact that ASCAP had 
previously sent letters to Girl Scout camps asking them to license up,4 
and accused ASCAP of wanting royalties for kids singing Puff the Magic 
Dragon around campfires. ASCAP’s chief operating officer at first 
responded combatively: “They buy paper, twine, and glue for their 
crafts––they can pay for the music, too.”5 ASCAP reconsidered and later 
                                                
2 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2000). 
3 Music Licensing in Restaurants and Retail and Other Establishments: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).  
4 Elisabeth Bumiller, Ascap Asks Royalties From Girl Scouts, and Regrets It, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/17/nyregion
/ascap-asks-royalties-from-girl-scouts-and-regrets-it.html. 
5 Lisa Bannon, Ascap Cautions the Girl Scouts: Don't Sing 'God Bless America', 
WALL STREET J. (Aug. 21, 1996), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB8405758923
77365000. 
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said the demand was a mistake, but the political tide had turned. The 
Fairness in Music Licensing Act provided that no royalties were needed–
–at least so long as the restaurants were smaller than 3,750 square feet, 
and used no more than six speakers to play the music.6 (Barlow’s own 
view of ASCAP, for what it’s worth: “I'm a member of ASCAP, and if 
you think that's the solution, I invite you to write some songs.”)7 
 The music licensing and recording industry mentality clashed 
quite a lot with mix-tape culture. As file sharing became routine, the 
policy drawing board entertained increasingly desperate measures to 
preserve what in fact had never been––people had always shared music 
without practical legal burden; the Internet’s new affordances posed 
genuine questions at the clash between what seemed like perfectly 
reasonable interpersonal behavior, and the new costs it was imposing on 
the industry. The industry’s prior encounters with new technology had, at 
times, resulted in new restrictions on it. In 1984, the videocassette 
recorder came within one Supreme Court vote of being found to be an 
instrument of contributory copyright infringement, and thus illegal 
without licensing.8 And in 1992, the music industry ensured through law 
that something called the “Serial Copy Management System” would be 
built into newly-emerging digital audio tape recorders, to prevent 
copyrighted material from spreading losslessly too well.9 (Oddly, Title 
17, which defines “children,” never specifies what the SCMS actually 
is.) 
 It was against that backdrop that Barlow wrote. His observations 
of the culture clash were vindicated as the industry floated such drastic 
proposals as to “close the analog hole”10 by making recording devices 
refuse to record music or images encountered in the wild that had “don’t 
record me” dog-whistles placed within them. They proposed legislation 
such as the “SSSCA”11 and “CBPTDA”12 to mandate that all computing 
                                                
6 Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1997). 
7 John Perry Barlow, Keynote Address at the Winter 1994 USENIX Conference: 
Stopping the Information Railroad (Jan. 17, 1994) (transcript available at John 
Perry Barlow, Stopping the Information Railroad, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 
17, 1994), https://www.eff.org/pages/stopping-information-railroad). 
8 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
9 See Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1992). 
10 Eric Diehl & Teddy Furon, © Watermark: Closing the Analog Hole (July 
2003) (paper presented at IEEE International Conference on Consumer 
Electronics). 
11 Security Systems Standards and Certification Act, Staff Working Draft, 107th 
Cong. (2001), available at http://cryptome.org/sssca.htm.  
12 Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th 
Cong. (2002). 
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equipment13 have digital rights management software built in. There were 
outsized lawsuits14 against people who swapped copyrighted files over 
peer-to-peer Internet services. There were legal threats against Internet 
service providers,15 including universities.16 
 Very little of it endured. Most legislative proposals stalled in 
Congress, and the lawsuits against individual users were retired despite 
most targeted users choosing to settle. This might suggest a victory for 
Barlow’s way of thinking––a certain peace emerged that reformalized 
commercial relationships around activities that, to the users, could still 
seem organic. But the copyright wars didn’t see victory by one side or 
the other so much as a muddling through. Today, the chaos of self-
published Web pages, hosted on individual Web servers, has given way 
to the carefully indexed homogeneity of DMCA-takedown-friendly 
Facebook,17 including the automatic monitoring of private chat for the 
presence of links to file sharing sites (as they are found, they are 
redacted), and Facebook’s silent tracking of all usage for the benefit of 
ad targeting. 
 Today music and movies are much less ripped and copied freely 
than they are subscribed and linked to like a utility––via one of a handful 
of streaming titans like Spotify, Tidal, Netflix, or Apple––with artists 
seeking to make a living from their work generally no better off18 than 
they were before the Internet came about. Recording industry profits, 
after a downsizing upon leaving the era of $15 compact discs, seem to 
have stabilized.19 Even the American film industry––which is seeing 
                                                
13 Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV.  L. REV. 1974, 
2024–25 (2006). 
14 Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011). 
15 RIAA v. Verizon, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2004), 
https://epic.org/privacy/copyright/verizon/.  
16 Anne Broache, RIAA Threatens 19 Universities with Lawsuits, CNET (Oct. 
18, 2007), https://www.cnet.com/news/riaa-threatens-19-universities-with-
lawsuits/.  
17 Daniel Sanchez, Facebook Promises Not to Rip Down Your Music Videos—If 
You Use Their Music, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2017/12/11/facebook-sound-collection/. 
18 Victor Luckerson, Is Spotify’s Model Wiping Out Music’s Middle Class?, 
RINGER (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.theringer.com/tech/2019/1/16/18184314/
spotify-music-streaming-service-royalty-payout-model. 
19 Felix Richter, Rise of Digital Formats Stops the Music Industry's Decline, 
STATISTA (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.statista.com/chart/4713/global-recorded-
music-industry-revenues/. 
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profit growth much slower than that of many global counterparts––
appears to be outpacing the broader economy.20 
 Of course, defending existing profit flows was not Barlow’s 
starting or ending point. The sentiments of Barlow’s A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace transcend something as transactionally-
based as the copyright wars. Rather, says Barlow, proposed new 
restrictions there: 
would declare ideas to be another industrial product, no more noble 
than pig iron. In our world, whatever the human mind may create 
can be reproduced and distributed infinitely at no cost. The global 
conveyance of thought no longer requires your factories to 
accomplish.21 
What Barlow envisioned was a renaissance of person-to-person 
interaction, one unmediated by corporate marketing departments: 
We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it 
be more humane and fair than the world your governments have 
made before.22 
Alas, from the standpoint of 2019, humane and fair have turned out to be 
tall orders. There remains a vibrant string of thriving, Lórien-like online 
communities of art and learning defined largely by their insularity. But 
the bulk of digital foot traffic has coalesced around sites known as much 
for meanness and harassment as for earnest exchange, coupled with 
demands by aggrieved users—rather than yesterday’s corporate 
copyright holders—for intervention by the respective corporate 
overseers. These sites are not self-governed in content or in design. They 
are monetarily optimized consumer offerings as authentically 
community-driven as Disney World’s Main Street USA. 
 And teenagers, or near enough, brought us this too. In his 2005 
book What the Dormouse Said: How the Sixties Counterculture Shaped 
the Personal Computer Industry, John Markoff notes that: 
Personal computers that were designed for and belonged to single 
individuals would emerge initially in concert with a counterculture 
                                                
20 David Robb, U.S. Film Industry Topped $43 Billion in Revenue Last Year, 
Study Finds, But It’s Not All Good News, DEADLINE (July 23, 2018), 
https://deadline.com/2018/07/film-industry-revenue-2017-ibisworld-report-
gloomy-box-office-1202425692/.  
21 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 18 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5, 6 (2019). 
22 Id. at 7. 
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that rejected authority and believed the human spirit would triumph 
over corporate technology, not be subject to it.23  
But, as Markoff goes on to note, the barbarians of yesterday have 
themselves become the gatekeepers of today. Barlow naturally drew 
upon the cultural fault lines of 1960s America in limning the heroes and 
sure-to-lose villains of the digital world, but today those lines aren’t quite 
so clear. The new boss turned out to be the same24 as the old boss––and 
our conflicts can as easily appear to be with one another as between 
citizen and state, or consumer and conglomerate. The causes that Barlow 
embodied and stood for––marked by values of humanity, of openness, of 
adventure, of good humor, and of inclusion––are ones that endure at 
every layer of the digital stack. A synecdoche: Barlow’s A Declaration of 
the Independence of Cyberspace remains free, but the authoritative 
version of The Economy of Ideas (as rendered in a 1994 issue of 
WIRED)25 is . . . metered through a paywall. 
 
 
                                                
23 JOHN MARKOFF, WHAT THE DORMOUSE SAID: HOW THE SIXTIES 
COUNTERCULTURE SHAPED THE PERSONAL COMPUTER INDUSTRY xv (2005). 
24 THE WHO, Won't Get Fooled Again, on WHO’S NEXT? (Track Records 1971).  
25 See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED (Mar. 1, 1994), 
https://www.wired.com/1994/03/economy-ideas/ (last accessed Aug. 3, 2019).  
  
DANCING ON THE GRAVE OF COPYRIGHT? 
ANUPAM CHANDER† AND MADHAVI SUNDER†† 
“[I]n the years to come, most human exchange will be virtual rather 
than physical, consisting not of stuff but the stuff of which dreams are 
made. Our future business will be conducted in a world made more of 
verbs than nouns.”1 
–John Perry Barlow (1994) 
INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS AN ECONOMY OF VERBS 
 John Perry Barlow would have wanted us dancing on the grave 
of copyright.2 Indeed, he told us so. He predicted that the internet would 
render copyright’s legal fences obsolete. How can you contain 
information? Ideas are contagious. “Information wants to be free.”3 
When produced in its ethereal form, information would be impossible to 
contain. Intellectual property is a “sinking ship,” and the lawyers 
preparing intellectual property for digitization are merely rearranging the 
deck chairs.4 
 Intellectual property law attached when the “word became 
flesh,”5 Barlow argued. A thought would become intellectual property 
when it entered a “physical object, whether book or widget.”6 Intellectual 
property grew up to protect things—books, machines, and later, records 
and movies. As the economy moved to focus on information powered by 
the internet, would intellectual property survive? Barlow predicted that 
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1 John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the 
Global Net, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, 31 (2019). 
2 See id. at 14 (“While there is a certain grim fun to be had in it, dancing on the 
grave of copyright and patent will solve little, especially when so few are willing 
to admit that the occupant of this grave is even deceased and are trying to up by 
force what can no longer be upheld by popular consent.”). 
3 Id. at 18.  
4 To be more precise, Barlow believed that the lawyers were either (1) 
rearranging “deck chair[s],” (2) issuing “stern warnings” of disaster and 
punishment, or (3) maintaining a “glassy-eyed denial.” Id. at 9. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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the rise of an “economy of verbs”—an economy focused on actions and 
experiences—would render intellectual property rights largely obsolete.7 
The “tottering travesties of case law”8 used to protect earlier economic 
products would prove useless in the new world of services and 
experiences. 
 The quarter century since Barlow’s writing allows us to assess 
his prophecy. The economy moved in the very direction that Barlow 
anticipated—from an economy focused on the ownership of things to an 
economy based on services and experiences.9 In high-income countries, 
services now account for three-quarters of the gross domestic product.10 
 But intellectual property proved more resilient and adaptable 
than Barlow predicted. Intellectual property law both offered exceptions 
where necessary, while simultaneously expanding to cover new forms of 
creativity and activities. In this short essay, we argue that, for good or ill, 
intellectual property has reconfigured itself for an economy driven by 
information and experience.  
 But the evolution is hardly complete. New forms of expression 
keep testing the limits of intellectual property. Consider the blockbuster 
game Fortnite. Epic Games offers Fortnite game play for free—but users 
pay for virtual clothing or various “emotes”—dances that allow users to 
express themselves online during in-game play. Indeed, Fortnite players 
paid some $2.4 billion in 2018 for the right to engage in such 
expressions—literally, to “emote.”11 Internet entrepreneurs have figured 
out a way to commodify dancing itself. Barlow believed that the internet 
 
7 Id. at 26 (“One existing model for the future conveyance of intellectual 
property is real time performance, a medium currently used only in theater, 
music, lectures, stand-up comedy and pedagogy.”). Barlow’s prediction came 
several years before the influential article by B. Joseph Pine II & James H. 
Gilmore, Welcome to the Experience Economy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jul.–Aug., 
1998), https://hbr.org/1998/07/welcome-to-the-experience-economy. Pine and 
Gilmore similarly depicted the new Experience Economy with show tickets on 
their book cover. 
8 Barlow, supra note 1, at 24.  
9 See generally Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property in Experience, 117 MICH. 
L. REV. 197 (2018) (describing rise of the Experience Economy). 
10 Patricia Buckley & Rumki Majumdar, The Services Powerhouse: Increasingly 
Vital to World Economic Growth, DELOITTE (July 12, 2018), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/issues-by-the-numbers/trade-
in-services-economy-growth.html (“In 2015, services’ value added accounted 
for 74 percent of GDP in high-income countries, up from 69 percent in 1997.”). 
11 Patrick Shanley, ‘Fortnite’ Earned $2.4 Billion in 2018, HOLLYWOOD REP. 
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/heat-vision/fortnite-earned-
24-billion-2018-1176660. 
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would liberate us from the commodifying forces of intellectual 
property—but rather, the internet brought commodification into 
previously intimate, sacred spaces. This essay considers IP in 
expressions of joy and shared meaning online in the form of emotes, 
GIFS, and memes: the stuff of which dreams are made. These aesthetic 
experiences bring playfulness and humanity to the internet. Are they the 
proper subject of intellectual property? Are such forms of cultural 
innovation and appropriation better addressed by ethics or law?  
I. FROM GOODS TO A GOOD TIME:  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EXPERIENCE 
 Barlow was right about where the economy would go. He was 
wrong that intellectual property would not follow. A quarter century on, 
the Economy of Verbs is here.12 As The Economist puts it, in today’s 
economy, “goods and services are no longer enough.”13 Today’s 
consumers are made happier through “‘experiences’ over commodities, 
pastimes over knick-knacks, doing over having.”14  The move from 
nouns to verbs in fantasy properties exemplifies this shift in the nature of 
both consumption and entertainment. From Star Wars to Harry Potter, 
fans do not just want to watch or read about their favorite characters—
they want to be them. They don the robes of Gryffindor, flick their 
wands, and drink the butterbeer. The owners of fantasy properties 
understand this, expanding their offerings from light sabers in 1977 to 
the Galaxy’s Edge, Disney’s new “100% immersive” Star Wars-inspired 
resort opening in 2019.15  
 Cyberspace and new technologies have enabled “whole new 
genres of experience, such as interactive games, Internet chat rooms and 
multi-player games, motion-based simulators, and virtual reality.”16 
Experiencing the Galaxy’s Edge will no doubt require that you wear a 
radio frequency identification (RFID) chip, transmitting your identity 
and precise location to sensors throughout the park, allowing computers 
 
12 This section is adapted from Sunder, Intellectual Property in Experience, 
supra note 9. 
13 Economics Discovers Its Feelings, ECONOMIST (Dec. 19, 2006), 
http://www.economist.com/node/8401269. 
14 Id. 
15 Jennifer Fickley-Baker, Plans Unveiled for Star Wars-Inspired Themed Resort 
at Walt Disney World, DISNEY PARKS BLOG (July 15, 2017), 
https://disneyparks.disney.go.com/blog/2017/07/plans-unveiled-for-star-wars-
inspired-themed-resort-at-walt-disney-world/ (quoting Bob Chapek, Chairman 
of Walt Disney Parks & Resorts). 
16 Pine & Gilmore, supra note 7. 
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to monitor and inform local engagements with you. Facial recognition 
will empower many of these experiences. The move toward “simulated 
lived experience in cyberspace”17 places renewed emphasis on 
performance. “In cyberspace . . . one goes from watching the screen to 
going behind the screen and becoming the performance.” Cyberspace 
theorist Randall Walser describes the move thusly: “print and radio tell; 
stage and film show; cyberspace embodies.”18 
 Barlow correctly predicted how “interactivity . . . will be a 
billable commodity.”19 But while performers would sell tickets to an 
authentic experience, they could not commodify it and protect it as 
intellectual property, or so Barlow thought. “The protections which we 
will develop will rely far more on ethics and technology than on law,” he 
surmised.20 
 Intellectual property, however, has not only survived the doom 
of the information economy—it has thrived. Today, intellectual property 
has fully evolved from goods to a good time. As consumer researchers 
have become savvier about how to package and market the human need 
for fantasy, play, imagination, and haptic experience, areas of thought 
and expression once free as the air we breathe are increasingly becoming 
commodified and metered fare, regulated by licenses and royalties, 
requiring permission and payment.  
 Increasingly, owners of cultural properties are issuing cease-and-
desist demands to third parties and offering their own official pay-to-play 
options. Amazon.com launched Kindle Worlds, a forum to write and sell 
fan fiction based on specific licensed media properties.21 YouTube 
algorithms to protect copyright are wreaking havoc on Game of Thrones 
fan theory sites, where fans use video clips from the popular HBO series 
to discuss everything from character development to symbolism in The 
World of Ice and Fire.22 The Tolkien estate shut down an unlicensed 
Lord of the Rings summer camp.23 Disney filed a trademark suit against 
 
17 JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS 170 (2001). 
18 Id. 
19 Barlow, supra note 1, at 27. 
20 Barlow, supra note 1, at 30.  
21 After five years, Kindle Worlds has just been retired. See Kindle Worlds, 
AMAZON, https://kindleworlds.amazon.com/worldsAmazon (last visited Jan. 13, 
2018). 
22 Chris Mills, HBO is Abusing Copyright to take ‘Game of Thrones’ Fan Videos 
Off YouTube, BOY GENIUS REP. (May 10, 2016), http://bgr.com/2016/05
/10/game-of-thrones-youtube-theories-hbo/. 
23 Mike Masnick, Tolkien Estate Strikes Again: Forces Summer Camp to 
Change Name, TECHDIRT (Apr. 20, 2011, 11:40 AM), https://www
 
147              DANCING ON THE GRAVE OF COPYRIGHT?  [Vol. 18 															
 
 
a game maker for creating a mobile version of the fictional card game 
from the Star Wars universe, “Sabacc,” in which Han Solo famously won 
the Millennium Falcon from Lando Calrissian.24 Netflix sent a cease-
and-desist letter to the owners of a pop-up bar in Chicago based on its 
popular new television series, Stranger Things, with the quip, “We love 
our fans more than anything, but you should know the Demogorgon is 
not always as forgiving.”25 The Cartoon Network prevented fans from 
opening an unauthorized Rick and Morty themed pop-up bar in 
Washington, DC, claiming the move “wasn’t polite and aimed at 
profiting off of Rick and Morty fans.”26 Fans responded that the bar 
would have been a labor of love and that the company was denying fans 
the freedom to “geek out.”27 
 The economy of verbs is now fully delimited by intellectual 
property. The full pantheon of intellectual property rights—copyrights, 
trademarks, utility patents and design patents—are marshalled to create 
exclusive rights in look and feel, aura, and aesthetic experience.28 Ever-
expanding merchandising rights, based on copyright’s derivative work 
right and trademarks’ prevention of sponsorship and endorsement 
confusion, have propelled the commodification of experiences to go 
beyond the enclosure of speech into the enclosure of cultural practices. 
The result is that copyright and trademarks have crept into some of the 
most intimate spaces of human thought and action: our fantasy lives. 
Intellectual property laws seek to govern who we imagine ourselves to be 
and to commodify every endorphin of glee when we hear a reference to 
our favorite characters or stories. This enclosure has serious implications 
for humanity. As Yale psychologist Paul Bloom observes, American 
 
.techdirt.com/articles/20110419/01104713954/tolkien-estatestrikes-again-forces-
summer-camp-to-change-name.shtml. 
24 Ashley Cullins, Hollywood Docket: ‘Star Wars’ Sabacc Game Sparks Another 
Lawsuit, HOLLYWOOD REP. (May 4, 2018), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com 
/thr-esq/hollywood-docket-star-wars-sabacc-game-sparks-lawsuit-1108386. 
25 John Lynch, Netflix Asked a ‘Stranger Things’ Pop-Up Bar to Shut Down with 
this Humorous Cease-and-Desist Letter, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 19, 2017), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/netflix-stranger-things-pop-up-bar-funny-cease-
anddesist-letter-2017-9. 
26 Jessica Sidman, Rick and Morty-Themed Bar Shut Down After Threats from 
Turner Broadcasting, WASHINGTONIAN (Aug. 18, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonian.com/2018/08/18/rick-and-morty-themed-bar-shut-
down-after-threats-from-turner-broadcasting/. 
27 Id. 
28 Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder, The Law of Look and Feel, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
529, 529 (2017). 
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adults spend on average four minutes a day on sex and over four hours a 
day in imaginary worlds.29 
 The demands to cease such activity follow the old, refuted logic: 
“If value, then right.” Rochelle Dreyfuss first offered this pithy 
formulation, but the logic had been repudiated much earlier. Felix Cohen 
explained the circularity that this approach rests upon: “The vicious 
circle inherent in this reasoning is plain. It purports to base legal 
protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of fact, the economic 
value of a sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally 
protected.”30 
 In recent writing, one of us (Sunder) has repudiated this 
expansion of rights, decrying the threat to fundamentally human activity, 
such as the ability to play, imagine, learn with others, and to reference 
the cultural works that shape our lives and societies.31 Unlike Barlow, the 
critique does not turn on the form in which information is conveyed—
that is, bottles or no bottles, in Barlow’s parlance. Rather, the critique is 
premised on the nature of art itself. Perhaps the most influential theorist 
of aesthetic experience is John Dewey. Dewey argued that aesthetic 
progress ought to be measured not by the creation of artistic works, but 
by the extent of human engagement and participation with cultural 
works.32 Dewey’s insights are all the more poignant today in the wake of 
DIY (do-it-yourself), the Maker Movement, and User Generated Content 
(UGC) enabled by new technologies and the Internet. Kenneth Arrow’s 
theory of “learning by doing” and Michael Polanyi’s account of tacit 
knowledge, which reveals how scientific knowledge must be 
experimented within labs with mentors and colleagues, are also gaining 
new purchase in copyright scholarship and in the digital context, as we 
increasingly recognize that cultural knowledge, too, must be actively 
experienced, repeated, held, touched, tasted, and practiced with others to 
be fully known and enjoyed. Performance theory, which describes the 
development of individual agency through physical “embodiment” in the 
cultural worlds we love, also has important lessons for crafting limits on 
property rights in experience, especially in cyberspace, where 
embodiment is the primary mode of experience and play. 
 
 
29 PAUL BLOOM, HOW PLEASURE WORKS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF WHY WE LIKE 
WHAT WE LIKE 155 (2010). 
30 Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 814 (1935).  
31 Sunder, supra note 9. 
32 See generally JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE (1934). 
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II. ONCE MORE, WITH FEELING: COPYRIGHTING EMOTES 
 Now, copyright and trademark are poised to dive further into the 
realms of imagination and experience. Instead of dancing on the grave of 
copyright, we consider copyrighting dance itself. 
 Today, dancing online is sold as a commodity, to the tune of 
literally billions of dollars. As mentioned earlier, Epic Games offers its 
blockbuster videogame Fortnite for free. Players fight to the death in a 
battle royale (the concept itself borrowed from an earlier Japanese manga 
and movie). The game’s explosive popularity stems not just from the 
exciting competition, but the inclusion of aesthetic elements of joy and 
style in the form of avatar skins and “emotes.”33 Emotes are literally in-
game expressions: “After a kill, players can dance . . . , adding a fillip of 
humor and split-second grace to the victory.”34 The sale of emotes and 
skins made Epic over $2 billion in profits in 2018 alone.35   
 Emotes often borrow popular dance moves—typically, without 
licensing. Recently, a number of individuals who created the original 
dance moves have sued Epic. Alfonso Ribeiro, a star of the television 
show “The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air,” sued Epic Games appropriating his 
signature “Carlton dance.” The rappers 2 Milly and BlocboyJB have also 
sued Epic on similar grounds for the “Milly Rock” and “Shoot” dances, 
respectively. The lawsuits argue that Epic’s unauthorized use of the 
artists’ dance moves violates their intellectual property rights, including 
copyright, trademark, and right of publicity.36  
 The first round of the legal battle royale went to the corporation. 
The U.S. Copyright Office denied registration on Ribeiro’s dance moves 
known as “The Carlton Dance,” characterizing it as “simple routine” 
“not registrable as a choreographic work.”37 The U.S. Copyright Office’s 
 
33 Sarah L. Kaufman, The Dances in ‘Fortnite’ Have Become Nearly as 
Contagious as the Game, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2018/09/10/the-dances-in-
fortnite-have-become-nearly-as-contagious-as-the-game/?utm_term=.79f41746
6135 (arguing that aesthetics in the form of skins and emotes allow players to 
create personal style, making the game both more fun and immensely 
profitable). 
34 Id. 
35 Shanley, supra note 11. 
36 Elizabeth A. Harris, A Real-World Battle Over Dancing Avatars: Did Fortnite 
Steal the Floss?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/11/arts/fortnite-floss-dance-lawsuits.html.  
37 Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss at 12, Ribeiro v. Take-Two Interactive Software, 2:18-cv-10417 (filed 
Feb. 13, 2019) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss]. 
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longstanding position is that social dances are not copyrightable38 and 
that individual dance steps are un-copyrightable ideas that must remain 
in the public domain as “the building blocks of choreographic 
expression.”39 A recent Supreme Court decision adds a further stumbling 
block for the plaintiffs: they cannot file a copyright lawsuit without a 
copyright registration.40 
 While there are important questions about copyrightability, there 
is also a racial dimension to the conflict. Some of the artists complaining 
of theft are African-American. When Epic offered its first in-game 
concert, it invited a white electronic musician, Marshmello, to perform, 
partnering with him to offer a “branded” (and likely duly licensed) 
Emote.41 “Meanwhile black artists must resort to lawsuits to even be 
acknowledged,” bemoans cultural critic Yussef Cole, saying that it is not 
simply Fortnite’s failure to share profits with black creators, but its 
erasure of the dances’ authorship that is the true offense. “To recognize 
someone’s contribution to culture is to lend that person, and their 
community some measure of power.”42 
 The law has not thus far not offered support for copyright in the 
popular dance moves of the “Milly Rock,” the “Carlton Dance,” or 
“Shoot.” The dances are renamed and repackaged for predominantly 
white audiences,43 the serial numbers connecting them to black creators 
and their communities rifled off. There are reasons to worry about the 
 
38 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CIRCULAR 52 COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF 
CHOREOGRAPHY AND PANTOMIME 1 (2017) (“Choreography and pantomimes 
consisting of ordinary motor activities, social dances, commonplace movements 
or gestures, or athletic movements may lack a sufficient amount of authorship to 
qualify for copyright protection.”). 
39 See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 37, at 10. 
40 See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.Com, L.L.C., 139 S. Ct. 
881, 886 (2019) (providing certain exceptions). 
41 Yussef Cole, Fortnite’s Appropriation Issue Isn’t About Copyright Law, It’s 
About Ethics, WAYPOINT (Feb. 11, 2019),  
https://waypoint.vice.com/en_us/article/a3bkgj/fortnite-fortnight-black-
appropriation-dance-emote (describing long history of social dancing first 
developed by black performers “on dance floors and sidewalks, rather than on 
stages and in studios” being “plagued by appropriation and unoriginality”). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. (“[W]hen these dances are turned into to Emotes, their connections with 
poverty and racism are elided and they are reduced to nothing more than a funny 
dance, cut off and erased, made vanilla and palatable. This is not simply bad 
luck, it is the latest in a long trend of omission. . . . Shoot becomes Hype, Milly 
Rock becomes Swipe It. Blackness becomes a grey area, becomes bundles of 
mocap data, and is made ultimately invisible.”). 
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extension of copyright to a very limited set of dance steps, but, given the 
context of a wealthy corporation further enriching itself based on the 
creativity of others, there seems little occasion for a victory dance. 
III. CAN HAS CHEEZBURGER?: THE LAW OF MEMES AND GIFS 
 “Information wants to be free.” This is perhaps the best-known 
slogan of the information age. John Perry Barlow credited “this elegant 
statement of the obvious” to Stewart Brand. Barlow recognized that the 
statement implied agency in information,44  an idea that science and 
technology studies scholars would find familiar. Barlow explicitly 
borrowed biologist Richard Dawkins’ concept of a meme—in Barlow’s 
words, “self-replicating patterns of information that propagate 
themselves across the ecologies of mind . . . ”45 
 Barlow was not content with mere replication, but also 
evolution: information would not only propagate, it would “evolve 
constantly into forms which will be more perfectly adapted to their 
surroundings[,]” he wrote.46 Barlow wrote: 
Digital information, unconstrained by packaging, is a 
continuing process more like the metamorphosing tales of 
prehistory than anything which will fit in shrink wrap. From the 
Neolithic to Gutenberg, information was passed on, mouth to ear, 
changing with every re-telling (or re-singing). The stories which 
once shaped our sense of the world didn’t have authoritative 
versions. They adapted to each culture in which they found 
themselves being told.47 
Everything old was new again. 
 As Barlow predicted, the internet would explode with replicating 
and evolving memes. From grumpy cat to doge, memes often serve to 
entertain and to inform, and often both. Sites like 
 
44 See Barlow, supra note 1, at 18 (noting that slogan “information wants to be 
free” “recognizes . . . the fact that [information] might be capable of possessing 
something like a ‘desire’ in the first place”). 
45 Id. In a subsequent article describing “Godwin’s Law of Nazi Analogies,” 
Mike Godwin would describe a “meme” as “an idea that functions in a mind the 
same way a gene or virus functions in the body.” Mike Godwin, Meme, 
Counter-Meme, WIRED (Oct. 1, 1994), 
https://www.wired.com/1994/10/godwin-if-2/. For a fuller discussion of memes, 
see Angela Watercutter & Emma Grey Ellis, The WIRED Guide to Memes, 
WIRED (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/guide-memes/. 
46 Barlow, supra note 1, at 19. 
47 Id. 
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ICanHas.Cheezburger.com (named after an original nonsensical meme) 
collect such memes.48 Usually, the meme borrows an image or set of 
video stills and adds a caption that removes the image from its original 
context and deploys it in a way that the original image creator would not 
have anticipated. Websites and apps offer the ability to write one’s own 
captions to popular memes, tailoring them to one’s own politics or 
viewpoints.49 One popular meme takes a clip from a 2004 German film 
to add different captions to a scene where Hitler learns that the Nazis 
have lost Berlin.50 
 But memes were not the only new vocabulary of the internet: 
emojis and GIFs also emerged as a form of expression. Eric Goldman 
writes that emojis offer “a powerful and efficient way to express 
ourselves.”51 He observes, “The right emoji can convey emotional 
valence, cultural jokes, or other valuable information to a message.”52 
Most importantly, emojis “make communicating fun.”53 
 Where memes seem to have developed independently without 
need for a particular corporate sponsor, GIFs and emojis needed 
technological encoding to function across platforms. GIFs emerged only 
when a corporation sponsored a file format that allowed compressing 
graphical information so that it could be shared widely without 
burdening limited communications resources. Compuserve invented the 
“Graphic Interchange Format” in 1987 as a means of bringing “a little 
color and movement to the Web.”54  
 
48 See, e.g., I CAN HAS CHEEZBURGER?, https://icanhas.cheezburger.com/ (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2019). 
49 See, e.g., MEME CREATOR, https://www.memecreator.org/ (last visited May 
16, 2019) (collecting popular memes and permitting users to generate new 
captions for them). 
50 See Aaron Schwabach, Reclaiming Copyright from the Outside In: What the 
Downfall Hitler Meme Means for Transformative Works, Fair Use, and Parody, 
8 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 2 (2012) (“[P]arodies, posted on YouTube and 
elsewhere, using clips from the 2004 German film Der Untergang (released in 
the US as Downfall), particularly the climactic rant scene after Hitler (played by 
Bruno Ganz) learns that Felix Steiner has not mobilized troops to break the 
Soviet assault on Berlin—meaning that the Nazis have lost the war.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
51 Eric Goldman, Emojis and the Law, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2018). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1229. 
54 Alex Williams, Fresh From the Internet’s Attic, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/fashion/common-on-early-internet-gif-
files-make-comeback.html?_r=0. 
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 Since that time, GIFs have become a means to invoke cultural 
references to express an idea with a flourish. As Arwa Haider notes, “In 
an age of 24/7 information, where there’s pressure to stand out, and a 
general expectation that we should react to news in real time, we need to 
say something as quickly and emphatically as possible—so we say it 
with gifs.”55 Where memes are often used to originate and promote ideas, 
even complicated ones, GIFs are often used to express a response.  
Haider explains: GIFs “embody a range of expressions that have become 
everyday patter, thanks to social media: the ‘eye roll’, the ‘facepalm’, the 
‘mic drop’. These are potent little shots of melodrama; gifs are inherently 
camp.”56 
 This does not mean that GIFs are free of problematic aspects. 
Some have noted that non-black users often use GIFs featuring black 
figures to express themselves—that black people are deployed to 
perform the emotional labor “as a kind of modern 
minstrelsy, . . . reinforc[ing] racist caricatures.”57 This works by 
exploiting our culture’s racist association of “black people with 
excessive behaviors”58—the kind of dramatic gesture often found in 
GIFs. Not only is the usage of GIFs distributed unequally, the types of 
available GIFs also exhibit disparities. Because there are few Latino, 
Asian American, and Native American celebrities in Western media, 
there seem to be few GIFs featuring these races. A quick perusal of GIF 
repository Giphy.com will attest to this absence.59 This may reduce the 
reinforcement of racist caricatures, but it also compels non-white and 
non-black individuals to utilize folks who don’t look like them to express 
themselves, furthering a sense of invisibility in contemporary culture. 
 Unlike emojis, which are designed for public use, GIFs and 
memes rely on copyrighted works—almost invariably without the 
permission of the copyright holders. These devices often borrow stills 
from broadcast video or movies. They often focus on particularly striking 
moments, a pose or gesture within a larger scene. So why haven’t GIFs 
and memes succumbed to a wave of copyright infringement claims?  
 For his part, John Perry Barlow did not believe that sharing 
memes was illegal. He tweeted this point: 
 
55 Arwa Haider, How the GIF Won the Internet, BBC (Aug. 29, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20170825-how-the-gif-won-the-internet. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Lauren Michelle Jackson, We Need to Talk About Digital Blackface in 
Reaction GIFs, TEEN VOGUE (Aug. 2, 2017), 
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/digital-blackface-reaction-gifs.  
59 See GIPHY, https://giphy.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2019). 
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 Not only is sharing a meme unlikely to constitute copyright 
infringement (the sharing is implicitly licensed), the meme itself is likely 
to qualify as a fair use of the underlying copyrighted work.  
 Yet, we have not seen a deluge of litigation challenging these 
uses, even when the copyright owners are Hollywood studios with a 
history of asserting their intellectual property claims against 
infringement. Indeed, we can identify no case bringing a copyright 
infringement or other legal claim against either a GIF or a meme. This is 
because most GIFs and memes are likely protected as fair use, thereby 
protected from copyright infringement claims.  
 GIFs and memes are likely protected as fair use largely because 
users make a transformative use of the original work. GIFs and memes 
take an original gesture and allow others to utilize it to communicate 
their own emotions or thoughts. Transformative works “lie at the heart of 
the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of 
copyright.”61 This is true even though most memes do not take aim at the 
original work but employ it for critical analysis of contemporary 
phenomena. Copyright law clearly privileges critique and parody that 
makes fun of the original work, but the most popular uses of GIFs and 
memes do not fall squarely into that realm. Because of the highly 
transformative nature of GIFs and memes, however, we believe that most 
GIFs and memes would find legal protection from copyright 
infringement claims as fair use. 
 Take the American Chopper meme. In its most common format, 
it consists in a set of five stills from a Discovery Channel reality 
 
60 John Perry Barlow (@JPBarlow), TWITTER (Oct. 11, 2011, 10:47 AM), 
https://twitter.com/JPBarlow/status/123816905608929281. 
61 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
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television show that depicted tensions between a father and son.62 
Fingers are pointed, and, in the fourth panel, a chair gets thrown—all of 
which makes for a dramatic backdrop to an otherwise pointy-headed, 
back-and-forth intellectual argument. Meme creators offer captions that 
offer point and counterpoint on a variety of subjects. As one writer notes, 
“What makes American Chopper truly unique in the meme world is that 
it gives equal weight to both sides of an argument.”63 The original 
television show and memes based on these five stills are worlds apart. 
They discuss different subjects in a different form for a different purpose.  
 Another popular meme, the Distracted Boyfriend meme, uses the 
original photo and repurposes it entirely as social commentary. The 
meme borrowed stock photos showing three individuals engaged in a 
complicated relationship, but captions allow each of the individuals to 
become a stand-in for another person or concept. The Distracted 
Boyfriend meme seems to have originated in a Turkish Facebook group, 
deployed to comment on musician Phil Collins’ move from progressive 
rock to pop.64   
 
 
62 See Opheli Garcia Lawler, The Star of the ‘American Chopper’ Meme Didn’t 
Know What a Meme Was, VICE (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7xddj4/the-star-of-the-american-chopper-
meme-didnt-know-what-a-meme-was. 
63 David Britton, What the American Chopper Meme Taught Us in 2018, DAILY 
DOT (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.dailydot.com/unclick/american-chopper-
argument-2018-meme/. 
64 See Tiffany Kelly, Why ‘Distracted Boyfriend’ is the Meme of 2017, DAILY 
DOT (last updated Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.dailydot.com/unclick/distracted-
boyfriend-meme-2017/. 
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 David Britton observes, “If you use Distracted Boyfriend, you’re 
commenting on how you’re ignoring something you should be paying 
attention to in favor of something you find more captivating.”65 The 
meme also reveals how readily susceptible to repurposing memes often 
are: as Tiffany Kelly notes, “The distracted boyfriend meme is a modern 
version of a caption contest. Who is the distracted boyfriend? Who is the 
woman distracting the boyfriend? Who is the offended girlfriend? Just 
fill in the blanks!”66 The Distracted Boyfriend meme also shows how 
memes cross global boundaries of culture. 
Even businesses now deploy GIFs and memes.67 But the fact that 
their use is inevitably commercial does not necessarily defeat their fair 
use claim. The courts have upheld a variety of commercial acts as fair 
use. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme Court held that 
a rap group’s parody of a song could constitute fair use despite its 
commercial purpose: “the more transformative the new work, the less 
will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may 
weigh against a finding of fair use.”68 
A meme may be protected even if the people depicted in the 
meme object to its politics. The Seventh Circuit held that a T-shirt using 
a significantly modified photo of a Wisconsin mayor to criticize that 
mayor was fair use because the copyright holder did not claim the 
modified version reduced demand for the mayor’s photograph and 
because it significantly modified the original.69  
Of course, borrowing from popular broadcast properties can 
violate copyright. When a company published a book of trivia questions 
about the television show Seinfeld, including many instances of actual 
dialogue from the show, the studio sued and won, prevailing over a 
defense of fair use.70 A number of factors contributed to the court’s 
ruling that the trivia book did not constitute fair use. The trivia book had 
“slight to non-existent” transformative purpose.71 Furthermore, the 
 
65 Britton, supra note 63.  
66 Kelly, supra note 64.  
67 See Diana Bradley, 5 Brands Insert Themselves into the Viral ‘Distracted 
Boyfriend’ Stock Picture, PRWEEK (Aug. 30, 2017), 
https://www.prweek.com/article/1443244/5-brands-insert-themselves-viral-
distracted-boyfriend-stock-picture (displaying various company versions of the 
“Distracted Boyfriend” meme).  
68 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
69 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation L.L.C., 766 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2014). 
70 Castle Rock Entm’t Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 135 (2d 
Cir. 1998). 
71 Id. at 142. 
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defendant’s trivia book would be “likely to fill a market niche that Castle 
Rock would in general develop.”72 These factors distinguish this case 
from the facts typical in the creation of GIFs and memes.  
IV. LAW OR ETHICS?  
 There are certainly reasons to think that copyright and other 
forms of intellectual property are not the right weapons in battles over 
cultural appropriation. For starters, too many property rights in bits and 
memes will stifle innovation and the further development of culture. For 
this reason, Barlow seemed to think intellectual property was “OP,” or 
overpowered—too high-powered and absolute to regulate a field as 
dynamic as culture. Barlow suggested that ethics, not law, were more 
suitable to assess privileges and obligations where, as here, Epic Games 
is making billions off the backs of predominantly black creators whose 
dances and style bring immense cultural and economic value to the 
game.  
 More recently the eminent philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah 
has staked a claim in the cultural appropriation wars. “[W]hen an 
American pop star makes a mint from riffing on Mbaqanga music from 
South Africa, you can wonder if the rich American gave the much poorer 
Africans who taught it to him their fair share of the proceeds,” Appiah 
contemplates.73 “If he didn’t, the problem is not cultural theft but 
exploitation. People who parse such transgressions in terms of ownership 
have accepted a commercial system that is alien to the traditions they aim 
to protect.”74 Appiah concludes that “[d]isrespect and exploitation are 
worthy targets of our disapproval, but the idea of cultural appropriation is 
ripe for the wastebasket. . . . The rhetoric of ownership is alluring and 
potent, but when we’re describing the quicksilver complexities of 
culture, it just isn’t appropriate.”75 
 It is understandable that Appiah, a scholar of identity, does not 
see property as a nimble enough tool for regulating cultural production 
and dissemination in a complex and unequal society on fair terms. But 
that is precisely the task of modern property and intellectual property 
law! In truth, the criticism of the property claims of black creators of 
 
72 Id. at 145. 
73 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cultural Borrowing Is Great; The Problem Is 
Disrespect, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
cultural-borrowing-is-great-the-problem-is-disrespect-1535639194?mod= 
e2fb&fbclid=IwAR2THbjvXRmRuZgTmFeU8irPXD75jcu7HwN8TWC7uT5R
ondNUj00O1kjikk.  
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
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popular social dances can be applied to most intellectual property claims. 
Copyright protects works as mundane as calendars, coupons and 
competition cards, kitsch from ashtrays to lamps,76 and useful articles 
such as the stripes and chevrons on cheerleading uniforms.77 Copyright 
protects The Macarena and has Girl Scouts running scared to perform the 
social dance sans paying royalties for the music.78 But copyright draws a 
line at popular dance moves created by African American artists?79 In 
truth, very little in the way of copyright doctrine supports the Copyright 
Office Circular recommendations. Copyright protection requires a very 
low bar of originality80 and self-consciously refuses to discriminate 
between high and low art.81 We must confront the reality that our 
copyright law is rife with inconsistencies, as best, and racial and cultural 
biases, at worst. 
 And then there is the question that if we are to regulate by ethics, 
whose ethics? Barlow imagined Cyberspace as an opportunity to return 
to the Western frontier (dubbing it, with Mitch Kapoor, the “electronic 
frontier”) where community norms, not law from above, would regulate 
modes of life.82 “Having come from a place where people leave their 
keys in their cars and don’t even have keys to their houses, I remain 
convinced that the best obstacle to crime is a society with its ethics 
 
76 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 221 (1954) (opening the door to copyright 
in everyday useful articles, from silverware to ashtrays). 
77 See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002, 1012 
(2017) (“The [colors, shapes, stripes, and chevrons on the surface of the 
cheerleading uniforms] are therefore separable from the uniforms and eligible 
for copyright protection.”). 
78 Backlash from one California Girl Scout troupe’s performance of a “silent 
Macarena” for fear of copyright reprisals spurred Congress to pass the Fairness 
in Music Licensing Act of 1998, which increased the number of bars and 
restaurants exempt from royalties. See Fairness in Musical Licensing Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C. (2012)). 
79 Cole, supra note 41. 
80 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991) (“The 
standard of originality is low, but it does exist.”). 
81 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) 
(articulating the now famous “non-discrimination principle” in copyright law, 
warning that judges are not suited to evaluate the artist or aesthetic merit of art). 
82 Barlow, supra note 1, at 24 (romantically yearning for the early frontier days 
when “order was established according to an unwritten Code of the West which 
had the fluidity of etiquette rather than the rigidity of law. Ethics were more 
important than rules. Understandings were preferred over laws, which were, in 
any event, largely unenforceable”). 
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intact,” Barlow mused.83 But Barlow’s “ethics” derive from a 
homogeneous, well-to-do community—or one that forcefully created 
homogeneity by routing out Native Americans, Mexican Americans and 
other non-whites from the settlers’ “frontier.” Can black or indigenous 
creators rely on frontier “ethics”? Should we allow conflicts over 
contested resources to be determined by the ethics of those in power in 
Cyberspace—the “brogrammers” of Silicon Valley? 
 We must always be attendant to the ethical implications of law. 
But our ethical inquiry should start by asking, how does law affect real 
people on the ground, including the weakest and the poorest? How does 
our diversity affect our sense of trust in “community norms”? Our 
discussions of the future role of intellectual property laws—in 
cyberspace and real space—need to account for historical and ongoing 
racial, class, and gender exploitation in the production and dissemination 
of culture.84 Miley Cyrus twerking at the Video Music Awards (VMAs) 
in 2013 caused international outrage. As one critic memorably put it, 
“the effect was not of a homage but of a minstrel show, with a young 
wealthy woman from the [S]outh doing a garish imitation of black music 
and reducing black dancers to background fodder and black women to 
exaggerated sex objects.”85 What are the implications of an intellectual 
property law that would allow for the appropriation of the creative works 
of black bodies and minds through the erasure of the human authorship 
embedded in those works? Intellectual property is a tool for power, and 
that includes the ability to name a resource as property or public domain. 
We must confront the violence of the law, which is not neutral, but beset 
by implicit racial, cultural, gendered and class biases.  
 Memes, like genes, travel and evolve. They are the building 
blocks of culture, just as genes are the building blocks of life. At the 
same time, we must be ever cognizant of the social context in which 
culture is produced. Cultural production and the laws that regulate it are 
deeply imbricated in the construction of society and economy, including 
the creation and maintenance of colonial power and unequal distributions 
 
83 Id. 
84 See, e.g., KYRA D. GAUNT, THE GAMES BLACK GIRLS PLAY: LEARNING THE 
ROPES FROM DOUBLE-DUTCH TO HIP-HOP 94–97 (2006) (recounting how 
everyday musical games of black girls becomes a bedrock inspiration of “black 
popular music making” in popular male centered hip-hop, including Nelly’s 
“Down, Down Baby”). 
85 Hadley Freeman, Miley Cyrus’s Twerking Routine was Cultural Appropriation 
at its Worst, GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/27/miley-cyrus-
twerking-cultural-appropriation. 
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of wealth and knowledge. This truth should not lead us to throw up our 
hands, letting ethics but not law play a role in the difficult questions of 
our time. To the contrary, intellectual property law must confront its own 
role in apportioning respect, power, and wealth in our worlds, and be 
resolved to do better. 
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CONCLUSION IN FORM OF MEME 
 
 
 
WHAT DIDN’T HAPPEN:   
AN ESSAY IN SPECULATION 
PETER JASZI 
Most of us held off celebrating the beginning of a renewed slow 
trickle of works into copyright’s public domain until the first seconds of 
New Year’s Day, 2019, but (if it hadn’t been so early in the day), we 
would have been entitled to raise a glass at 4:04 PM on the preceding 
December 27th, when the last substantive business undertaken in 2018 by 
either house of Congress was concluded in the Senate.  (Like the House, 
which wrapped up its business at 4:02, the World’s Greatest Deliberative 
Body had convened that day at 4:00.)  At that moment, a last-minute 
push to extend copyrights beyond the 20-year bonus terms awarded in 
the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension became a practical and 
mathematical impossibility.  This was all the more true since no 
legislation to achieve that result had been introduced in either house 
during the 115th Congress. 
Obviously, non-events matter, not only in the Holmesian 
heuristic sense (per the “curious incident” recited in The Adventure of 
Silver Blaze), but substantively as well.  Some of the last 25 years’ most 
important positive developments in copyright policy have—in fact—
been negatives:  the collapse of the SOPA/PIPA bills in 2012, the 
congressional failure to enact categorical and comprehensive 
paracopyright legislation in 1998,1 and the long and ultimately successful 
effort (throughout the mid-and late-90’s) to block enactment of sui 
generis database protection in U.S. law.2  The congress’s failure to enact 
term extension legislation (despite having been greenlighted by the 
Supreme Court in Eldred v. Reno) is another example. 
So one minor goal of this essay is to celebrate the power of 
inaction.  Another is to acknowledge the pleasure of having your 
 
1 As originally called for by a Clinton administration Commerce Department 
Task Force on Information Infrastructure. BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF 
THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) [hereinafter 
WHITE PAPER]. In the event, the final version of the new Chapter 12 of U.S. 
Code Title 17, introduced in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 
constrained as it was by a workable mechanism for defining exceptions to the 
prohibitions against “circumvention,” has proven inconvenient, expensive, and 
downright frustrating but not a measurable drag on innovation. 
2 For references to this still largely untold story, see INDRANATH GUPTA, 
FOOTPRINTS OF FEIST IN EUROPEAN DATABASE DIRECTIVE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
OF IP LAW-MAKING IN EUROPE (2017). 
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predictions proven wrong.  I’m happy to say that in 1995 I told a Senate 
panel that a 20-year term extension would “represent[] a down payment 
on perpetual copyright on the installment plan.”3  Obviously, and 
happily, it didn’t work out that way.  My main objective in what follows 
is to suggest what accounts for that particular negative result.  In other 
words, how did the time-honored notion of periodic add-ons to copyright 
duration, so recently viewed as non-controversial, become politically 
toxic over less than two decades? 4 
In search of an explanation, you are invited to return with us now 
to those thrilling days of yesteryear to witness what is arguably the 
primal scene in which influence and ideology conceived the 
contemporary term extension movement.  In May 1962, the stage was set 
in a House of Representatives Judiciary Committee hearing room.  
Congress recently had begun the process of devising comprehensive 
copyright reform legislation, and it was already clear that (among other 
things) it eventually would change the law in various ways.  The most 
foreseeable and (then) least controversial of these would be to introduce 
a modest prospective extension of copyright term.   It was just as easy to 
predict that any change in the formula would put the next generation of 
copyright owners at a durational advantage vis-à-vis the current one—so 
that transitional provisions to harmonize existing and new copyright 
terms would be politically necessary in the final legislative package.  But 
because all of this was going to take some time (14 years, as it turned 
out!) there was a more immediate problem:  If copyright terms calculated 
the old-fashioned way continued to run their course, some rightsholders 
would lose their existing protection before the new dispensation kicked 
in.  A rough and ready solution would be to extend existing renewal 
terms while the new legislation was being considered, and this bill before 
the House was the first such “interim extension” to be proposed.5  The 
 
3 The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S. 
Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 72 (1995) (statement of Peter Jaszi, Professor of 
Law, American University).   My near contemporary reflections on this richly 
demoralizing experience can be found in Peter Jaszi, Goodbye to All That—A 
Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded 
Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 595 
(1996). 
4 See Timothy B. Lee, Why Mickey Mouse’s Copyright Term Extension 
Probably Won’t Happen Again, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 8, 2018, 8:00 AM), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/01/hollywood-says-its-not-planning-
another-copyright-extension-push. 
5 See Extending the Duration of Copyright Protection in Certain Cases: Hearing 
on H.J. Res. 627 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
House of Representatives, 87th Cong. (1962) [hereinafter Hearing on Extending 
the Duration of Copyright Protection].  The 1961 Report of the Register of 
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Judiciary Committee had consulted with the Justice Department, which 
had expressed strong reservations, writing that it would be “unwise” to 
extend the term of copyright from the viewpoint of the public “which 
is interested in the early passing of copyrighted material into the 
public domain.”6 
Then as now, it was unusual but not unheard of for a member of 
Congress to appear as a witness before a committee other than their own; 
it was even more unusual when that member was one of the most 
powerful members of the body.  Nevertheless, the next voice you hear is 
that of Majority Whip Hale Boggs (D-LA) countering the 
administration’s stated position with remarks leading up to this old-
fashioned stemwinder of a conclusion: 
This startling statement is wholly inconsistent with reality.  The 
public does not gain from the “early passing of copyrighted 
material into the public domain.”  When a copyright passes into the 
public domain, the public is not the beneficiary.  The right to make 
the profit passes from the creator or the original publisher to a 
person who has contributed nothing to the work.  The cost of a 
ticket to a Bach, Beethoven, or Brahms concert is no less than to 
one which provides the music of contemporary composers.  
Listening to radio or watching television programs which use public 
domain material costs no less than programs utilizing copyrighted 
works.  Copyrighted and public domain works are sold in books in 
same price ranges. 
    The public cannot have any real interest in depriving authors, 
composers, or artists of their incomes from the books or songs or 
plays which they have written, or from the picture which they 
create. What benefit can result to a society dedicated to free 
enterprise from depriving some of its citizens of the earnings of 
their productions during their lifetime. Are we to say to our young 
authors, playwrights, composers, and others that they may live by 
their talents provided they do not live too long? Are we to say to 
 
Copyrights that kicked off the reform process made a relatively modest 
suggestion: retain the long-prevailing general approach based on a relatively 
short initial term of 28 years commencing at publication, but extend the 
additional “renewal” term potentially upon application from 28 to 48 years. See 
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW 
REVISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL 
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT Law 50–51 (Comm. Print 1961), 
https://www.copyright.gov/history/1961_registers_report.pdf (proposing a 
maximum general term of “76 years from first dissemination” [20 years longer 
than the law then provided]). 
6 Hearing on Extending the Duration of Copyright Protection, supra note 5, at 
30 (statement of Rep. Cramer, referring to a letter from the Attorney General). 
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them that no matter how great their skills, despite their talents, and 
irrespective of the dedication to their work, if they commence 
writing too young and live too long, there is no place for them in 
our free enterprise society?  Are we to tell them that the only 
property of value which can be transmitted to their dependents must 
be in the form of stocks, bonds, cash, or real property and that 
intellectual property must be valueless to them? 
   There is no benefit to the public from the “early passage of 
works into the public domain.”  That is a foreign philosophy—on 
which is the very anthesis of the standards by which we live.  In our 
society the creator of intellectual property cannot be the forgotten 
man, or we shall become a forgotten society.7  
 Why Rep. Boggs chose to insert himself into this debate on the 
side of interim copyright extension remains (at least to me) unclear.  But 
for present purposes the politics of his intervention is less interesting 
than its rhetoric.  Most notably (in addition to summoning the spirit of 
capitalism and darkly denouncing foreign influence), he models an 
approach to assessing (and denigrating) the value of the public domain 
which would dominate discussion for decades to come.  In effect, Boggs 
suggests, allowing works to exit copyright would confer a public benefit 
only if it had a measurable effect on conventional measures of consumer 
welfare such as the unit price of a book or a concert ticket—and 
advocates of the term limitation have failed to meet their burden on that 
point.  In the absence of such a showing—Boggs asserts—there is no 
reason to resist creators’ “natural” property claims.8 
 
7 Hearing on Extending the Duration of Copyright Protection, supra note 5, at 6 
(statement of Rep. Hale Boggs).  
8 The proposed interim extension was enacted, and was the first of nine similar 
bills passed over years to preserve copyrights already in their renewal terms, 
ultimately qualifying them for the 20-year extension provided in the Copyright 
Act of 1976.   Where prospective protection was concerned, however, the 1976 
Act departed dramatically from the approach proposed back in 1961; following 
general international practice, it abolished the two-term scheme in favor of a 
basic unitary term consisting of the life of the author plus fifty years.  In 
retrospect, we can see that the elimination of the renewal formality represented 
the single most dramatic extension of copyright term in U.S. history, since under 
the old dispensation the vast majority of copyrights wound up at the end of the 
initial term. See generally Jamie Carlstone et al., Copyright Renewal of U.S. 
Books Published in 1932: Re-analyzing Ringer's Study to Determine a More 
Accurate Renewal Rate for Books, 79 COLLEGE & RES. LIBRARIES 697 (2018), 
available at https://doi.org/10.5860/crl.79.5.697.  But that’s another story.   
     So is the one that follows, but I can’t resist.  The specific claim that Boggs 
understands as deriving from the frictionless operation of authors’ rights is, at 
least, relatively modest in scope, i.e., “creators should be able to live by their 
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talents,” as well as to pass along something (unspecified in extent) to their 
“descendants.”  More than a half century earlier, that hot-and-cold champion of 
creative entitlement, Samuel Langhorne Clemens, had been more explicit in his 
testimony on what would become the Copyright Act of 1909:  “I like that 
extension of copyright life to the author’s life and fifty years afterward. I think 
that would satisfy any reasonable author, because it would take care of his 
children.  Let the grand-children take care of themselves.  That would take care 
of my daughters, and after that I am not particular. I shall then have long been 
out of this struggle, independent of it, indifferent to it.”  To Amend and 
Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Arguments Before the Committees 
on Patents of the Senate and House of Representatives, Conjointly, on the Bills 
S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, 59th Cong. 196–201 (1906) (statement of Mr. Samuel 
L. Clemens); Mark Twain in White Amuses Congressmen, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 
1906, at 5, 
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1906/12/08/101852379.pdf.  
Did he mean the last, or was the joke just too good to let pass?  Either way, we 
can recognize in Twain’s main discourse a version of the argument from 
generational succession that would gain traction in years to follows.  Consider, 
for example, the actuarially dubious congressional rationale for the CTEA 
memorialized by Justice Ginsberg in Eldred v. Ashcroft:   
Members of Congress expressed the view that, as a result of increases 
in human longevity and in parents’ average age when their children are 
born, the pre-CTEA term did not adequately secure the right to profit 
from licensing one’s work during one’s lifetime and to take pride and 
comfort in knowing that one’s children—and perhaps their children—
might also benefit from one’s posthumous popularity. 141 Cong. Rec. 
6553 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see 144 Cong. Rec. S12377 
(daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Among the main 
developments [compelling reconsideration of the 1976 Act's term] is 
the effect of demographic trends . . . on the effectiveness of the life-
plus-50 term to provide adequate protection for American creators and 
their heirs.”).  
537 U.S. 186, 207, n.14 (2003).    
     Indeed, in her 1995 congressional testimony, Register of Copyrights Mary 
Beth Peters had recited that “[p]rotection of two succeeding generations is the 
standard goal recognized in [the] Berne [Convention]” citing various authorities 
including recitals of the 1994 EU Directive on Copyright Term.  Copyright 
Term, Film Labeling, And Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 989, 
H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual 
Property of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 
104th Cong. 175 n.39 (1995).  Subsequently, defending the constitutionality of 
the CTEA before the Supreme Court, the U.S. government asserted that in 1908, 
the revision of the Berne Convention to provide for a basic term of “life-plus-
50” years was designed “to provide compensation during authors’ lives and 
during the lives of any children or grandchildren”—and that, as a result, changes 
in life expectancy justified the 20-year add-on.  Brief for Respondent at 25, 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).   
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     Viewed from an author-centric perspective, all this makes perfect sense.  A 
copyright system that is author-directed, root and branch, could be expected to 
elevate considerations relating to the welfare of creators’ survivors over, say, 
public access.  Certainly, this explanation of the rationale for term extension 
provides relatively little room for weighing the consequences on pro and con.  
But there is a problem with this plausible-sounding explanation, which no one 
stopped to consider at the time: It is demonstrably untrue!  
     In fact, the records of the 1908 Diplomatic Conference (and that of 1967, 
where term was discussed again for good measure) are innocent of any mention 
of this author-centric rationale for term expansion.  Sam Ricketson, the foremost 
historian of Berne, has stated that “in the debates that took place at various 
Berne revision conferences on the question of duration, one is hard pressed to 
find reasoned justifications for the move for longer terms of protection.”  Sam 
Ricketson, The Copyright Term, 23 INT’L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 
L. 753, 778 (1992).  Indeed, a 1991 Memo on the project for what was then 
called the “Berne Protocol” (later rechristened the WIPO Treaty on Copyright) 
states (shades of Mark Twain) that the original intent had been to “make 
reasonably certain that at least the first generation of [heirs]” would benefit.  
Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, 1st Sess., 
Nov. 4–8, 1991, WIPO Doc. BCP/CE/I/3, ¶ 159, (Oct. 8, 1991).  So where does 
this line of reasoning find its source?  The answer may be found in Claude 
Masouyé’s widely-read but authoritatively non-authoritative 1978 “Guide to the 
Berne Convention,” a WIPO publication which recites that “It is not merely by 
chance that fifty years was chosen. Most countries have felt it fair and right that 
the average lifetime of an author and his direct descendants should be covered, 
i.e. three generations.” CLAUDE MASOUYÉ, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971) 46 
(1978).  Of course, as then-WIPO Secretary General Árpád Bogsch made clear 
in his introduction, the Guide is not, in itself, “an authoritative interpretation.”  
What was Masouyé’s authority?  None is cited, but the closest I can come is his 
own 1959 article, advocating for (without any identified source or precedent) the 
position later enshrined in the official-seeming volume.  Claude Masouye, Vers 
une prolongation de la durée de la protection, 24 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU 
DROIT D'AUTEUR 93 (July 1959) (Fr.), https://www.la-rida.com/fr/article-
rida/3406.  There, the evidentiary trail ends, as does this digression.  Or almost.  
I would be remiss to omit noting that Silke Von Lewinski’s Term of Protection 
in Copyright repeats the rationale, although it adds no evidence for it.  See Silke 
von Lewinski, EC Proposal for a Council Directive Harmonizing the Term of 
Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 23 INT’L REV. OF INDUS. 
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 753, 785 (1992).   
    So what, exactly, is demonstrated by this story of an all-too-plausible 
explanation that has—in fact—no visible means of support?  On the one hand, 
perhaps, only that even the most distinguished scholars can, from time to time, 
get carried away with themselves.  On the other, I’d suggest, is a different 
cautionary proposition: That the author-construct apparently enjoys, like the 
Shadow, the power to cloud human minds.  It is not for nothing that at p. 3 of his 
statement, Rep. Boggs cites the century-old (and distinctly foreign) observation 
that “equally with the builder or the planter, the author’s ownership of his work 
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There’s nothing particularly remarkable in Boggs’ framing.   For 
decades, arguments on both sides of the issue were primarily made in 
what might be called a “consumerist” frame, with crisscrossing claims 
about whether a more robust public domain would (or wouldn’t) offer 
more conventional information goods at lower prices.  For many (or 
most) of that era’s public domain advocates, myself included,9 engaged 
with the issue primarily, if not exclusively, in similar terms.  Even the 
heroes of the early resistance to term extension, such as the late Professor 
Dennis Karjala, cast their arguments about the costs of a longer 
protection period primarily in terms of the loss to the public of specific 
finished derivative works (such as motion pictures based on public 
domain originals) that it might bring about—an expanded argument, to 
be sure, but one with roots in the dominant consumerist rhetoric 
nonetheless.10  It’s not a coincidence, therefore, that the “business 
model” of the exemplary named plaintiff in the ultimate court challenge 
to the constitutionality of the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
 
is, in (literary raconteur and presumably proud parent) Disraeli’s famous words, 
‘the most natural of all titles, because it is the most simple and least artificial.  It 
is paramount and sovereign, because it is a tenure by creation.’”  1 ISAAC 
DISRAELI, THE CALAMITIES AND QUARRELS OF AUTHORS: WITH SOME INQUIRIES 
RELATING TO THEIR MORAL AND LITERARY CHARACTER, AND SOME MEMOIRS 
FOR OUR LITERARY HISTORY 30 (New York, W.J. Widdleton 1868), which the 
publisher describes as “edited by his son, the Hon. Benjamin Disraeli” (‘silver-
fork’ novelist turned politician). Isaac Disraeli (b.1766) had died more than a 
decade before the first British printing of this posthumous collection, which is 
undated but may be as early as 1859.    
9 In retrospect, my own 1995 comment that “discussions of the public domain 
which center on whether high quality reprints of classics cost more or less than 
cheaply produced mass market paperbacks trivialize the concept of the public 
domain by overlooking its more central function as the source to which the 
creative men and women of each generation turn for the materials they refashion 
into new and newly valuable works of imagination” may have been on the track, 
but read now it seems infuriatingly non-specific.  Likewise, it is sobering to 
reread David Lange’s beautiful 1981 article, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981),  which launched a thousand inquiries, and 
realize that it says almost nothing about the virtues of limited copyright as such 
(rather than the vices of supplementary pseudo-copyright in state law).  But see 
id. at 150 n.16–19. 
10 See Statement Of Copyright And Intellectual Property Law Professors In 
Opposition To H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, & S. 505, “The Copyright Term Extension 
Act,” from Dennis S. Karjala, Professor of Law, Arizona State University, to 
Comms. on the Judiciary of S. & H.R. 12–13 (Jan. 28, 1998), 
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/1
998Statement.html. 
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Extension Act was giving away physical exemplars of downloaded 
books (while encouraging others to follow suit).11  
This narrow, market-oriented understanding of the value of the 
public domain enabled, in turn, another set of tropes, in which the public 
domain was figured as a kind of information limbo in which neglected 
works linger precisely because nobody owns them.  Here’s Bruce 
Lehman, the Clinton administration’s “IP Czar,” in comfortable colloquy 
with Senator Mike DeWine (R-Ohio) in the run up to the CTEA, 
comprehensively missing the point about Shakespeare and the public 
domain:  
SEN. DEWINE: . . . Your contention . . . was that going into public 
domain is really not necessarily to the benefit of the consumer . . . 
How far do you take that? . . . .  
MR. LEHMAN: . . .  I can give you probably an example. I think 
that sometimes you go to book stores, and you will see very old 
films that have fallen into the public domain . . . [S]ome of those 
films you will see in a book store have been reissued and sold very 
cheaply as, you know, video cassettes maybe for $6 or $7 or 
something like that. That would be an advantage. But you have to 
balance that off by the fact that there are probably a lot more films 
that have been lost to the public forever and never reissued at all 
[nor] made available because nobody had the economic incentive to 
do so. 
SEN. DEWINE: To preserve them. 
MR. LEHMAN: That is right, to preserve them and to put them out. 
And I would also just say, if you think of your own behavior, if you 
go into a book store, there are lots of books—you know, 
Shakespeare is not under copyright anymore. Do you really see a 
big difference in price between the public domain stuff and the 
nonpublic domain stuff? Does that even enter into your 
consciousness as a consumer?12 
Representations of the public domain as a limbo of the unowned 
still pop up from time to time, but—as the political collapse of copyright 
 
11 For more on programmer/provocateur Eric Eldred and his Eldritch Press, see 
generally Eric Eldred, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Eldred 
(last visited on May 19, 2019). 
12 The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S. 
Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 38 (1995) (testimony of Hon. Bruce Lehman, 
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office); 
but see MARIE HALL ETS, JUST ME 12 (1965) (“‘Rabbit,’ I said.  [He didn’t have 
any name because nobody owned him.]”). 
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term extension demonstrates, they no longer dominate.  So what 
changed?  My speculative sketch of a tentative answer follows. 
Material objectification characterized not only millennial 
discussions of the public domain; it also marked emerging discourse 
about what came to be known as Internet policy—although we hadn’t yet 
even settled on a name for the thing itself.  It was “cyberspace” to those 
like John Perry Barlow, who were committed to its disembodied 
potentialities, and “the information superhighway” or (worse) the 
“National Information Infrastructure” to its would-be regulators.  
Although Barlow insisted in 1996 that “increasingly obsolete information 
industries would perpetuate themselves by proposing laws, in America 
and elsewhere, that claim to own speech itself throughout the world . . . 
[that] would declare ideas to be another industrial product, no more noble 
than pig iron.”13  (Or—he might have added—printed books.)  
Nevertheless, in the political debates of 1994–98, toward which he 
gestures here, the Internet was figured primarily as a complicated near-
frictionless system of virtual conduits for the distribution (or 
misappropriation) of finished content.14  Indeed, this portrayal continued 
to hold rhetorical sway when the Internet found itself under close judicial 
scrutiny for the first time in connection with the file-sharing wars of the 
 
13 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 18 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5, 6 (2019). 
14 Consider this, from the opening pages of the government report that started 
the trouble: 
The NII of tomorrow . . . will be much more than these separate 
communications networks; it will integrate them into an advanced high-
speed, interactive, broadband, digital communications system. 
Computers, telephones, televisions, radios, fax machines and more will 
be linked by the NII, and users will be able to communicate and 
interact with other computers, telephones, televisions, radios, fax 
machines and more—all in digital form. The NII has tremendous 
potential to improve and enhance our lives. It can increase access to a 
greater amount and variety of information and entertainment resources 
that can be delivered quickly and economically from and to virtually 
anywhere in the world in the blink of an eye. For instance, hundreds of 
channels of “television” programming, thousands of musical 
recordings, and literally millions of “magazines” and “books” can be 
made available to homes and businesses across the United States and 
around the world.  
White Paper, supra note 1, at 8 (citations omitted).  There are valuable near-
contemporary discussions of such figures of speech.  See RAYMOND GOZZI JR., 
THE POWER OF METAPHOR IN THE AGE OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA (1999); see also 
Annette N. Markham, Metaphors Reflecting and Shaping the Reality of the 
Internet: Tool, Place, Way of Being (2003) (unpublished paper) 
(https://annettemarkham.com/writing/MarkhamTPW.pdf). 
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early 2000’s.  Both foes and friends of Napster and its sequelae 
celebrated in, effect, the technology’s potency as a mode of distribution, 
rather than confronting its potential to build disembodied communities of 
interest(s).15 
Soon thereafter, the grip of this rhetoric on the public 
imagination began to loosen.  Thanks to sweeping changes in the way we 
think and talk about networked digital technology, no one ever again can 
refer to the Internet as a “series of tubes” without major risk of 
embarrassment.16  What once was viewed as a delivery system is now 
commonly figured as a space for virtual interaction and collaboration––
in accord with Barlow’s foundational vision.17  And it is this shift that (in 
turn) has enabled the emergence of what was for many a whole new way 
to think about the public domain: less as a repository for disregarded 
cultural cast-offs and more as a rich mine of source material.18  To those 
of us with an early inchoate sense of the potential value inherent in the 
unowned, it provided a new wealth of practical and appealing examples 
of why the public domain really mattered.  For others, direct experience 
online was a powerful teacher in its own right.  Either way, the trends 
 
15 Copyright scholars did this discussion no favors by generally conceding the 
issue of end-user infringement and focusing instead on the metes and bounds of 
secondary liability.  In retrospect, there was more space than we were then 
aware to discuss the application of fair use to at least some peer-to-peer sharing 
practices. 
16 Not an “Internet of Things” but the Internet as Thing.  See Cory Doctorow, 
Sen. Stevens’ Hilariously Awful Explanation of the Internet, BOING BOING (July 
2, 2006, 11:45 PM), https://boingboing.net/2006/07/02/sen-stevens-
hilariou.html. 
17 And, giving credit where credit is due, that of Howard Rheingold.  
Oxymoronically clashing title and sub-title notwithstanding, his book gave many 
of us a first glimpse of the future.  See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE 
VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (1993).   
18 Not that the old rhetoric ever vanished entirely from the scene.  In 2014, a 
New York Times article carried the following lead: 
They show up in discount DVD bins, or more often today online, 
sometimes looking a little worse for the wear. A general pall of 
darkness might cloud the image; the dialogue might be a bit tinnier than 
you remembered. Often the quality is not too shabby, though in the 
case of the web, it can be a surprise that they’re online at all. They’re 
films that have fallen out of copyright for one reason or another and 
must weather the wilds of the public domain. 
Nicolas Rapold, Even Good Films May Go to Purgatory, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/movies/old-films-
fall-into-public-domain-under-copyright-law.html. 
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thus set in motion led directly to the Great Legislative Nonevent of 
2018.19 
This broad and consequential shift began, I would suggest, with 
the availability of Web browsers and search engines, along with 
increased opportunities to cut, paste, and modify digital files using a 
growing host of applications and programs.  Before the early 1990s, 
taking creative advantage of the public domain entailed scouring 
physical collections in search of old information objects, investing time 
and money in transcribing them, and recasting them using skilled 
techniques that hadn’t changed dramatically in decades (if not centuries).  
But 1993 alone saw AOL offering access to the whole Internet to its 
users for the first time, the introduction of both the Mosaic browser and 
Photoshop 2.5; although flatbed scanner and OCR technology had been 
around since 1978, they became practically available to individual users 
only in the early 90s.  In addition to a proliferation of tools that enabled 
increasingly convenient exchange of digital files, the following decade 
would see accelerated progress in public access to information online.  
The Internet Archive, with its ever-expanding storehouse of material 
(including rich collections of public domain works) became searchable 
by the public in 2001, and catalogues of other digitized records followed; 
in 2003, both “Open WorldCat” and an online index of public domain 
titles digitized by Project Gutenberg were launched.  Within a few years 
of the CTEA’s enactment, the world in which this provision (and the rest 
of copyright law) had altered materially and irreversibly—just as Barlow 
had called it. 
The opening of the Internet did not, in itself, create or even first 
release the impulse to tinker with and recast found material for new 
purposes.  Elite writers and artists had been at it since Classical times,20 
and in the late twentieth century Vidders21 and Ziners22 making creative 
 
19 We might have known, had we been paying closer attention.  In 2001, the 
Digital Future Coalition, of which I had been an organizer, secured a small grant 
from the MacArthur Foundation to study “messaging” strategies for public 
interest campaigns around copyright policy.  The goal was to identify key words 
and concepts that might be deployed to counter the copyright industry’s very 
effective communications campaign.  We commissioned the Belden & 
Russonello strategic consulting firm to conduct a series of structured focus 
groups at sites across the U.S., and the results (never published nor, more’s the 
pity, systematically implemented) were clear: the tropes of “freedom” and 
“choice” had the potential to trump “piracy” and “property.” 
20 See, e.g., Cento: Poetic Form, POETS.ORG (Feb. 20, 2014), 
https://poets.org/text/cento-poetic-form. 
21 See Morgan Dawn, A History of Vidding, VIDELICET, 
https://vidders.github.io/articles/vidding/history.html (last visited May 18, 2019) 
(“Vidding is communal poetry . . . .”). 
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(and painstaking) use of analog technology showed the way.  Internet 
access did radically enlarge the population of people with the tools to 
express that impulse.  In so doing, it also expanded practical appreciation 
for what could be done with diverse source material, including the rich 
trove that is the public domain.23   
Of course, there is more to the story.  All honor goes to those 
who, in the dark years after the CTEA’s enactment, kept the flame of the 
public domain alive.  The Eldred litigation itself, however unlikely of 
conventional success, clearly raised levels of public awareness about the 
issue, particularly among Internet users.  The attention, in turn, energized 
a powerful and persistent trope in which responsibility for term extension 
was laid squarely at the feet of the Mouse-You-Love-to-Hate; despite its 
tendency to obfuscate the real stakes and the forces actually at work,24 
the meme had enormous power as an organizing tool.  Essential books 
like Laurence Lessig’s Free Culture (2004) and Remix (2008), or James 
Boyle’s The Public Domain:  Enclosing the Commons of the Mind 
(2008), made indelible contributions, as has Duke University Law 
School’s Center for the Study of the Public Domain (directed by Jennifer 
Jenkins).  Beginning in 2005, campaigns to raise awareness of the 
“orphan works” problem that term extension did so much to exacerbate, 
although they ultimately brought no legislative relief, had the secondary 
effect of helping to refigure the public domain as a rich granary rather 
than a run-down Roach Motel. 
In an environment marked by ubiquitous high-speed Internet 
connectivity, 200 million active websites, and a vast array of information 
tools, the Web hasn’t brought us everything we hoped—and has brought 
much we might never have wished to see.  Ultimately, though, it was the 
Internet itself that came to the rescue of copyright’s open spaces.  In this 
at least, John Perry Barlow’s organic vision of cyberspace has been 
realized. 
 
22 See A Brief History of Zines, DUKE UNIV. LIBRARIES, 
https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/findingdb/zines/timeline/ (last visited May 
18, 2019). 
23 The ease with which information can be retrieved and repurposed online is not 
restricted to material that is out of copyright.  In fact, the forces at work behind 
the markup in the cultural value of copyright-free material also helped to drive 
the transformation of the fair use doctrine from 1994 onwards.  See generally, 
PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT 
BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT (2d. ed. 2018).  
24 In fact, the music industry was more vocal and effective in pushing for the 
CTEA.  
A DECLARATION OF THE MISSION OF 
UNIVERSITY IN BARLOWSPACE1 
CHARLES R. NESSON 
Universities and schools, on behalf of future generations, I ask 
you to preserve space for freedom of mind into the future. Only in such 
shared mindspace will human liberty of thought survive.   
John Perry Barlow, in his A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace, spoke presciently of this very space––‘Cyberspace is the 
mind space.’ Barlow claimed self-sovereignty in mind space for himself 
and for all of us.  
The exercise of free mind space requires trust. But trust is not an 
inherent feature of the open net. We must find and build trust within 
closed classrooms within the wider environment of the open net. Unless 
the cyberspace of our future contains interior closed spaces in which 
human trust and freedom of mind can live, truth as we have known it will 
not survive.  
  The great universities and schools of the world supported by 
philanthropy made it their mission to build free mind space in the past. 
They must make it their mission to build and preserve this space for truth 
into the future. In Barlow’s vision, they must build “a civilization of the 
Mind in Cyberspace.”  
Contrast Barlow’s vision with Lessig’s. Lessig’s cyberspace is 
exogenous, a universe of forces building an ever-tightening internet 
surrounding and constraining us. Lessig looks out into this dystopian 
world from the vantage of a ‘pathetic red dot,’ targeted and being 
crushed by forces of outside control. Lessig is not wrong to be worried. 
But his focus is the wide-open net.  
Barlow’s cyberspace is interior to Lessig’s red dot. Within that 
space, we in the universities can create a free mind space for aspiring self 
sovereign individuals, students of law and the humanities. From the 
viewpoint of a university in pursuit of truth, we can envision the red dot 
as anything but pathetic. In classrooms, students can be insulated from 
and protected from the surveillance and distrust of the open net. They 
can speak their minds and experience themselves as self-sovereign. 
 
1 Also available as Charles R. Nesson, A Declaration of the Dependence of 
Barlowspace, https://cyber.harvard.edu/eon/BarlowSpace.html (last visited July 
31, 2019).  
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  In our university settting, we come together to seek truth. We 
feel subjectively, individually, that we know what is true and good. We 
feel justice in our hearts but we are also aware that others differ. In our 
classrooms, we can subscribe to a common quest for the resolution of 
difference through free discussion. Our mission must become not just 
knowledge transfer but the experience of recognizing and transcending 
bias. Universities must evince and protect their faith in the search for 
truth through freedom of mind.  
Until now, our universities’ focus has been on the open net.  
Their research has created wealth in the marketplace and surveillance 
tools for government. Now is the time to balance concern for the 
crumbling hearsay truth of the open net by look inside, reframing the 
experiential learning process for students as they grow into the new 
cyber world.  
  Reification of free mindspace for student minds to grow is 
critical to preserving truth into the future. If we teach our children how to 
communicate with each other, they will accomplish more in solving the 
problems they address. The creation of Barlowspace lies within 
University domain. The development of framework and code-platform 
for intercommunication among students and faculty is and must be a 
university-led research-and-development construction project.  
How can university intensify student learning experience so as to 
express and teach self-sovereignty? What is its spirit? How can it be 
maintained in the face of corrupting force?  Answer: By creating Barlow 
space classrooms––spaces protected within a respected boundary of self-
imposed constraint.  Barlowspace classrooms will preserve freedom of 
mind.  
Many who loved John Perry Barlow and put faith in his vision 
feel disappointingly overwhelmed by the Lessigian world. To find 
freedom of mind amid the enveloping surveillance and lurking trolls of 
the open net has proven to be more difficult than many expected.  The 
game is not over.  Create space for freedom of mind NOW. Let us call it 
Barlowspace in his honor. 
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